

# GODS LOVE TO MANKIND.

MANIFESTED,  
By Dis-prooving his Absolute  
Decree for their Dam-  
nation.

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*Hez. 13. 9.*

*O Israel thou hast destroyed thy selfe : but in me is thy  
help.*

*Wisd. 1. 12, 13.*

*Seek not Death in the error of your life ; and pall not upon  
your selves destruction, with the works of your hands.*

*For God made not death : neither hath he pleasure in the  
destruction of the Living.*

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# TO LOVE GODS MANKIND

By D. G. Bowring His Apology  
Desire for their Due  
Honor.



Лекция 10

TO THE READER.

He Author of this Treatise was  
perswaded to Pen the reasons  
of his opinion against absolute  
Reprobation, that he might satisfie a  
worthy friend of his, who required it.  
VVhat satisfaction that learned Gentleman,  
his friend, hath received by  
these reasons, I know not: but sure I  
am, they have given good content to  
some others, who have read them, and  
doe still desire a Copie of them for  
their further use. To ease whose paines  
in transcribing this Treatise, it doth  
now appeare in this forme. If any of  
contrary opinion, shall undertake to  
answer or refute it; I wish, he would  
set downe his opinion and reasons with  
that perspicuitie and modestie, that our

To THE READER.

Author set downe his. Such a course  
of disputing will gaine more credit to  
himself and his cause, then volu-  
minous Vagaries about impertinent  
things. If any shall use railing speeches,  
or unnecessary diversions from the  
cause; I shall ever interpret that to be  
a strong signe of a weake cause: or, at  
least, I shall think it to be an argument  
of an obstinate minde, who neither  
knoweth how to yeeld to the Truth,  
nor to defend his error. I hope the  
Reader, who loveth his owne salva-  
tion, will be a more indifferent Judge in  
a question, which concerneth him so  
nearly. And so I leave him to Gods  
blessing.

Faults escaped in the Triology

list.	for	reads	pag.	list.	for	reads
1	slaying	Say.	52	16	slg. God,	slg. the God,
2	threching,	threching,	53	20	transgressions,	transgressions,
3	of speculatiue,	of certain speculatiue,	56	12	fault of nature,	fault of our nature,
4	which they,	which, thus they.	60	10	as usque miseri,	as usque miseri,
5	by this,	besides this.	27	10	flow of anger,	flow to anger,
6	second,	secondly.	62	8	thence,	thence,
7	Power,	Power.	63	2	salvific,	salvific
8	to err,	to the error.	65	5	compatible,	incompatible,
9	scapte,	escapeit.	66	4	and mercy,	and his mercy,
10	soveraignt power,	soveraignt & power	70	34	sublapsaratus,	sublapsaratus;
11	of God is,	in God of,	71	6	if had,	if had.
12	gavy,	gave.	73	9	De natus.	De natura Del.
13	sharp or sensibl,	sharp and sensibl.	75	31	commanded,	commanded.
14	andam,	accens.	79	6	which bears,	which bare.
15	other things,	other finnes.	81	4	God is,	yet God is;
16	that he hath,	, he hath.	82	37	sacrificing himself,	sacrificing of himself,
17	Wicked.	(3) Wicked,	89	37	to what use,	of what use,
18	3. this,	(2)	95	37	the end of,	the end than of;
19	3. a	1	99	32	the upbraids,	he may upbraid,
20	6. (1)	put to.	103	32	selfe,	selfes.
21	7. put to,	rigide.	104	5	negligen.	negligen.
22	3. rigide,	swimme, or any.	ibid.	34	for the whole world,	for the finnes of the
23	swimme, any	any other outragious.			whole world,	whole world.
24	any outragious,	(2) Nor			thou art one of them	thou art one of them
25	Nor	Works, sayth this.			they were lost, & then	they were lost, & then
26	Works, this	more harsh.			art one of the whole	art one of the whole
27	most harsh,	excluded from.			world.	world.
28	included from				my lot to be,	my lot not to be,

Faults escaped in the Margent.

list.	for	reads	pag.	list.	for	reads
1	Brand.	Brand.	43	(s)	injustitiae,	injustitiae.
2	(b) par.	par.	(s)	adv. 2.	adv. b. ref.	adv. b. ref.
3	(c) Iustiz.	Iustiz.	44	(w)	cas. 2.	cas. 2.
4	(r) ad obj.	ad obj. 7.	49		Heb. 10, 20,	Heb. 10, 38,
5	id ad eo.	ideo.	50	(s)	aptrum,	aptrum.
6	(m) credere,	credere	57	(s)	Ecclesiam, spiritu.	Ecclesiam spiritu.
7	ausam.	ausam.	(s)		ipsamque,	ipsamque.
8	Jonah, 4. 22.	Jonah, 4. 2.	66		§ 23.	§. 7.
9	(t) Epist. Job,	Epist. 106.	67	(d)	cum dicimus,	cum dicimus,
10	pred pag.	pred. pag.	81	(p)	delationem,	delationem.
11	(i) pag. 106.	pag. 19, thef.	87	(s)	quo,	quo.
12	(u) illustrandum,	illustrandum.			etiam exercitatur,	exercitatur;
13	Reprobri.	Reprobi.	89	(s)	debit,	debit.
14	(q) v. 18.	cap. 18.	(s)		controllum,	controllum,
15	(t) deficiens.	deficiat.	90	(s)	a contredic.	de contredic.
16	Infilt. lib. 14,	lib. 4.	97	(s)	proterrum,	proterrum.
17	6. 2.	dele cap. 2.	101	(q)	sumusque.	sumusque.



# GODS LOVE TO MANKIND.

SIR,

 Have sent you here the reasons, which have moved me to change my opinion in some controversies of late debated betweene the Remonstrants and their Opposites.

I do the rather present them unto you.

1 That I may shew the due respect which I beare your Worship with my forwardnesse to answer your desires, as I can with regard to conscience.

2 That you may see that I dissent not without cause, but have reason on my side.

3 That if I can be convinced that my grounds are weak and insufficient, I may thinke better of the opinion which I have forsaken, then I can for the present.

In the delivery of my motives I will proceed in this order.

1 I will state the opinion which I dislike.

2 I will lay downe my reasons against it.

Touching the first, your Worship knoweth these two things very well.

1 That the mayne *controversy* and question in these controversies, and that on which the rest do hang, is what the decrees of God are touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered.

2 That the men who have disputed these things, may be reduced to two sorts and sides.

The first side affirmeth, that there is *an absolute and peremptory decree* proceeding from the alone pleasure of God, without any consideration of mens finall impenitency and unbelief; by which God casteth men off from grace and glory, and shutteth up the farre greater part, (even of those that are called by the preaching of the Gospell to repentence and salvation) under invincible and unavoidable sinnes and damnation.

A *shorte and easie waye to conveine The*

## The Question staled.

The other side disavowing any such decree, saying, that God's decree of casting men off for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sinne and unbelife, both avoydable by grace, and consequently inferring no mans damnation necessarily.

The first side is devided, for

1 Some of them present man to God in the decree of reprobation look't on out of, or above the fall: and say,

That God of his meere pleasure antecedent to all sinne in the creature, original or actual, did decree to gloriſe his ſovereignty and justice in the eternall rejeſtion and damnation of the greatest part of mankind, as the end; and in their unavoydable ſinne and impenitency, as the meaneſ. And this way goe *Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Piscator, Gomarus,* and ſome of our owne Countrimen.

2 The reſt of that ſide, thinking to avoyd the great inconveniences, to which that *supralapsarian* way lyeth open, fall downe a little lower, and present man to God in his decree of Reprobation, lying in the fall and vnder the guilt of original ſinne, ſaying,

That God looking vpon miserable mankind lying in *Adams* ſinne, did decree the greatest number of men (even thoſe men whom he calls to repenteſce and ſalvation by the preaching of the Gospell) to hell torments for ever, and without all remedy, for the declaration of his ſevere justice. This way went the Synod.

The diſference between them is not much, and even in their own account too ſmall a diſcord to cauſe a breach. Notwithſtanding this petty diſference therefore, they agree well enough together, as we may ſee in the *Hague* conference and Synod.

In the conference at *Hague*, the Contraremonſtrants have theſe words; (a) *As touching the diſverſitie of opiniſons in this argument, viz. that God looks at man in this decree, not yet created, or created and fallen: because this belongs not to the foundation of this doctrine; we do in Christian equity bear with one another.*

After this in the Synod at *Dort*, they permitted *Gomarus* to ſet downe his judgement in the upper way. And the Delegates of *South-Holland* were very indiſferent which

(a) *Col. Hag.*  
*Brandi: pag. 37.*  
*Quoad ſententiarum*  
*diſverſitatem in hoc*  
*argumento, quod de-*  
*us reſpexit hominem*  
*in hoc decreto non*  
*duum creatum, vel cre-*  
*atum & lapsum; quia hoc ad*  
*fundamentum*  
*hujus doſtrinæ non*  
*penitit, libenter alij*  
*alios æquitate Chri-*  
*ſtianam toleramus.*

which way they tooke : For these are their words, (b) Whether God in choosing, considered men as fallen, or else as not fallen : They (the Delegates of South-Holland) think it is not necessary to be determined ; so it bee held, that God in choosing, considered men in a like estate. (c) Macovius also Professor of Divinity at Franeker, a violent and fierce maintainer of the most unsavoury speeches, which have beeene uttered in this Controversie, and one that undertooke in the very Synod to make good against Lubbert his fellow Professor, that God did (d) With sinnes, ordaine men to sinne, and would not at all, that all men bee saved : and besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that Except these things were hold and maintained by them, they could not possibly keepe their owne ground, but must come over to the Remonstrants. This man was not onely not censured, but publickly declared in the Synod to be pure and Orthodox, and dismissed onely with this kinde and friendly admonition : that hee should hereafter take heed of such words, as might give offence to tender eares, and could not well dwone with those, who are yet uncapable of such Mafferies.

By these instances it appeareth, that they of the first side can easily beare one with another in this difference. And (to say the truth) there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance. For they both contend,

1 That the moving-cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man, Originall, or Actuall.

2 That the finall impenitency and damnation of Reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by Gods absolute Decree.

These two things are the [maxima gravamina] principal grievances that the other side sticke at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way.

Both these opinions of the first side I dislike.

My reasons why, are of two sorts ;

1 Such as first made me to question the truth.

2 Such as convince me of their untruth.

(b) *Acta syn. per. 31*  
pag. 48. An Deus in  
elegero consideraverit  
homines vel lapsos, an  
etiam ut nondum  
lapsos ; existimant  
non esse necessarium,  
ut definatur ; modis  
stipulatur Deum in  
eligendo considerasse  
homines in pari statu.

(c) *Antidot. Remon-  
str. pag. 32.*

(d) *Velle peccata,  
ordinare homines ad  
peccatum, quid pecca-  
tum, & neutiquam  
velle, ut omnes ho-  
mines salventur, &c.*

MY reasons of the first sort doe indifferently respect  
and make against both, and I will set them downe  
against both together.

My second sort of reasons I will divide, delivering  
some of them against the upper and more rigid way, o-  
thers against the lower and more moderate way.

I begin with those reasons, which first moved me to  
question the truth of absolute Reprobation, as it is taught  
both wayes.

They are these foure, which follow.

1. Reason,

*Novity.*

The *Novity* of this opinion. Absolute and inevita-  
ble Reprobation hath little or no footing in Antiquity. The  
upper way was never taught or approved by any of the  
Fathers ( even the stoutest defenders of grace against the  
*Pelagians* ) for the space of 600 ( I may say 800 ) yeares  
after CHRIST : nor the lower way till the time of St.  
*Austin*, which was about 400 yeares after CHRIST. They  
did generally agree upon the contrary conclusion, & taught  
men in their times,

That it was *possible* for them to be saved, which in the  
event were not saved ; and to have repented which repen-  
ted not : and that there was no Decree of God, which did  
lay a *necessity* of perishing upon any sonne of *Adam*. This  
that I say, Mr. *Calvin* himselfe doth freely acknowledge,  
speaking of Election and Reprobation according to Gods  
fore-knowledge : ( e ) *This commonly received opinion*  
( saith he ) *of a conditionall respective Decree* ) *is not the*  
*opinion only of the common people*, *but hath had great au-*  
*thores in all ages*. Reverend *Bizs* likewise speaking of the  
same opinion, hath these words to the same purpose :

( f ) *Into which surely most foule error Origen hath driven*  
*many of the Ancients both Greeke and Latin*. To the same  
effect also *Prosper* ( *St. Austin's follower* ) *hath a remark-*  
*able speech*. ( g ) *Almost all the Ancients* ( saith he ) *did*  
*grant with one consent*, *that God decreed mens ends according*  
*ad Aug prope fiam*.

Penitentia patet inveniri & unum sententiam, quā propositum & prædestinationem defi-  
secundū n præscientiam receperat s. ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa consumet, alios honoris vasa  
fecerit; quā fine uniuscujus præridet, & sub ipso gracie adiutorio, in qui futurus esse vo-  
luntate & actione præscient.

## The Absolute Decree questioned.

to his fore-sight of their actions, and not otherwise. To these speeches let me adde that of *Remigius* Archbishop of *Lyon*, who to *Rabanus* Archbishop of *Mener*, objecting that St. *Austin* wrote a booke called *Hypognosticon*, against *Pelagius* and *Calestius*, wherein he denied that *Reprobates* were properly (b) [ *prædestinati ad interitum* ] *predestinates* to destruction; answere that St. *Austin* said not so: but some other man (as it is supposed) to purge the Church of that calumny, which some ill affected ones did cast upon it: namely, that it taught, that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, did withdraw the Word ( *Predestination* ) from the point of *Reprobates*, and gave it only to the *Elect*, and so gave great occasion of further error and mistake. In this speech of his is clearely implied, that it was the constant doctrine of the Church then, that *Reprobates* lye under no necessitating Decree of Perdition.

The truth of this charge may further appeare by a few particular instances.

*Minutius Felix* brings in the *Paganas* objecting to the Christians, that they held the events of all things to be inevitable, and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoydable Destinies, not their illchoyses. This is the Objection: (i) *Whatsoever we do, as others to fate, so you ascribe to God: you make therefore to your selves an unjust God, who punishment in men their lot, not their will.* To this he answere, (k) Christians hold no other Fates, then Gods Decrees; who (l) foreknowing all men and their actions, did accordingly determine their retributions.

St. *Hierom* an eager opposer of the *Pelagians*, in many places of his Writings saith the same thing; (m) *From the fore-knowledge of God is commeth to passe, that who he knowest will be righteous, him he loveth before he commeth out of the wombe; and who he knoweth will be a sinner, him he hateth before he sinneth.* In another place he speaketh to the same purpose, (n) *The love and hatred of God, ariseth either from the fore-sight of future things, or from the Workes; otherwise we know that God loveth all things, nor durst he hate any thing that he hath made.* And in his booke against *Pelagius* he saith (o) [ *Eligit Dens quem bonum cernit* ] *God chooseth whom he seeth to be good.*

(b) *Vsb. bsp. Gorci*  
pag. 107.

(i) *Min. Felix* pag.  
32. *Quicquid agi-  
mus, ut alii fato, iea-  
vos Deo addicimus: in-  
iquum igitur deum  
singitis, qui sortem  
in hominibus puniat,  
non voluntatem.*

(k) *Illud fatum est,*  
*quod de unoquoque  
Deus fatus est.*

(l) *Min. Felix* p 116  
*Qui cum universam  
p[ro]p[ri]etatem materiam, pro  
meritis & qualitatibus  
singulorum etiam  
fata determinat, & ita  
in his non geni-  
tura p[re]dicta, sed in  
genii natura punitur.*

(m) *Hier. ad Galate-*  
e. 1. v. 15. *Ex p[re]-  
scientia dei evenit sub  
quem justum futu[rum]  
scit, prius diligit, qua[rum]  
oriatur ex altero, &  
quem peccatorem, q[ui]  
derit antisquam pec-  
cerit.*

(n) *Ad e. 1. Malae.*  
*Dilectio & odium  
det, vel ex p[re]scien-  
tia nascitur futu[rum]  
vel ex operibus; alio-  
quin novimus quod  
omnia Deus diligit,  
nec quicquam eorum  
oderit quia creavit.*

(o) *Lib. 3. contr. Pe-  
lag.*

## The Absolute Decree questioned.

The summe of all which speeches is but this, that there is no decree of damning or saving men, but what is built upon Gods fore-knowledge of the evill and good actions of men. *Fulgentius* is plaine for it too : (p) *Ib[is]c[re]t Whom God fore-saw Would dye in sinne, he decreed should live in endless punishment.* I may take in St. *Austin* and *Propper* also, who are judged to be the Patrons of the absolute decree, as it is set downe the *Sublapsarian* way : even they doe many times let fall such speeches, as cannot fairely be reconciled with absolute Reprobation.

I will onely cite *Propper* (for St. *Austin* speakes in him) he discoursing of some that fall away [ à *Sanctitate ad immunditium*] from *Holiness* to *uncleanness*, faith (q) *They that fall away from holiness to uncleanness, lye not under a necessity of perishing, because they were not predestinate ; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were foreknowne to be such by voluntary prevarication.*

Not long after speaking of the same men he saith. (r) *Because God foresaw they would perish by their owne free-will ; therefore he did not by any predestination sever them from the children of perdition.* And againe in his answer to the 13th, Objection, he hath these words ; (s) *God hath not withdrawne from any man ability to yeld obedience, because he hath not predestinated him : but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience, therefore he hath not predestinated him.*

I will flout up mine instances of that Age with the judgment of the councell at *Arles* against the *Pelagians* in the yeare 490, or thereabout. This councell subscribed to the letter which was written by *Fausius* against *Lucidus* the Predestinarian, and made the *Anathemas* and curses, which therein he denounceth against him and such like to be their own : Some of which were these (t) *Cursed be he that shall say that the man that perisheth, might not have been saved : and againe, (u) Cursed be the man that shall say that a vessel of dishonour, may not rise to be a vessel of honour.*

A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some persons of note, and those St. *Austins* followers too, who lived about 400 years after St. *Austins* time. *Remigius* the great patron of *Gotschalk* the zealous preacher and public

(p) *Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Nonimum.* *Quos præscivit deus hanc vitam in peccato terminaturos prædestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos.*

(q) *Prosp. ad obj. 3. Gall.* *Non ex concessitate percuti habu. runt, quia prædestinati non sunt, sed ideo prædestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntaria prævaricatione prædicti sunt.*

(r) *Proper resp. ad Obj.* *Quia illos ruituros propriâ voluntate præscivit, ob hoc à filiis perditionis nulla prædestinatione discrevit.*

(s) *Ib. resp. ad Obj. 12* *Vires obedienciarum non ideo cuiquam subtraxit, quia cum non prædestinavit ; sed quia recessurum ab ipsa obediencia esse prævidit, ideo cum non prædestinavit.*

(t) *Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui perire non accepisse ut salvus esse possit.*

(u) *Anathema illi qui dixerit, quod vas consumeliz non possit assurgere ut sit vas in honorem.*

## The Absolute Decree questioned.

7

there her of absolute reprobation in those times) in his answer  
is built to that epistle, which we suppose to be the Epistle of Rabanus; to Rabanus saying, that God did (w) make the nations  
Whom the world heathfull, and that he doth [vello omnes homi-  
in eud- nes salvos fieri] will that all men be saved; he gives such  
er also, answer as cannot stand with absolute Reprobation;  
ecree, (x) This (saith he) is very true, because God layeth on no  
the ma- man a necessity of perishing, as he hath layd on none a necessity of  
recon- sinning. And a little after he is plainer, (y) Those whom  
him) God did foreknow would live and dye in their Wickednesse, for  
d imp- reasons most just be decreed should perish, as himselfe saith, Him  
They which sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my booke.  
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(w) Bishop Usher  
bif. Gott. p. 53. &  
54. Sanabiles facere  
nationes orbis terra-  
rum.

(x) Et hoc omnino  
verum est, quia ne-  
mini deus imponit  
necessitatem peren-  
di, sicut nemini impo-  
nit necessitatem male-  
agendi.

(y) Quos verissime  
prespicit impios &  
iniquos futuros & in-  
suam impietate & ini-  
quitate permauersos,  
justis & rectissimis de-  
causis decrevit, statuit,  
& praedestinavit peri-  
turos, sicut ipse ait,  
Qui peccaverit mibi,  
ipsum delebo de libo  
meo.

(z) Can. 2. Necipso  
malos idem perire,  
quia boni esse non  
potuerunt, sed quia  
boni esse noluerunt,  
suoque vito in massa  
damnationis, vel meri-  
tito originali vel etiā  
actuali permauerunt.

(a) Can. 3. Verum a  
liquos ad malum pra-  
destinatos esse divisa  
potestate, ut aliud esse  
non possint, non sicut  
non credimus, sed e-  
tiam si sunt, qui tan-  
tum malum credere  
velint, cum omni de-  
testatione, sicut Aran-  
sia Synodus, illis Ac-  
nathemadiciimus.

2 Reason,  
Unwillingnesse to  
be tryed.

*The Absolute Decree questioned.*

thereto by their chiefe Magistrates, who might have compelled them: a shrewd argument (mee thinks) that it is too light.

In the disputation at Mompelgart, anno 1586 held between *Berza* and *Jacobus Andrea*, with some seconds on both sides, *Berza* and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the Person of CHRIST and the Lords supper, when they came to this poynt, did decline the sifting of it, and gave this reason among others, that it could not then be publiquely disputed of (b) without the great scandal and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries. (c) The contraremonstrants also in their Conference with the opposite parties at the Hague in the yeare 1611, could not be drawne to dispute with them about this poynt, but delivered a petition to the States of Holland and West Friezeland, that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the conference, then to meddle with it.

In the Synod likewise at *Dort*, in the yeares 1618 and 1619, the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod (d) That they should rather dispute of the point of Election, then the odious paine of Reprobation.

Can this Doctrine be a truth and yet blush at the light, which maketh all things manifest? Especially considering these things:

1 That Reprobation is a principall head of Divinity, by the well or ill stating and ordering of which, the glory of God and the good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.

2 That there is such a necessary connexion betweene the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of Prædestination) that the one cannot well bee handled without the other.

3 That the Doctrine of Reprobation was the chiefe cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time.

4 That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falsehood; and therefore bound in Justice to purge it selfe of the crimination.

5 That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of among the common people, who might

(b) *Berzae Coll.*  
*Mompel* pa. 373. Sine  
gravi coruus off. ndi-  
culo, qui tanti myste-  
rii capaces non sunt.  
(c) *Braud. Col. Hag.*  
pa. 57.

(d) *Acta Syn. per 1.*  
pa. 133. Ut de electi-  
one potius quam de  
odiola Reprobationis  
materia agerent.

might have stumbled at it; but disputed of among the judicious and learned, who (as the threshing Oxen which were to beat the corne out of the huske) are to bolt out those truths which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures.

That the doctrine which is loth to abide the tryall even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falsehood, the Heathen Orator shall witnesse for me; who to *Epicurus* saying that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people, who might happily take offence at it, answere thus; (e) *Declare thine opinion in the place of judgement, or if thou art afraid of the assembly there, declare it in the Senate-house, among those grave and judicious persons. Thou wile never doe it; and why? but because it is a foul and dishonest opinion.*

This striving to lye close, is (peradventure) no infallible argument of a bad cause, yet it is a very probable one. For true Religion (as *Vives* saith) is not a thing gilded over, but gold it selfe; the more that's scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlyer it is, and so is the truth. (f) *Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more then silence can: let's not feare therefore (saith he) to lay our Faith when it is layd open, appeare shelye to the eyes of beholders.* (g) *Let false and Superficiall religions, in which there is no sound effect, be afraid of this.*

The Jew is loth to reason with the Christian touching his Law; and the Turke is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran: because their Religions are brittle, like glasse broken with the least touch. But the Christian (h) who is confident of the goodness of his Faith, fearest no examination, but rather as much as may be, solicith and provoketh his Adversary to the combat.

Truth whether it be in men or doctrines, is best, when it is uncovered; it covets no corners, though error doe; but is willing to abide the tryall. (i) *Search me O Lord and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts: and see if there be any way of wickednesse in me;* saith the Prophet David, knowing his heart to be without guile. And our Saviour telleth us, (k) *that every one that doth evil, hateth the light, and commeth not to it; his deeds should be repro-*

(e) *Cicer. de fin. bon. & malorum, l. 2 pag. 115. Aut tu eadem ista dic in judicio, ne si coronam times, dic in Senatu. Nunquam facies. Cur nisi quod turpis est oratio.*

(f) *Vives de veritate fidei, l. 1. p 15. Patriorem ac nitidorem illam reddit bellum, quam pax adversus gentes.*

(g) *Metuant hoc alii religiones false & umbrales.*

(h) *Vives l. 4 page 479. Qui veritate fuit fidit, nihil refutat examen ingenii: inquit ad vocat, & quantum potest, excauit.*

(i) *Psal. 139.23.24*

(k) *Ioh. 3. 20, 21.*

Titus 3, 11:

ved; but he that dasheth rough, commeth to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. As St. Paul sayth of an Heretique, he is [ *αύροχαρακτήρες* ] *Selfe-condemned*; so we may say of Heresie and untruth; it condemneth it selfe, and by nothing more, than by refusing the touchstone. He is to be thought an empty Scholler, who is loth to be apposed; and his gold to bee light and counterfeit, who will not have it toucht and weighed, and those opinions to be but errors, which would so willingly walke in a mist, and dwell in silence, when it concerneth the peace of the Church so much to have them examined.

3. Reason.  
*Infamy.*

(1) *Molin. Anat.*  
*Arm. c. 12. de Pred.*

(m) *Quia enunciata*  
*injiciunt scrupulos,*  
*& aiam præbēt ad-*  
*versariis infamandi*  
*veram Religionem.*

Sir Edwin Sandys:  
pag. 372.

3. The *Infamy* of it. It is an opinion (especially as it is defended the upper way) odious to the Papists, opening their foule mouthes against our Church and Religion; abhorred (mainteyned eyther way) by all the Lutherans: who for this very Tenet call us damned Calvinists, thinke usunworthy to be above ground, and in their writings protest, that they will rather unite themselves to the Papists then to us. And it is also distastfull to all the Greeke Churches, which are very many. *Molin* in his *Anatomic*, speaking of the *Supralapsarian* Doctrine, sayth (1) If it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the confideration of sinne, or hath ordayne them to sinne; yet it is the part of a wise man to conceale these things, or not to know them, rather then to utter them; (m) *Because when they are caught and defended they fill mens heads with scruples, and give occasion to the Adversaries of defaming the true Religion.* The same may as truly be sayd of the *Sublapsarian* way. For (as I have sayd) they are in substance all one. And Sir *Edwyn Sandys* is of the same minde too. For in his most excellent Booke called a *Survey of the State of Religion in the Westerne parts of the World*, Speaking of the deadly division betweene the Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany, he hath these words. That though the *Palgrave and Landgrave* have with great judgment and Wisdome, to aslakē these flames, imposed silence in that part to the *Ministers of their party*, hoping the charity and discretion of the other party, would have done the like; yet it falleth out otherwise. For both the *Lutheran Preachers rayle* as bitterly *against*

against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as great detestation, not forbearing to pro-  
fesse openly, that they will returne to the Papacie, rather then  
ever admit that Sacramentary and predefinatory Pestilence.

For these two points are the ground of the quarrell, and the  
latter more scandalous at this day, then the former. And in  
the same book, pag. 194. and 198. speaking of men whom  
he commendeth for singular learning and piety (whose iudg-  
ment he so sets down as that he declareth it to be his own)  
he sayth, that they think it were no blemish for the reformed  
Doctors to revise their doctrines, and to abate the risoar of  
speculative opinions, (for so he is pleased to call them) espe-  
cially touching the eternall decrees of God: wherein some of  
their chief authors have run into such an extreme to all Ro-  
mish doctrine, as to have exceedingly scandalized all other  
Churches wthall, yea and many of their own to ref very ill sa-  
tisfied.

At the closing up of the conference at Montpelgat, when  
Frederick Earle of Wortenberg exhorted his Divines to  
acknowledge Boza and his company for brethren, and to  
declare it by giving them their hand; they utterly refused,  
saying they would pray to God to open their eyes, and  
would doe them any office of humanity and charity, but  
they would not give them the right hand of brotherhood,  
because they were proved to be guilty [*errorum terribilium,]* of most pestilent errors, among which they reckon'd  
for one.

Hemingius left his own fide and joyned with us in the  
poynt of the Sacrament: but he would come no nearer,  
manteyning alwayes a distance in this.

And as for the Grecians, we learne also by Sir Edwin <sup>pag. 237.</sup>  
Sandys his relation, that they doe mightily differ from  
that doctrine touching the eternall counsels of God, which Cal-  
vin (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced  
into the Christian world; and since, some of his friends and fol-  
lowers have seconded; as thinking it very injurious to the good-  
ness of God, and directly and immediately opposite to his very  
nature. In regard of which, one of their Bish. ps hath written  
a Booke against it, which hath been sent to Geneva and there  
recoured.

*Coll. Momp. pa. 566.*  
*567 Ofand. His. Ec.*  
*clie/ pa. 1040. Cem.*  
*16.*

*The absolute Decree questioned.*

It is a morsell which the greatest part of Christian Churches cannot swallow: and therefore (I think) it should not very easily without suspicion downe with us.

And to say one thing more; by this *infamy* of it among Christians, it is very probable, that among the too many scandals given to the Jewes by Christians, among whom they dwell; this doctrine is not one of the least rubs in the way of their conversion. For they think it a bad opinion (sayes the same iudicious and learned Gentleman) Which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreme miserie of any of his Creatures for the shewing of his justice and severity in tormenting them; or that the calamity, casting away and damnation of some should absolutely and necessarily redonnd more to his glory, than the felicity of them all, considering that his nature is mere goodness and happiness, and hath no affinity with rigour or misery. This is my third reason.

Reason, 4.  
*Affinity to Fate.*

The fourth, It's affinity with the olde exploded errors of the Stoicks and Manichees.

The opinion of the Stoicks was, that all actions and events were unavoydable, determined either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of such starres as raigned at mens births, or by the concatenation of naturall things and the disposition of the first matter, all things being so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another, as it doth; and the [*prima materia*] being so disposed, that things cannot successively come to passe otherwise then they doe, but must of necessity be as they are, even [*in via deo*] though God would have some things to be otherwise then they are.

The Manichees held, that all mens actions, good or evill were determined too: good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things that were created, and of all good actions that came to passe in the world; Evill actions by an evill God who was the [*primum principium mali*] the prime author of all evill things or actions that were extant in the world.

The Maintainers of the Absolute Decree do say one of these two things, either that all actions naturall and morall, good and evill, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary

necessary ; so the Supralapsarians : or that all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills ; so the Sublapsarians. And this is upon the matter all one with the former. For first, in vaine is our freedome in the actions and meanes, if the end at which they drive, be pitched and determined ; sith all actions are for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not. And second, the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that precede that end ; as if a man be fore-determined to damnation, he must unavoidably sinne, else he could not be damned.

Now in these 3 opinions we may note two things.

1 The Substance and formality of them, which is an *unavoydableness* of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be : in this all of them agree, all holding that in all things, at least in all mens ends, *undeviuable fates* and insuperable necessity do domineere.

And therefore *Melanthon* doth not sticke sundry times in his common places to call this Absolute Decree [*Fatum Stoicum, & tabulas Parcarum*] *Stoicall fate, and the Distin-  
nies tables* : He also chargeth the Church of Geneva (the great Patron of it) with a labor to bring in the Stoicks error, as we may see in a certaine Epistle of *Melanthon* to *Pencer*, where he hath these words. (n) *Lelius wriseth unto me, that in Geneva there is such strife about the Stoicks fate that onewas cast into prison, because he dissented from Zeno. O miserable times ! &c.* And by the Testimony of *Beza* too, who speaking of *Melanthon* sayth ; (o) *Philip bath so written of these things, as of he means to taxe the Geneva Divines for bringers in of Destiny.*

2 We may note the *circumstance* or the grounds of their opinions ; The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or the first matter ; The Manichees from two [*pri-  
ma principia, eterna & coeterna*] first principles of all things eternall and coeternall. These last, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God.

So that they differ in their grounds indeed ; but in this difference the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive this necessity of

(n) *Melanthon Epist. ad Penc. Scribit ad me Lelius de Stoico factu usque adeo licet Geneva moverit, ut quidam in carcere conjectus sit, propterea quod a Zeno differret. O misera tempora ! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur.*

(o) *Beza in via Calvini. Philippus de his rebus ita scribere ceperat, ut Genevales quasi Stoicis fatum invenientes notare quibusdam in-  
vill deinceps.*

evill actions and unhappy events, from an evill God or the course of nature, then from the decree of that God, who is infinitely good. The substance of their opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to Gods error.

Which being so, for this very reason alone may this the on doctrine of absolute Reprobation be suspected: because those dreames of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts; and this of the Manichees was generally cryed downe by the Fathers, not onely as foolish, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Common-wealth, not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it, as for the substance of the error; because it made all things and events to necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my reasons of the first sort.

**T**He Reasons that have convinced me of the untruth of absolute Reprobation, now follow. And first of those that fight against the upper way.

They are drawne [ *ab incommode* ] from the great evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: which may be referred to two maine heads.

§ 1 The dishonour of God.

§ 2 The overthrow of religion and government.

It dishonoureth God. For it chargeth him deeply with two things, no wayes agreeable to his nature.

1 Mens Eternall torments in Hell.

2 Their sinnes on Earth.

First, it chargeth him with mens Eternall torments in hell, and maketh him to bee the prime, principall and invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable soules: the prime cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction, of his owne voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them; and the principall and invincible cause; because it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable Decree: and so necessary, that they can no more escape it, then poore *Abbyans* could

### I. Inconveniences.

or he could avoid the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians  
who tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy.  
is all. Now this is a heavie charge, contrary to Scripture,  
call to Gods nature, and sound reason.

1 To scripture, which makes man the principall, nay  
this the onely cause ( in opposition to God) of his owne ruine.  
because *Thy destruction is of thy selfe O Israel, but in me is thy help.*  
best Hos. 13. 9. *As I live, saith the Lord, I will not the death*  
was of the wicked, &c. *Turne ye, turne ye, why will ye dye?* Ezech.  
33. 11. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children*  
of men. Lam. 3. 33. To which speeches, for likenesse sake,  
I will joyne one of Prophets. (p) Gods predestination is to  
many the cause of standing, to none of falling.

2 It's contrary to Gods nature (q) who sets forth him-  
selfe to be a God mercifull, gracious, long suffering, abundant  
in goodness, &c. and he is acknowledged to be so by King  
David. (r) *Thou Lord art good and mercifull, and of great*  
*kindnesse to all them that call upon thee.* And by the Prophets  
*Joel, Ionab, and Micah.* *He is gracious and mercifull, slow*  
*to anger and of great kindnesse.* faith Joel. *I know (sayes Io-*  
*nab) that thou art a gracious God and mercifull, slow to an-*  
*ger, and of great kindnesse.* And who (sayth Micah) is a  
*God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity?* &c. be retray-  
neth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him.

3 'Tis contrary also to sound reason which cannot but argue  
such a Decree of extreme cruelty, and consequently  
remove it from the father of mercies.

We cannot in reason think that any man in the world  
can so farre put off humanity and nature, as to resolve  
with himselfe to marry and beget Children, that after  
they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may  
hang them up by the tongues, teare their flesh with  
scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers,  
or put them to any cruell tortures; that by thus tortur-  
ing them he may shew what his authority and power  
is over them. Much lese can we beleive without great  
violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so far forget  
himselfe, as out of his absolute pleasure to ordaine such in-  
finite multitudes of his children made after his own Image,  
to everlasting fire; & create them one after another, that af-  
ter

(p) *Reff. ad 13.*  
*Obj. Vincent. Prae-*  
*destinatio dei multis*  
*est causa standi, ne-*  
*minis est causa labedi.*

(q) *Exod. 34. 6.*

(r) *Psal. 86. 5.*

*Joel. 2. 13.*

*Ionah. 4. 23.*

*Micah. 7. 18.*

## Supralapsarian's charge God

Gen. 18.25.

Object.

Answe.

ter the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to shew his power & sovereignty over them. If to destroy the righteous ~~wish~~ be wicked temporally, be such a piece of iniustice, that Abraham removeth it from God with an ~~abst~~, Wilt thou destroy the righteous ~~wish~~ the wicked? That be farre from thee O Lord. Shall not the judge of all the world doe right? How deeply (may we thinke) woulde that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soules eternally in hell fire?

But God (say some) is soveraigne Lord of all creatures and men, they are truely and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth, and doe with his owne what he will?

The question is not what an Almighty soveraigne power can doe to poors vassalls, but what a power, that is just and good, may doe. By the power of a Lord, his absolute and naked power, he can cast away the whole masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to omnipotency or soveraignty: but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actuall power of his, which is alwayes cloathed with goodnes and justice, he cannot.

For it is not compatible with these properties in God, to appoyn men to Hell of his meere will and pleasure, no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall minde.

1 It is not compatible with justice, which is a constant will of rendering to every one his proper due, and that is, vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. (1) God is good (saith St. Austin) and God is just: he may without any deserts free men from punishment, because he is good; but he cannot without evill deservings condemn any man because he is just. In another place also he saith, (2) If God be believed to damne any man that by sinne deserueth it not; he is not believed to be free from injustice.

2 Nor is it compatible with goodness, which is an inclination of God in communicating that good which is in himselfe to his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his Justice: and therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he shoulde of himselfe without any motive in the reasonable creature provide

(1) *Auf. I.3. cont. Iu-  
lian. c. 13. pag. 164.*  
Bonus est Deus, ju-  
stus est Deus: potest  
aliquem sine bonis  
meritis liberare, quia  
bonus est; non potest  
quenquam sine malis  
meritis damnare, quia  
justus est.

(2) *Aug. ep. Job. ad  
Bonifac. Quemquam  
reli immemor & nul-  
li obnoxii peccato si  
Deus damnare credi-  
tur, alienus ab iniqui-  
tate non creditur.*

vide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it, or bestowing any good at all upon it.

It is further objected, that we do and may slaughter our beasts for our daily use, without any cruelty or iniustice: & therefore God may as well, nay much more appoint as many of us as he pleaseth to the torments of Hell for his glory, and yet be iust and good notwithstanding: for there is a greater disproportion betwene God and us, then between us and beasts.

For answer to this we are first to premisse thus much, Answ. 1 namely, that our slaughtering of our beasts for our daily use, is by Gods ordnance and appoyntment: We had not this authority of our selves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may see, *Gen. 9.2.3.* where we may observe, First, that God delivereth up all Creatures, beasts, birds, and fishes into the hands of men. Secondly, that the end why he doth so, is, that they might be meat for men and consequently that they might be slayne.

Which being so, our slaughtering of oxen, sheep, and other creatures for our daily use, is to be accounted Gods doing rather then ours. And therefore the obiection should be made thus; God may without any breach of goodness or iustice appoint brute creatures to be slayne for mans use: therefore he may ordeyne men to be cast into hell torments for ever for his owne use, that is for the declaration of his soveraignty, &c.

This being premised, I answer further, that this comparison holds not: for there is little proportion between the obiects compared and lesse between the acts.

There is but small proportion between the objects, Answ. 2 beasts and men, creatures of a different nature and made for a different end. Beasts are void of reason and liberty in their actions, creatures whose beings vanish with their breath, made onely for the use and service of men upon Earth: but men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the creators bounty to discern between good and evill, and according to their first principles, to choose the good and forsake the evill: they are the very image of Gods purity and eternity, and were made for the service of

God

God alone vpon Earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in Heaven.

So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and men, yet nothing so great as betweene God and beasts. It followeth not therefore, that if God may appoint beasts to be kill'd of his own free pleasure for mans use, he may with like equity and reason appoint men of his own will to destruction for his own use. We reade that God required of his people many thousand beasts for sacrifices, but not one man.

The first borne of other creatures hee challenged for burnt offerings (except they were unclean beasts;) but the first borne of men were to be redeemed: which sheweth, that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beasts. Besides, in the 9 of Gen: he giveth men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures, but he straitly forbids them to shew mans blood, and giveth this reason of the prohibition; *Man is the Image of God.* So that we may well conclude, that there is but small proportion between the objects compared; men and beasts, in respect of this act of killing or slaughtering.

2. There is farre lesse or rather no proportion at all between the acts compared, killing and eternal tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous injustice and cruelty torment his beast and prolong the life of it, that he may daily vexe and torture it, to shew what power and soveraignty he hath over it: so I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affir'ming it) I doubt not (I say) but God may kill a man of his owne free pleasure, yea and resolve him into nothing without any cruelty or injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he had given him: but he cannot without both these, *antecedently decree to keep him alive for ever in Hell,* that he may there torment him without end, to shew his soveraignty. For this is to inflict an infinit evill upon a guiltless creature, to whom he had given but a finit good. And so is the comparison most unequall too in the acts compared: and therefore proveth just nothing.

But it is replied by some (who will rather speak unreasonably,

*Vid. Moliae etenodat.  
quest. graviss. p. 125.*

*Dr. Twis' his vnde,  
gra. 1. 2. part. 1. digy. 1.  
pag. 17. Edita.*

sonably and against common sense, then lay downe the conclusions which they have undertaken to mainteyne,) that it is better and more eligible to be tormented in Hell, then to want or loose a being : for he that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in Hell, hath a being; and by consequence something that is good. If therefore God may take away a mans being that is innocent, and turne him into nothing for his pleasure ; much more may he torment him in hell.

1 To the first part of this Reply, namely, that it is more desirable to be in Hell, then to be nothing, I oppose three things.

Answ. 1.

Math. 26. 14.

1 The speech of our Saviour concerning *Iudas* : *Woe be to that man, by whom the Sonne of man is betrayed : it had beene good for that man, if he had never beene borne.* Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Saviour. First, the misery of *Iudas* the betrayer of his Lord, *Woe be to, &c.* Secondly, the greatnessse of his misery, *It had beene good, &c.* It is as much as if our Lord had sayd, *Iudas the Traytor shall be damned ;* and therefore so wofull will his condition be, that it had beene good and happy for him, if he had never received a being : good in earnest as Interpreters doe generally expound it, not in the opinion and esteeme of weak-minded, faint-hearted men onely, as some few understand it. For,

1 Let it be granted that the Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to mens opinions ; yet without reason to fasten such an exposition upon any Scripture, is to doe as Dunses doe in the Schooles, who being not able to answer a place in *Aristotele* wherewith they are charged, shift it off and say, [*logitur ex aliorum sententia*] be speake according to the opinion of others.

2 This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded, 2 Because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the truth or greatnessse of the misery of *Iudas* ; *Woe to the man, &c.* And why woe ? Because it had been good, &c. But it were no argument to shew his wofull estate by, to say that it had been good for him that he had never been borne, in the opinion of men who mistake the case, - but not in truth.

C a

2 Be-

2. Because this Exposition would teach and encourage men to be Atheists and Epicures. In the second of *Wisdom* we read, how voluptuous men do stir up one another to enjoy the good things that are present, to fill themselves with wine and oyntments, to leave some tokens of their jollity in every place, and to practice all maner of wickednesse and what is their motive? A false perswasion that they soules should dye with their bodies, and that they should have no being after death. If this conceit could flesh them thus in their impious and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we thinke) would they pursue their carnall and sinfull delights, if they could be but once perswaded, that after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case, then if they had no being?

Secondly, I oppose common consent; where shall wee pick out a man, but will say (if he speake from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings, then to be cast into hell? What is the reason why men are so afraid of Hell, when they are touched to the quicke with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with Job they curse their birth-day, and wish an hundred times over, that they had never beene, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments; but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse then no being anywhere? and why are men who are sensible of hell fire, so strongly curbed and held in by the feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved times, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of all terribles? feare of being annihilated can never doe that which the feare of Hell doth.

The third thing which I oppose is common sense, which judgeth paines when they are extreme to be worse then death. Hence it is, that Job being tormented in his body by the Devill, cursed his birth-day, magnified the condition of the dead, and wished himselfe in the grave, plainly preferring the losse of his being before that miserable being which he then had.

And hence it is, that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by daily experiance) would (if they might enjoy

enjoy their option ) choose rather to have nobodys at all, then bodyes tormented with the stone or gout, or any other sharpe or sensible disease. It is a knowne saying grounded on this judgement of sence, [ *Praestat semel quam semper mori* ] better it is to dye once, then to be always dying.

This the Tyrant *Tiberius* knew very well: and therefore he would not suffer those, towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty, to be put to a speedy death, but to lingring torments, as *Swetonius* reporteth of him in that chapter where he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruell practises.

(u) *Tbose* (saith he) who through the extremity of their torments would have dyed, he used meanes to keepe alive. [ *Nam mortem aded leve supplicium putabat* ] For he accounted death so light a punishment, that when he heard that one *Carnilius* a man appoynted to torments, had prevented him, he cried out [ *Carnilius me evasit* ] *Carnilius* hath escaped my bands. To a prisoner intreating him to put him quickly to death, he gave this answer, [ *Nondum secum ready in gratiam* ] I am not yet freinds with thee; accounting it great kindnesse to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured.

Many that were called into question, did partly wound themselves in their own houses [ *ad vexationem ignominiam, vitandam* ] to prevent that paine and ignominy, which they knew they should endure: and partly poysone d themselves in the midst of the court, as they were going to their arraignment, for the same caule. *Seneca* speaking of one *Alcearius*, who was so afraid of being dead, that he sayd he would not refuse weaknesse, deformity, [ *neq; acusam crucem* ] nor the sharpest crucifying (w) so that he might live still in the midst of these extremities; he calleth his desire [ *supplicium votum* ] a base and most ignoble and unnaturall wish, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; (x) because in all his evils he was afraid of that which is the end of all evils, the privation of his being. And certainly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones rather then flesh and blood, who can so put off all feeling and sence, as to think a tormented being in Hell to be a lighter and lesser evill then no being at all.

(a) *Sueton. vit. Tibi cap. 61. Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi.*

*Senec Epist. 17. E-  
pi. 101.*

(w) *Dummodo inter  
hac malam situs pro-  
rogetur.*

(x) *Quia difficulter id  
quader in multis opti-  
mum, supplici finem.*

Ans. 2

To the reason on which the reply is grounded, which is, [Melius est esse quam non esse] is is better to be, then to have no being, I answer that it is a sophisme or fallacy, à non distributo ad distributum. To be, in it self is better then not to be: but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again, it is true in some cases & ex hypothesi, [sic aetra sunt paria] if there be any equality in the adjuncts. It is so far from being simply true, that our Saviour limiteth it, & putteth a case wherin it is not true, but the contrary to it is true: and that is the case of *Judas*, of which we have said somewhat before.

*It had been good &c.* which words St. Hieron expounding, saith, (y) *It is simply and plainly averred by our Saviour, that it is better to have no being then an ill being.*

(y) Hieron comment. in Mat. 6. 26. v. 24. Simpliciter dictum est, melius est non sub sistere quam male sub sistere.

This was the judgment too of Job cap. 3. v. 11. 12. 13. *Why dyed I not (faith he) in the birth? why did the knees prevent mee? and why did I suck the breasts? for now should I have lyen still and been quiet: I shoulde have slept then and been at rest.* In which words he plainly implyeth, that he thought it farre better to have had no birth and being, then such a painefull and miserable being. This was also the opinion of Solomon. Eccles. 4. 1. 2. 3. *So I returned (saith he) and considered all the oppressions that are done under the Sunne; and behold the teares of such as were oppressed, and they had no Comforter, &c.* Wherfore I praised the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive: yea better is he then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evill worke that is done under the Sunne.

The words doe clearly shew, that Solomon did think it better to be dead and to be deprived of being, or to have alwayes wanted a being, then to be opprelled by the mighty and to be without comforters: that is, then to have a miserable and a mournfull being.

To this assenteth Sir Francis Bacon in his Colours of good and evill, where against this mathematicall position (as he calls it) that there is no proportion between something and nothing; and that therefore the degree of privation seemeth greater then the degree of diminution: he excepteth, that it is false in sundry cases, and among the rest in this, namely, when the degree of diminution is more sensitive, then the degree of privation. In this case, a totall privation is much better then

Sr. Fr. Bacons colours  
of good and evill, the  
last colour.

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then a diminution: hence these usuall formes of speech ;  
Better eye out then alwayes ake : make o' warre, &c.

Some evils and paines (perhaps) cyther for their light-  
nesse, because they may be well endured ; or for their short-  
nesse, because they are quickly over ; are lesse then reso-  
lution into nothing : and a man had better for awhile end-  
ure them, then lose his being to be rid of them ; because  
his being may afford him presently or afterward such and so  
many desirable good things, as will more then recompence  
his paines. But when his paines are so many and violent,  
that they leave him no other good then a poore being, or  
so pinch him that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods that  
remaine ; it were a thousand times better for him to have  
no being. And such are the paines of Hell, which for their  
greatnesse are infinite, producing many miserable weepings  
and waylings, and gnashings of teeth ; all symptomes of  
intollerable griefes : and for their length, eternall ; *The  
warme never dyesh, the fire is never quenched : but the breath  
of the Lord, as a River of brimstone doth kindle it for ever.*  
And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then  
to live in those tormentes, which cannot be equalled by any  
good, which a being can make us capable of : much lesse by  
that poore little entitative good, which is all the good the  
damned doe enjoy in Hell.

This sophifticall evasion therefore and all others of the  
like sort notwithstanding ; I doubt not but I may safely say,  
that the unavoydable damnation of so many millions can-  
not be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, with-  
out the greatest injustice and cruelty which may in no wise  
be imputed to God. (a) *Plutarch* speaking of the Pa-  
gans who to pacifie the anger of their Gods, did sacrifice  
to them men and women, sayth ; It had beeene much bet-  
ter with *Diagoras* and his fellowes to deny the being of a  
God, then confessing a God to think he delighteth in the  
blood of men. How much rather may we say, it were better  
to be an Atheist & deny God, then to believe or report him  
to be a devourer of the soules of men. The like argument  
is pressed by *Eusebius* against those cruell and merciless  
Gods of the Pagans ; (b) *Doubtlesse* (sayth he) if there were  
any footstep or parke of goodnessse in them, for which they might  
deserv.

(a) *Plut.de superf.*  
prope finem.

(b) *Euseb de prepa-*  
*rat. 14. c 16. p. 161.*  
*edit Grecol. Enian.*  
vero, si boni vestigia  
um in eis ullum esset,  
quamobrem bonorum  
appellationem jure  
fortitentur eos utiq;  
cum natura sua be-  
nignos ac salutis on-  
nium cupidos, tamen  
vero amantes justi-  
tiae, hominumq; stu-  
diosos ac defensores  
esse oportet, &c.

(c) *Ibid. c. 15. pag. 153.* Non bonos sed malos suisse dæmones : vel hac ipsa ratione confici existimo. Quicquid bonū est prodest solet: nō eere vero contrarium.

(d) *Prop. at Obj. Vincent. resp. 3.* Omnia quidem hominum deus creator est, sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est, ut periret: quia alia est causa nascendi, alia perirendi.

*Psal. 5. 4:*

*Esay. 66. 4.*

*Iam. 1. 13. 14.*

*3. Joh. 2. 16.*

*Ecclesiasticus 15. 12*

deserve to be called good; they would be disposed to doe good and desirous to save all men: they would love justice, and take care of men. And being such, how could they delight in their slaughter? &c. Yea, he concludeth that they were (c) Divils or evill sp̄rits; and not Gods or good sp̄rits; because, if they were good, they would doe good, Whereas those which are evill use to doe hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper. (d) God is the Creator indeed of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reason why we are created is one, and why we are damned another.

**S**econdly, this opinion chargeth God with mens sinnes on earth, and makes him the Author, not of the first sinne onely that entred by *Adam* into the world, but of all other things that have been, are, or shall be committed to the worlds end: no murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever, fall out at any time or in any place, but they are the necessary productions of Gods Almighty decree. The Scriptures, I am sure, teach us another lesson. *Thou art not a God* ( sayth *David* ) *that hath pleasure in Wickednesse.* And the Prophet *Esay* tells the people, that when they did evill in the sight of the Lord, *they did choose the things which he would not.* *Let no man say when he is tempted; I am tempted of God:* for God cannot be tempted with evill, neyther tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted, when he is drawne away with his owne concupiscence. And *S. John* having referred all the sinnes of the world to three heads, *the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life;* telles us that they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which speeches let me adde the speech of *Siracides*, though not of the same authority: *Say not thou it is through the Lord, that I fell away: for thou oughtest not to doe the things that he hateth. Say not thou that he hath caused me to erre: for he hath no need of the sinfull man.*

Pious antiquity hath constantly sayd the same, and prest it with sundry reasons; some of which are these that follow. If God be the Author of sinne, then

1 He is worse then the Divell, because the Divell doth onely tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may bee resisted: but God (by this opinion) doth will and procure it by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be resisted. This is Proffers argument (a) who to some, objecting that by S. Austins doctrine, when *Fathers desile their owne Daughters, and mothers their owne sonnes, servants murder their masters, and men commit any horrible villanies; it commeth to passe, because God hath so decreed: answe- re- eth, that if this were layd to the Divells charge, he might in some sort cleare himselfe of the imputation; (b) Because though he be delighted with mens sinnes, yet he doth not, he can- not compell them to sinne: (c) What a madnesse therefore is it to impute that to God, which cannot be justly fastered upon the Divell?*

2 He cannot be a punisher of sinne: for none can justly punish those offences, of which they are the authors. This is Proffers argument too: (d) *It is against reason to say, that he which is the damner of the Divell, would have any man to be the Divells Servant.* This reason Fulgentius useth likewise. (e) [*Nullus rei Deus utor est, cuius auctor non est.*] *God is the avenger of that, which he is not the author.* Tertul- lian also before them hath sayd, (f) *He is not to be accounted the Author of sinne, who is the Forbider, yea and the Con- demner of it.*

3 He cannot be God; because he should not bee just, nor holy, nor the ludge of the world, all properties essen- tiall to God. And this is S. Basils reason, who hath writ- ten a whole Homily against this wicked assertion. (g) *It is allone (sayth he) to say, that God is the author of sinne, and to say he is not God.*

Vpon these and the like considerations I may well con- clude, that the opinion which chargeth the holy God with the sinnes of men, is neyther good nor true.

But this opinion doth so. For albeit the Writers, that have defended it (*Piseator and a few more of the blunter sort excepted;*) have never sayd directly and in terminis, that God is the cause of sinne; yet have they delivered those things, from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence, that he is so. For they say,

D

1 That

(a) Proffers resp. ad adobj. 11. Vincent.

(b) Quia et si de- lectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulisse vim criminis.

(c) Quid ergo in simi- citate, quare de men- tia, diuinatur ad Dei referendum esse con- sultum, quod nec dia- bolo in totum ascribi potest, qui in peccan- tium flagitium, illece- brarum adjutor, non voluntatum creden- dus est esse generator.

(d) Proff. Relp. ad Obj. 4. Vincent. In- sanum omnium & co- tra rationem est dice- re, damnatorem dia- boli, & ejus famulo- rum, velle ut diabolo serviatur.

(e) Fulgent lib. 1. ad Maxim. c. 19.

(f) Tert. l. 2. con- Marcion. c. 9. *Nec idem habendus est delicti author, qui in- venitur interdictor & condemnator.*

(g) Basili. homil. quod deus non est, &c. Tantundem est deum afferere esse sa- thorem peccati, & ne- gare esse deum.

(b) *Marlor. Comis.* in Job. 15. v. 2. *Sicut* iugurta firma sententia: *Quemcunq; deus ante conditum or- bim elegit, eum nō posse peccare;* *quem vero rejecerit eum nō posse salvare;* *etsi omnia sanctorum o- pera fecerit;* *usque adeo irtractabilis est sententia.*

(i) *Piscator. l. contr. Schafm.* pag. thef. 27. *Deus hoc confi- lio condidit homines, ut teipis liberentur:* *quippe cum nisi ha- ratione pervenire nō posuerint, ad fines illos suos principales.*

(k) *Macovius. disp. 17.* p. 11. *Locus miseri- cordiae & justitiae manifestans nulla nullus fuisset futurus, si peccatum non existisset.*

(l) *Zanch. lib 5 d: mar. dei. c. 2. de pred. part. 4. resp. ad post. arg. prope faciem. Da- mus reprobos nec- cessitate peccandi, eqq; & pereundi, ex ha- dei ordinatione con- stringi, arg. ita con- stringi ut nequeant non peccare, & atque peccare.*

(m) *Non dubitamus itaque confiteri, ex immutabili reprobatione necessitatem peccandi, & quidem sine resipiscientia ad mortem usque peccandi, eoque & penas eternas dandi reprobis incuabere.* (n) *Calv. l. 3. In his. esp. 24. test. 14. Inse-ucabili dei judicio fuscitati sunt ad gloriam ejus sua damnatione illustrandum.* (o) *Pisc. resp. ad dupl. Vorst. part. 1. pag. 220. Reprobri ad utrumque hoc malum à Deo præcise destinati sunt, ut in eternum puniantur, & necessario peccent, & quidem ideo peccent, quo justè puniri possunt.*

1 That as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable: those poore soules which lye under it, must of necessity be damned. (b) It is (saith *Marloras*), a firme and stable truth, that the man whom God in his eternall counsell hath rejected, though he doe all the good works of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.

2 That without sinne this decree of Reprobation can not be justly executed. (i) God (sayth *Piscator*) did create men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall: for other wise he could not have attained those his principall ends. He meaneth the manifestatio of his justice in the damnation of Reprobates, and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. *Macovius* also sayth the same: (k) *If sinne had not beene, the manifestation of justice and mercy (which is as much to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never been.*

3 That therefore God decreed, that Reprobates should unavoydably sinne, and sinne unto death, that his eternall ordnance might be executed and they damned. (l) *Wee grant* (sayth *Zanchius*) *that Reprobates are held so fast under Gods almighty decree, that they cannot but sinne and perish.* A little after he sayth: (m) *Wee doubt not therefore to confess, that there lyeth upon Reprobates by the power of their un- changeable reprobation, a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning unto death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingily.*

*Calvin* also saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickednesse of their own hearts, and partly because (n) they are raised up by the unsearchable judgement of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation. I will end this with that speech of *Piscator*. (o) *Reprobates are precisely appointed to this double evill, to be punished everlastingily, and to sinne; and therefore to sinne that they might be justly punished.*

That immutabili reprobatione necessitatem peccandi, & quidem sine resipiscientia ad mortem usque peccandi, eoque & penas eternas dandi reprobis incuabere. (n) *Calv. l. 3. In his. esp. 24. test. 14. Inse-ucabili dei judicio fuscitati sunt ad gloriam ejus sua damnatione illustrandum.* (o) *Pisc. resp. ad dupl. Vorst. part. 1. pag. 220. Reprobri ad utrumque hoc malum à Deo præcise destinati sunt, ut in eternum puniantur, & necessario peccent, & quidem ideo peccent, quo justè puniri possunt.*

¶ That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne ; so he procures their sinnes in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoyding of sinne, and partly by mooving and enclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts, to sinfull actions.

(p) *Calvin* saith, that divels and reprobate men are not onely held fast in Gods fettters, so as they cannot do what they would, but are also urged and forced by Gods bridle [*ad sequia praestanda*,] to doe as he wold have them. And in the next chapter there are his words, (q) that *men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing into action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many and cleare testimonies.* In the Section following he sayth, (r) And surely unless God did work inwardly in the minds of men, it would not be rightly sayd, that he taketh away wisdom from the wise, &c. In those two chapters, that which he mainly driveth at, is to shew, that God doth not onely behave himself privatively in procuring the sins of men, but doth also put forth powerfull and positive acts in the bringing of them to passe. And in his second Book and 4 chapter after he had sayd, that God may be sayd to harden men, by forsaking them, he putteth in another way, by which God hardneth men, and that (he sayth) commeth a great deale nearer to the propriety of the Scripture phrases ; namely by stirring up their wills : (s) God doth not onely harden men by leaving them to themselves, but by appoynting their counsels, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes and indeavours by the minister of his anger, Satan : and this he proverth by the worke of God on Sibon king of the Amorites, *Deut. 2. 30.* and then insinuater the end too, why God thus hardens men in their wicked courses, which is, that he might *destroy them*, (t) because God intended his ruine, he prepared him for it by his insinuation.

The summe of all these propositions is this ; God, who from all eternity appoynted many miserable men to endless and unavoydable torments, decreed for the bringing about of their intended ruine, that they should without remedy live and dye in a state of sinne : and what he thus de-

(p) *Calv. Inflit. I. 1.*  
c. 17. sect. 11.

(q) *Ib. v. 18. sect. 1.*  
Quod nihil efficiant homines nisi arcana dei nunti, nec quicquam deliberando agent, nisi quod ipse jam apud se decreverit, & arcana sua directione constitutis ; innumeris & claris testimonis probatur.

(r) *Ib. sect. 2.* Et certe nisi intus operatur in mentibus hominum, non recte diri esset, auferre labium à veracibus, & à senibus prudentiam, &c.

(s) *Inflit. I. 2. c. 4. 5. 3*  
ad exequenda sui iudicia per ministra irae suæ Satanam, & consilia corum destrat quod vistum est, & voluntates excitat, & conatus firmat.

(t) *Quia pridem Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis divina fuit ad ruinam præparatio.*

creed from everlasting, he doth most powerfully effect in time, so governing, overruling, and working upon the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue, of avoyding their sinnes, but must of necessity commit them.

Thus they teach : and therefore by just consequence they make God the author of sinne ; as it will plainly appear by these following considerations.

1. It is ordinary to impute sinne to those, who have not so great a hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty by the grounds of this opinion. For,

(1) The divell is called a *father of lies*, Job. 8. 44. and by the like reason of all other sinnes ; and therefore *herbas committeth sinne*, is sayd to be of the divell, and to be a child of the divell, I Job. 3. 8. 10. and sinne is called, a *work of the divell, whicht be sonne of God appeared so loose*, vers. 8. And why is the divell so called, but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sinne ? This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he necessitate and by his decree first, and next by his powerfull and secrete working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistiblly to sin. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perwade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perwasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sinne (by this doctrine) then the Divell.

(2) Wicked men are esteemed authors of their owne offences; because they plot, purpose, choose and commit them, and are immediate agents in the acting of them.

But God (by this opinion) doth more : for he overruleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choyses and actions precisely that very way ; so as they cannot choose but doe as they doe, whatsoeuer they may think to the contrary. They have indeed [*potentiam in se liberam*] a *power in it selfe free*, to choole what they refuse, or to refuse what they choose, to determine themselves this way or that way as liketh them best : but they have not [*liberum usum*] a *free use* of this their power. God doth determine their

their will before it hath determined it selfe; and maketh them doe thole onely actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their willes out of any absolute dominion over their owne actions, have prescribed. More rightly therefore, may God be called the Author of those offences; for (u) deeds whether good or bad, are owned more truly by him that over-ruleth them, then by the servile instruments that onely execute and doe them.

(u) *Opera magis pertinente ad imperatorem, quād exequentem.*

3 Wicked counsellers, and they who allure and advise men to sinne, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sinnes, to which they are the persuaders; and have beene punished for those misdeeds, which others through their instigations have committed. *Jezabell Ahab's wife*, was reputed and punished as the murderer of *Naboth*; because she counselled and contrived the doing of it, as we may see *1. Kings. 21. 23. 25.* But what is counselling to inforging? Evil counsels may be refused, but an almighty power cannot be resisted? God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sinnes, is much more an author of them, then hee that only useth the other.

2 If we could finde out a King that shoulde so carry himselfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any subject, as (by this opinion) God doth in the effecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruine and sinnes of those his Subjects. (w) *Who would not abhorre* (sayth *Molin.*) *a King speaking thus;* (x) *I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him justly, I will have him murther or stealed.* This King (saith he) shoulde not onely make an innocent man miserable, [sed & sceleratum] but wicked too, and shoulde punish him for that offence [causus ipse causa effector] of which himselfe is the cause. It is a cleere case. (y) *Tiberius* (as *Suetonius* reports) having a purpose to put certaine Virgins to death; because it was now lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins, caused them all to be de- floured by the Hangman, that so they might bee strangled. Who will not say, that *Tiberius* was the principall author of the defoulling of those maides? In like manner (say the

(w) *Molin. Anat. c. 12. de predib. p. 73. Quis non regem a- domineum sic loqu- em?*

(x) *Ego hunc homi- nem addico suspendi- o, sed ut justè suspen- datur, volo patet homicidium vel pe- culatum.*

(y) *Sueton. vit. Tib. cap. 61.*

Supralapsarians ) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death, but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed, that the Devil shall defloure them; that afterward he may damne them. It followeth therefore, that God is the maine cause of those their sinnes.

3 That God is the Author of mens salvation and conversion, all sides grant: and yet hee doth no more in the procuring of them, then these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The salvation and conversion of the Elect (say they) he hath *absolutely* and *antecedently*, without the fore-sight of any deserving of theirs, resolved upon, and by irresistible meanes in their severall generations draweth them to beeleeve, repent and endure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his absolute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the sinnes and the finall impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure *peremptorily* decreed; this his decree he executeth in time, drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sinne to sinne, till they have made up their measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth, but that God (by their grounds) may as truly be stiled the prime cause and author of the sinnes of the one, as of the conversion of the other?

The Fathers thought it a plaine case: and therefore they did generally make sinne an object of prescience, not predestination, and bent the most of those arguments by which they refuted this foule assertion, against an absolute, irresistible, and necessitating decree, as I could easily shew, but that I feare to be overlong. Onely I will cite some few of those Authors words, whom the learned and reverend Bishop hath alledged in favour and for the defence of the *Pradefinarians* and the mainteiners of *Gotteschakles* opinion.

The Church of Lyons in their answer to the positions of *Johannes Scotus* which he framed against *Gottschalk*, hath these words (2.) *Whosoever saith, that God hath layd a constraint or a necessity of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly and fearfully blasphemeth God, in as much as he maketh him by affirming that of him, to be the very author of sinne.* *Remigius* Archbishop of that Church, explaining his Churches opinion in the poynt of prescience and predestination in 7 severall rules; in the 5th. of those rules he hath these words to the same purpose. *God (sayth he) by his prescience and predestination hath layd a necessity of being wicked upon no man, (4.) For if he had done this, he should have been the author of sinnes.*

And thus (in my judgment) doth it plainly appear that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of mens sinnes.

Many distinctions are brought to free the *Supralapsarian* way from this crimination: all which (me thinke) are no better then meere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give no true satisfaction to the understanding.

There is (say they) a twofold decree.

1 *An Operative*, by which God positively and efficaciously worketh a thing. *Distinction, 1.*

2 *A Permissive*, by which he decreeth only to let it come to passe. If God should work sinne by an *operative* decree, then he should be the author of sinne; but not if he decree by a *permissive* decree, to let it come to passe. And this onely they say they mainteyne.

It is true, that God hath decreed to suffer sinne: For otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered *Adam* to sinne, leaving him in the hand of his own counsell. *Eccles. 15.14.* he suffered the nations in times past to walk in their own wayes, *Act. 14.16.* and daily doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sinnes. And this he doth, not because he stands in need of sinne for the setting forth of his glory: for he hath no need of the sinfull man: *Eccles. 15.* but partly, because he is [*summus provisor.*] supreme moderator of the world, and knoweth how to use that well which is ill-done, and to bring good out of evill: and especially

(7) *Bisb. Ulster, bisb. bish. of Gottes.* pag. 138. *Qui vna & necessitate peccandi deum inutile homini vel inferre dicit, manifeste horribiliter in deum blasphemat quem ad peccata compellendo utique auctorem peccati esse confirmat.*

(a) *Id. ib. p. 173. Hoc enim si fecisset ipse utique esset auctor malorum, &c.*

*Answe. 1.*

Tertull. l. 1. contr.  
Marcion.

cially for that reason which *Tertullian* presleth, namely, because man is made by Gods owne gracious constitution, a free creature, undetermined in his actions, till he determine himself: and therefore may not be hindred from sinning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeale his owne ordinances.

2 It is true also, that a *permissive* decree is no cause of sinne, because it is meerly extrinsecall to the sinner, and hath no influence at all upon the sinne: it is an antecedent onely, and such a one too, as being put, siane followeth not of necessity. And therefore it is fitly contradicting to an *operative* decree. And if that side would in good earnest, impute no more in sinfull events to the divine power, then the word (Permissiōn) imports, their mayne conclusion would fall and the controversie betweenes us end. But,

(1) Many of them reject this distinction utterly and will have God to decree sinne [*effaciter*] with an energetical and working will. Witnesse that discourse of *Bez.*, wherein he averreth and laboureth to proove, that God doth not onely permit sinne, but will it also: and witnesse *Calvin* too, who hath a whole Section against it: calling it - A carnall distinction, invented by the flesh, and [*effugium*] a meere evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity, that that man is made blind [*volente & jubente Deo*] by Gods will and commandement, who must shortly after be punished for his blindnesse: he calleth it also, [*figmentum*] a *fallow*, and sayth they doe [*ineptire*] play the fooles that use it.

By many reasons also doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknesse of it, taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speake of Gods smiting men with a *spirit of number* and giddinessse, of blinding their mindes, infatuating and hardening their hearts, &c. of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded and hardened, (b) [*Nimis frivola est ista solutio*] saith he, *huius too frivolous a gloss*. In another place he blameth those that referre sinne to Gods prescience onely, calling theyr speeches [*argutia*] tricks and quirks, which Scripture will not beare: and those likewise that ascribe it to Gods permission: and sayth,

(c) What

Colloq. Mompel. 2. par.  
pa. 177.

Calv. Inflit. l. 14 c. 18  
Sect. 1 & 2.

Id ib l. 2 c. 4. sect. 3.

(c) What they bring touching the divine permission in this busynesse, will not hold water.

2 They that admit the word (*Permissive*) do willingly mistake it, and while (to keep off this blow) they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For,

(e) Similiter quod de permissione afferunt, dilatius est quam ut substat.

(1) *Permission* is an act of Gods consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom, and committing such sinnes day by day, as they might have avoyded, and to which he proceedeth [*lente gradus*] slowly and unwillingly, as we may see, *Psal. 81. 11, 12.* Israel would none of me: so I gave them up, &c. *Ezech. 18. 39.* Goe and serve every one his Idoll; seeing ye will not obey me, &c. *Rom. 1. 21, 34.* Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God: therefore God gave them up to their hearts lust, to vile affections, and to a Reprobate minde. *Revel. 22. 11.* He which is unjust, let him be unjust still. In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sinners onely; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and willfull, which will by no meane be reclaymed. But the permission, which they meane, is an act of Gods antecedent will, exercised about innocent men, lying under no guilt at all in Gods eternall consideration.

3 *Permission*, about whomsoever it is exercised, obstinate sinners or men considered without sinne, is no more then a not hindring of them from falling, that are able to stand, and supposest a possibility of sinning or not sinning, in the parties permitted: but with them it is a withdrawing or with-holding of grace needfull for the avoyding of sinne, and so includeth an absolute necessity of sinning: for from the withdrawing of such grace sinne must needs follow, as the fall of *Dagons* house followed *Sampsons* plucking away the Pillars that were necessary for the upholding of it. *Maccovins* in two disputations, expounding this word (*Permissive*) circumscribes it within two acts: the first of which, is a *subtraction* of divine assistance necessary to the preventing of sinne: and having prooved it by two arguments that none may thinke he is alone in this, hee saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two: 1 The first of them, is our reverend

*Maccov. coll. theol.*  
*dis. 9. pag. 10.*

## Supralapsarian charge God

(d) Pag. 15. Permissio peccari est pri-  
vano auxilii divini,  
quo posito peccatum  
impediretur.

(e) Subiacto auxi-  
lio dei, homo (Ada-  
mus) istis facultatibus  
ad standum bene uti  
non potuit.

and learned Whitaker, some of whose words alledged by him are these. (d) *Permission of sinne, is a privation of that aide, which being present, sinne would have been hindred.* The second is Pareus, for saying, that (e) *that helpe (which God withdrew from Adam) being withdrawn, Adam could not so use his endowments as to persevere.* And this doctrine (sayth he) is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of Pareus lib. de gratia primi hominis. cap. 4. pag. 46.

Their permission therefore of sinne being a subtraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actuall, effectuall procuring and working of it. (For *[causa] deficiens in necessariis est efficiens* ] a deficient cause in things necessary is truly efficient) and so is but a meere fig-lease to cover the foulnesse of their opinion.

## Distinct. 2.

There are two things (they say) in every ill act, —

1 The materiall part, which is the substance of the action.

2 The formall part, which is the evill or obliquity of it. God is the Author of the action it selfe, but not of the obliquity and evill that cleaveth to it; as he that causeth a lame horse to goe, is the cause of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion, that God is the Author of sinne.

1 All sinnes receive not this distinction; because of many sinnes the acts themselves are sinfull, as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and Sauls sparing of Agag, and the fat beasts of the Amalekites.

2 It is not true, that they make the decree of God one-ly of actions and not of their aberrations: for they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation, and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation, not as actions, but as transgressions of Gods law.

3 To the *Simile* I say, that the rider or master that shall resolve first to flee his horse or knocke him on the head, and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his halting: and so, if God determine to cast men into Hell, and then to bring them into a state of sinne, that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be less than the author.

## Answe. 1.

thor as well of their finnes as of those actions, to which they doe inseparably adhere, and that out of Gods intenti-  
on to destroy them.

The will is determined to an Object two wayes :

- 1 By *Compulsion*, against the bent and inclination of it.
- 2 By *necessity*, according to the naturall desire and liking of it.

*Distinct. 3.*

Gods Predestination (say they) determineth the will to sinne this last way, but not the first; it forceth no man to doe that which he would not, but carryeth him towards that which he would: when men sinne, it is true they cannot choose; and it is as true they will not chooze. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine, that Gods decree is the cause of mens finnes, but their owne wicked wils.

1 The Ancients made no distinction betweene these two words (*necessity*) and (*compulsion*); but used them in this argument promiscuously: and did deny, that God did necessitate men to sinne, lest they should graant him hereby to be the Author of sinne, as I have touched before, and shall intimate againe afterward.

*Ans. 1*

Nor did the Schoolemen put any difference betweene them, as may appeare by the testimony of Mr. *Calvin*, who speaking of the Schoole-distinction of the willes threefold liberty, from *Necessity*, from *Sinne*, from *Milery*, sayth; This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth necessity with coaction.

*Calv. Inst. i. 2. c. 2  
Sect. 5.*

2 That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is as truly the cause of sinne, as that which forceth it; because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed, which otherwise might be avoyded: and therefore, if the divine decree necessitate mans will to sinne, it is as truly the cause of the sinne, as if it did enforce it.

3 That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is more truly the cause of the sinne, then the will is; because it over-ruleth the will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it its true liberty, by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disposer of its own acts, and in respect of which, it hath beene usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too, [*adulterator*, *autodictator*, *adisorator*.] a power which is under

the insuperable check and controll of no Lord, but is selfe. It over-ruleth ( I say ) and maketh it becomobut a servile instrument, irresistibly subject to superior command and determination : and therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sinnes, as proceed from the will so determined , then the will is. For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect, the one a principall over-ruling cause, the other but instrumentall and wholly at the devotion of the principal; then is the effect,in all reaso, to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of its influx and impression produceth it,rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall, which is but a meere servant in the production of it. We shall finde it ordinary in Scripture, to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent. *It is not ye, that speak ( sayth CHRIST,) but the spirit of my father, that speaketh in you.* Math. 10. 20. *I laboured more abundantly, then they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me.* 1. Cor. 15. 10. *And I live; yet not I, but CHRIST liveth in me,* sayth S. Paul. Gal. 2. 20.

In these and many other places, the effect or worke spoken of, is taken from the instrument, and given to the principall Agent. Which being so, though mans will work with Gods decree in the commission of sinne, and willeth the sinne which it doth; yet seeing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of Gods almighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe; the sinne committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans will the inferior, as to Gods necessitating decree the superior cause.

4 That which maketh a man sinne by way of necessity only; that is, with and not against his will, is the cause of his sinne in a worse manner, then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will: as he which by powerfull persuasions draweth a man to stab, or hang, or poyson himselfe, is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall action, then he that by force compelleth him,because he maketh him to consent to his own death. And so, if Gods decree do not onely make men sinne, but sinne willingly too; not onely cause that they shall [ *male agere* ] doe evill, but [ *male volle* ] will evill, it hath the deeper hand in the sinne.

Sinne

Sinne may be considered as sinne, or as a meanes of declaring Gods justice in mens punishments: God doth not predestinate men to sinne, as it is sinne, but as a meanes of their punishment. He is not therefore (say they) the Author of Sinne.

1 A good end cannot moralize a bad action: it remayneth evill, though the end be never so good: [bonum *oritur ex integris*] end, manner, yea and matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steale that he may give almes, or commit adultery that he may beget children for the Church, or oppresse the poore to teach them patience, or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example, or do any forbidden thing; though his end be never so good, he finneth notwithstanding. And the reason is, because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne; for as much as it is [lesio diuinae maiestatis,] a wronging of Gods majesty, and so [divino bone opposita,] directly prejudiciale to the good of Almighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. Paul knew very well: and therefore he telleth us plainly, that *we must not doe evill that good may come of it.* Rom. 3. 8. Whosoever therefore willeth a Sinne though for never so good an end; he willeth that which is truely and formally a Sinne; and consequently God, though he will sinne for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerfull and effectuall will, as giveth a necessary being to it, he becommeth Author of that which is formally sinne.

2 The members of this distinction are not opposite: for Sinne as Sinne and in no other consideration, is a meanes of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a meanes of punishment, he willeth it as Sinne; his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.

3 This distinction fasteneth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three speciall indignities more.

(1) Want of *Wisdom* and *Providence*. His counsels must needs be weake, if he can finde out no meanes to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sinne, which his soule hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest justice in the punishment of it.

Answe. 1

(1) Want of sincerity and plaine dealing with men.

*Tiberius* (as *Suetonius* reporteth) having a purpose to put the two Sonnes of *Germanicus* (*Drusus* and *Nero*) to death (f) used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death: and herein is justly censured for great Hypocrisie. And so, if God having appoynted men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sinnegry, that so they may be damned for those sinnes which he deuiniteth and draweth them into; he dissembleth, because he slanthereth them under a pretext of justice; for sinnes sake, but yet for such sinnes onely as he hath by his eternall counsell appoynted as the meanes of their ruine.

(3) Want of mercy in a high degree, as if he did so deuote light in bloud, that rather then he will not destroy men or soules, he will have them live and dye in sinne, that he may destroy them; like to those Pagan Princes, of whom *Iustinus Mart.* *Apol.* 2. two or three leaves from the beginning, say, evi-  
th (g) They are afraid that all should be just, lest they should have none to punish: But this is the disposition of hangmen, rather then of good Princes. And therefore farre be these foule enormities, and in particular this latter from the God of truth and father of mercies.

And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is (in my conceit) most evident, that the riged and upper way maketh God the author of mens sinnes, as well as punishments. And so much for the first generall Inconveniencie, which ariseth from this opinion, namely the dishonour of God.

## II. Inconveniences.

**T**He second Inconvenience is, the overthrow of true religion and good government among men.

To this, this opinion seemeth to tend, for these reasons.

1. Because it maketh sinne to be no sinne indeed, but onely in opinion. We use to say, *Necessity bath no law*: creatures or actions in which necessity beareth sway, are without law. Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swimme, any bruit creatures to doe according to their kindes, because their actions are naturall and necessary:

men. nary : they cannot upon any admonition doe otherwise. A purpose among creatures indued with reason and liberty, lawes are given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason raw them and freedome : fooles, mad men, and children, are subject to be put to law, because they have no liberty. To men that can use hypocrisie their liberty, lawes are not given neither, but in those absolute wills which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepy, to weepe, to laugh, to love or to hate ; because these actions and affections are naturall and necessary : the will may governe them, but it cannot for sinne preesse them.

ll coan. And so if to deale justly, to exercise charity, &c. with their contraries, be absolutely and antecedently necessary so to do too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within y man or a Mover without, we are as lawlesse in these, as in the he may other.

*In Iustitia.* Now if Necessity haue no law, then actions in themselves say, evill, if under the dominion of absolute necessity, are transgressions of no law and consequentlly no sinnes. For *Sinnes, rausa transgression of the Law.* *I Tob. 3.4.*

*re foul.* This that I say, hath been layd long ago. For *Iustitia Martis* speaking agaunt destiny, hath these words; (b) *If it be by destiny (that is, by absolute necessity, for that the fathers in my dogenerally call by the name of Destiny;) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad.* A speech like to this he hath a little after (c) *It would seeme, if this be so, that vertue and vice are nothing; but things are judged to be good or evill by opinion onely, which as good reason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety.* And surely well might he say so: for to what purpose was the Sonne of God made man, and being man made a sacrifice for sinne? why was the Ministerie of the word and sacraments ordeyned? to what end are heaven and hell propounded? why are exhortations, dissuasions, or any other meane to hinder men from sinne applyed, if sinne be nothing but a meere opinion?

*re but* *are* *to* *ing* *cel-* *ty:* *law:* *CH RIST,* the Christian faith, the word and Sacraments and whatsoeuer according to the Scriptures hath been don for the applying of the pardon of sinne, are all but meere fables, nay very impostures, if sinne be nothing. And by consequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Christians,

(b) *Iust. Mart. Apot.*  
2. a little beyond the middle. Si tao fieri ut esset aut improbus aut bonus, nec alii quidem probi essent nec alii mali.

(c) *Videretur verum esse, nihil esse virtutem nec virtutem sed opinionem solum bona & melius judicari: quia, ut veritatio docet, est maxima impietas & injustitia.*

Iewes,

Iewes, Turks, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whither tendeth this, but to the overthrow of religion?

2 Because it taketh away the conscience of sinne.

Why shoulde men be afraid of any sinne that pleaseith or may profit them, if they must needs sinne? or what reason have they to weepe and mourne when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truely, because they sinned necessarily?

(k) *Fati ita culpa est: nemo sit fato nocens.* The Tragedian saith, (k) when a man sinneth, *his destiny must bearre the blame.* *Necessity freeketh him from all iniquity.* Sinnen are either the faults of that *irresistible decree* that causeth them, or no faults at all. If either: then sorrow, feare, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunke in, religion cannot long continue; for the affections have been the strongest planters, and are the surest upholders of it in the world. *Primum in orbe Deos fecit timor.*

3 Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sinne.

Offences if fatall, cannot be justly punished. Thereason is, because those deeds for which men are punished or rewarded, must be their owne, under their owne power and soveraignty: but such are no fatall actions or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can sinne be punished, if it be absolutely necessary.

(1) Not temporally, as God himselfe hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Iewes. *Deut. 22.25.* which was, that if a maide commit uncleanness by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was, because *there was no cause of death in her:* what she yeelded to, was through compulsion, being overborne by power; as a man that is wounded to death by his Neighbour, so was a virgin in that case, a *sufferer* rather then a *doer.* This particular law is of universall right: no just punishment can be inflicted for sin, where there is no power in the party to avoyd it. The speech of *Lypsimus*, is but a meere crotchet contrary to reason, [*Fatali culpa fatali pena*] *Fatal faults must have fatal punishments.* Did Magistrates think mens offences unavoydable, they would think it bootles and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not onely so, but

we

we see by dayly experience, that Judges following the direction of reason, have very remissly punished such faults, as have been committed through the power of headstrong and exorbitant passions: Yea, we may reade of some, who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. *Valerius Maximus* tellet, that *Popilius* a Roman Prætor, sitting in judgment on a woman who had in a bitter passion slaine her mother, because she had murther'd her children; [ *neque damnnavit, neque absolvit* ] neyber cleared her nor condemned her. And *Aulus Gellius* reporteth of *Dotabella* the Proconsull of *Asia*, that when a woman of *Smyrna* was brought before him who had poyson'd her husband and son for murdering a son of hers, which she had by a former husband; he turned her over to the *Areopagus* (which was the gravest & most renowned judgment seat in the world.) The Judges there not daring to acquit her being stayned with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being provoked with just grieve; commanded the Accuser and the Offender to come before them 100 yeares after. And so

*Val. Max. 1.3.52.*

*Gell. 1.12.c.73*

(1) *Neyther was the Womans fact justified, the Lawes not allowing it, nor yet the woman punished; because she was worthy to be pardoned.* If wise Magistrates have spared such Offenders as have beene over-swayed with passions, which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular actions; they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity. Or, if offenders did thinke that their offences were theyr Destinies, and that when they Murther, Steale, commit adultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practice any outragious villanies; they doe them by the necessity of Gods unalterable decree, and can doe no otherwise: they would (and might) complaine of their punishments, as unjust; as *Zenoes* servant did. When he was beaten by his Master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten; because he was [ *fato coactus peccare* ] constrainted to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The *Adrumetine Monkes*, misled by *S. Austin*, Epist. 103: ad *Sixtum Presbyterum* (which he calleth a Booke, wherein he setteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace) did so teach grace, that they denied Free-will. And this

(1) *Neq; absolutum mulieris beneficium est, quod per leges non licuit; neq; nonconsensu damnata punienda que quæ digna venia- fuit.*

S. Austin confuted in his booke *Degratis & lib. arb.* And thinking the grace of God (as S. Aug. taught) to be such, as could not stand with freedome of will, they thought that no man shoulde be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for, that God would give them grace to do better. Against this, S. Austin directed his other Booke, *De Corr. & grat.* In which discourse though it be grace that is still named, yet predestination is included. For as *Kimedoncius* sayth truly in his Preface to *Luther, de servo arbit.* Betweene Grace and Predestination, there is onely this difference (as S. Aug. teacheth, *l. de Predef. Sandoyū cap. 10.*) that Predestination is a preparation of Grace, and Grace a bestowing of Predestination. As Zenoes servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge; did they considerately think that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the reslance of such a perswasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolencies, and a dissolution of all good government!

2 Nor if this be true, can sinne be punished eternally, or that tribunall be just, on which the sentence of eternal fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this, I have the Fathers bearing witnesse generally and plainly. *Tertullian* hath these words, (m) *The recompence of good or evill can with no justice be given to him, who is good or evill, not freely but of necessity.*

(m) *Tertul. lib. 2. Contr. Marcion. Cx-*  
teum, nec boni nec  
mali merces iure sé-  
farent ei, qui aut b.  
nus aut vaalus neces-  
sitate fuit inventus,  
non voluntate.

(n) *Liberi arbitrii  
nos condidit Deus,  
nec ad virtutes nec ad  
vitia necessitate trahi-  
mus: alioquin ubi ne-  
cessitas est, nec dam-  
natio, nec corona est.*  
(o) *Epiph. advers.  
her. l. 1. bar. 5. num.  
3. Sanè quidem justi-  
tia a stellis quæ necessitate piciunt, pænae repitantur, quum ab eo qui quod agit (ἀνεγκαύματος)*

*necessitate adactus aggreditur.* (p) *Aug. l. 2. contr. Faust. c. 5.* *Etnos quidem sub facto stel-  
larum nullius horumq; genesis ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel male vi-  
vitur, propter justum Dei iudicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus.* (q) *Prosp. ad Obj.  
19. Viss.* *Quod iudicium futurum omnino non esset, si homines Dei voluntate peccarent.*

finis

done by the will and determination of God. Fulgentius also iayth the same (r) It is great injustice in God to punish him Whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was St. Bernards opinion too, (s) It is onely a will free from compulsion and necessity (faith he) which maketh a creature capable of reward and punishment. Out of these testimonies layed together may be collected 3 things;

1 That the Ancients did use to call a *necessity* of humane actions good and bad by the name of *destiny*, from what external cause soever this necessity did arise.

2 That they did use these two words [*Necessity*] and [*Compulsion*] promiscuously: and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills liberty.

3 (Which is for our present purpose,) that they believed and contended, that the judgements of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any absolute necessity under the power of their sinnes.

I will therefore conclude this argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the error of the Pharisees, who believed the immortality of the soule, and the resurrection of the Dead, and yet held that all things come to passe by necessity. (t) It is (sayth hee) a Point of extreme ignorance or madnesse rather, for him that confesseth the resurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of Gods righteous judgement, to say, that there is any Destiny, any necessity in mens actions. For how can the righteous judgement of God and destiny comply and stand together? And (let me adde) how can the beliefe of this and true piety stand together? For where this perswasion that mens sinnes are necessary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in; religion will quickly be rooted out.

4 It tendeth to religions overthrow, because it maketh the whole circle of a mans life but a meere Destiny. By it all our doings are Gods ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his Predestination; and all events in King-domes and Common-weales the necessary issues of the di-

(v) *Fulgent. l. 1. c. 2.*  
*ad Mont. cap. 22. Nesci-  
jusititia justa dice-  
tur, si puniendum  
reum non invenire,  
sed fecisse dicatur.  
Major vero erit injus-  
titia, si lapsus Deus re-  
tribuat peccatum, quem  
statim prædelinse-  
re dicimus ad ruinam.*

(s) *Ber. I. de grā: & lib. arb. p. 908.* Sola voluntas, quoniam profuī ingēnita libertate aut dissentire sibi aut præter se in aliquo consenteat, nulla vi, nulla cogitur necessitate, non immiserito justum vel injustum beatitudine seu miseria dignā ac capacem creaturam constituit, prout feliciter justitiae, in justitiae consenserit.

(t) *Epiph. l. 1. adu-  
ber 16. p 35. nu 3.*  
Est illud vero extre-  
mæ cujusdam impedi-  
tis, ne dicim amen-  
tia, cuia resurrec-  
tio mortuorum, esse  
fata, ac justissimum  
a uisque facti iudici-  
um co*lli*atum fatu-  
m iudicemus esse ul-  
timum, afftere. Quia e-  
stis duo ista conve-  
nienter possunt, judicis  
sequi fatum.

vine decree. All things whatsoever, though they seem to doe somewhat; ; yet (by this opinion) they do indeed just nothing: the best lawes restraine not one offender, the sweetest rewards promote not one vertue, the powerfulllest Sermons convert not one sinner, the humblest devotions divert not one calamity, the strongest endeavours in things of any nature whatsoever, effect no more then would be done without them: but the necessitating, overruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of Religion doe nothing, why are they prescribed? If the wills of men doe nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, scared from another? And if good endeavours and onsets doe nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled, and every way governed by an active, absolute and almighty decree) to what purpose are they used? Who seeth not plainly whither these things tend? To nothing more, then the subversion of piety and policy, religion and lawes, society and government? This did the Romans see full well: ) and therefore, they banished [Mathematicos] The teachers and abettors of destiny, out of Rome. These and the like inconveniences which come from the upper way, did worke so with Prosper, as that he calls him no Catholique, who is of this opinion. (u) Whosoever saith, that men are urged to sinne and to be damned by the predestination of God, as by a ~~fact~~ all (unavoydable) necessity, he is no Catholique.

They did also make the Arauican councill denounce a curse against such. (w) That any are predestinated by the divine power to sinne, we doe not only not believe, but with the greatest detestation that we can, we denounce Anathema to such (if there be any such) as will believe so great an evill.

Thus farre of my reasons against the upper and most harsh and rigorous way.

**T**He Arguments by which for the present I stand convinced of the untruth, even of the milder and lower way too, I will take from;

These five following heads; namely, from

- 1 Pregnant testimonies of Scripture, directly opposing it.
- 2 Some principall attributes of God, not compatible with it.
- 3 The end of the word and Sacraments with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
- 4 Holy endeavours much hindred, if not wholly subverted by it.
- 5 Grounds of comfort (by which the conscience in distresse should be relieved) which are all removed by it.

It is  
I Repugnant to  
Scripture.  
Ezek. 33. 11.

1 It is repugnant to plaine and evident places of Scripture even in terminis, as will appear by these instances.

*As I live saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner; but that the wicked turne from his wayes and live.*

And lest men should say, It is true, God willeth not the death of a repenting sinner; the Lord in another place of the same Prophet, extendeth the proposition to them also that perish — *I have no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth.* Ezek. 18. 32.

In this Scripture we may note three things.

- 1 Gods affecti- *S Negatively, I have no pleasure in his death on to men, that dyeth.*  
set forth — *C Affirmatively, but that the wicked turne.*
- 2 The persons in whose destruction God delighteth not: (*Wicked men*) such as for their rejecting of grace dye and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much lesse in the death of men, eyther altogether innocent or tayated onely with originall sinne.

3 The truth of his affection; *As I live [Capit credi-  
bi] God woulde ne haue us believe him* (sayth Tertullian) when he sayth, *I will not the death of him that dyeth:* and therefore he bindeth his speech with an oath. (*x*) *Happy are we for whose sake the Lord vouchsafeth to sweare;* but most unhappy, if we believe him not when he sweareth.

Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, certainly he never did out of his absolute pleasure scaldup so many millions of men lying in the fall under in-

Tertull. lib. de  
pen. c. 4.

(x) O beatos nos;  
quorum causâ Deus  
jurat. O miserrimos,  
si nec jurantu domino  
credimus.

*The Sublapsarians doctrine*

vincible damnation: for such a decreeing of men to eternall death, is directly opposite to a delight in their repentence and everlasting life.

*God bath shew up all in unbelieve, that he might have mercy over all.*

In these the Apostles words are two (*Alls*) of equall extent, the one standing against the other.

An (*All*) of unbelievers, and an (*All*) of objects of mercy: looke how many unbelievers there be, on so many hath God a will of shewing mercy. And therefore, if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeliever; then is every man of every condition under mercy: and if every man be under mercy, then there is no precise antecedent will of God, of shutting up some and those the most from all possibility of obtaining mercy. For these two are *asurā* and cannot stand together.

*God so loved the world, that he gave his onely begotten Sonne; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, &c. God loved the world, sayth the Text, that is, the whole lumpe of mankinde: therefore he did not absolutely hate the greatest part of men.*

Againe, God loved it fallen into a gulph of sinne and misery. For he so loved them, as to send his sonne to redeem them; and a Saviour presupposeth sinne. He did not therefore hate the most of them lying in the fall: for love and hatred are contrary acts in God, and cannot be exercised about the same objects.

Many Expositers (I know) doe take [world] here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the world of Believers onely, but they have little reason for it (in my opinion;) for,

<sup>1</sup> I thinke there can be no place of Scripture alledged, wherein this word [world] especially with the addition of [whole] as *I. Epist. of Job. cap. 2. v. 3.* (a place equivalent to this for the matter of it and a comment upon it.) I say no place (I thinke) can be produced, where [world] doth signifie onely the Elect, or onely believers; but it signifieth, cyther all men, or at least the most men living in some certaine place, and at some certaine time, but without distinction

distinction of good and bad, or if it be used anywhere more restraynedly, it is applyed onely to wicked and Reprobate men, who in their affections are wedded to the world and its transitory delights: and therefore do most properly deserve this name.

2 Suppose it be granted, that (World) in some Scripturæ is restrayned to the Elect; yet it cannot beare this signification here; - because,

1 The words then would have a fenseleſſe construction. For thus would they runne; *God so loved the Elect that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh, &c.* and if they run thus, this would follow: - There are two ſorts of the Elect, ſome that do believē and ſhall be ſaved, others that do not believē and ſhall be damned: which is a diſtinction or diſtinction unknowne in Divinity.

2 Believers and unbelievers, damned and ſaved, comprehend all mankind: for there is no man but he is one of theſe. Now (world) in this place includeth believers and unbelievers, the ſaved and the damned, as appeareth moſt plainly to him that layeth the 16, 17, and 18. verſes together. Therefore it ſignifyeth here all mankind without exception of any.

*Who would have all to be ſaved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.*

2. Tim. 2. 4.

In theſe words, the Apostle delivereth two things:

1 That it is Gods will, that men ſhould enjoy a happy end, and be ſaved.

2 That it is alſo his will, they ſhould have the meaneſ and make a good uſe of them in comming to the knowledge of the truth, that ſo they might be ſaved. There is no let in God, but that all men may believē and be ſaved: and therefore there is no absolute will, that many thouſand men ſhall dye in unbeliefe and be damned.

Two anſwers are uſually returned, which I confeſſe give me little ſatisfaction.

1 That by (All) here we are to understand all ſorts, and not every particular man in theſe ſorts.

It is true, that (All) is ſometimes ſo taken in Scripture; but (I believē) not here: for the very context ſheweth, that we are to understand by it the individuals and not the kinds.

kinds. In the first verse there is a duty enjoyned. [ *7 Will that prayers and supplications be made for all men;* ] and in this verse the motive is annexed [ *God will have all to be saved;* ] As if he should have sayd - Our charity must reach to all whom God extends his love to.

God out of his love will have all to be saved : and therefore in charity we must pray for all. Now in the duty, ( *All* ) signifyeth every man : for no man though wicked and profane is to be included from our Prayers.

*Pray for them* ( sayth our Saviour ) *that persecute you: and pray* ( sayth the Apostle here ) *for Kings and all that are in authority;* men in those dayes, though the greatest, yet the worst, the very Lyons, Wolves and Beares of the Church: *Pray for them.* And if for them, then for any other. Thus in the duty it signifieth every man : and therefore, it must have the same extent in the motive too, or else the motive doth not reach home, nor is strong enough to enforce the duty.

The second answer is, that God will have all to be saved with his *revealed will*, but millions to be damned with his *secret will*.

But if this answer stand, then ( in my apprehension ) these inconveniences will follow.

1 That Gods words (which are his *revealed will*) are not interpretations of his minde and meaning ; and by consequence are not true : for the speech which is not the signification of the minde, is a lye.

2 That there are two contrary wills in God , a *secret will*, that many sonnes of *Adam* shall irrevocably be damned, and a *revealed will*, that all the sonnes of *Adam* may be saved.

3 That one of Gods wills must needs be bad, cyther the secret or the revealed will. For of contraries, if the one be good, the other is bad : and so of Gods contrary wills, if one be good, the other must needs be bad. For, *malum est contrarium bono.*

*Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, &c.*

This Scripture is not soliable to the exceptions against the former testimony. For it is a negative proposition and must

must be taken distributively: and therefore speaketh that in plaine termes, which is contrary to absolute reprobatio.

That which is usually replyed, is, that the persons here spoken of, are the elect onely, and such as truely believer: God is not willing that any of them should perish.

But the contrary appeareth in the text. For the persons here mentioned are those, toward whom God exerciseth much patience, and long suffering; as it is in the words next going before. And who are they? Are they the elect, are they believers onely? No, but Reprobates rather, who dy for their contempt of grace. For it is apparent by Scriptures, that God doth patiently expect the conversion even of them that are never changed, but dye in their sinnes, as we may see, 1 Pet. 3. v. 19, 20. Where we read that the patience of God was exercised toward those, who in the dayes of Noah despised it, and went to prison, that is, to Hell for it. Yea of all men, Reprobates are the truest and most proper objects of Gods patience, as we may see, Rom. 2. 4. where St. Paul speaking of such as go on in sinne, and treasure up wrath to themselves against the day of wrath, saith, that God useth patience towards them that he might lead them to repentance. And Rom. 9. 22. He endureth (saith the text) with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. In the 5 of Esay, v. 2. and the 63 cap. v. 2. we may see the same thing. Reprobates therefore as well as others, nay rather then others, doth Peter here speake of, and saith, that God would have none of them to perish: if they do perish, it is through their owne fault and folly, and not Gods absolute pleasure, who would have no man to perish.

To these testimonies, I may adde these conditionall speeches.

If thou seek him, he will be found of thee: but if thou forsake him, he will cast thee off for ever. 1 Chron. 28. 9.

If you seek him, he will be found of you: but if you forsake him, he will forsake you. 2 Chron. 35. 2.

If thou doe well, shalst thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sinne lyeth at the doore. Gen. 4. 7.

The just shall live by faith: but if any man withdraw him self, my soule [in evanescē] shall have no pleasure in him. Heb. 10. 22.

### The Sublapsarian doctrine

shall not like him, he shall be a Reprobate.

By all these and many other places that speake conditionally (for ought that I can see) it is cleere, that God forsaketh no man considered simply in the fall, till by actuall sinnes and continuance in them he forsake God. Now if God reject no man from salvation in time and in deed, till he cast off God; then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw, would reject and cast off him. For Gods acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time. *Ephes. 1. 11. He worketh all things* (sayth the Apostle) *according to the counsell of his own will:* and therefore there must be an exact conformity between them, as between [ *regulam* ] and [ *regulatum* ], the rule and the thing squared thereby. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the world, we may know what he purposed to do before the world; and by his actuall casting men off when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to cast them off, for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not before.

Besides, it is in substance all one, to cast a man off indeed and to entertaine a resolution to do it. Our *volle* and *facere* are all one in Gods account: and the reason is, because where there is a deliberate and settled will, the deed will follow, if nothing hinder. Much more is Gods will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent and irresistible: and whatsoever he willeth directly and absolutely, is certainly done, when the time commeth.

Well: all these plaine and expresse Scriptures, with the whole course and tenour of Gods word, this opinion flatly contradicting; though it do (perhaps) shrowd it selfe in some darke and obscure speeches of holy writ, I take it to be an untruth. For what S. Austin sayth in another case, I may safely say in this. (y) Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure? (z) A few *Testimonies* (sayth Tertullian,) most receive an expostion answerable to the current of Scripture, not contrary

(y) *Nunquid ideo negandum quod appetum est, quia comprehendere non potest quod occultum est.*  
 (z) *Secundum plura pauciores sunt intelligenda, & ne unus sermo subvertat aliis, secundum omnia potius, quam adversus omnes intelligendam.*

This is my first reason.

Second:

**S**econdly, it croftib some principall *Attributis* of God: therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own most glorious nature, and such as are incompatible with these excellent Attributes, by which he hath discovered part of himselfe to men. [*Voluntas Dei semper sequitur naturam suam*] is a rule among Divines, *Gods will always follow his nature*; the reason why, is given by the Apostle, 2. Tim. 2. 13. *God cannot deny himselfe.*

3 It is incompatible with Gods Attributis.

Two things are here to be premised.

1 That Gods chiefe attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified; which are *Mercy, Justice, Truth and Holiness*. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these among men, then by the putting forth of his unlimited power and *soveraignty*; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects for his equity, candor and clemency, then for his dominion and authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For,

(1) *Power* is no vertue; but Holines, Mercy, Justice, and Truth are: acts of power are not morally good in themselves, but are made good or evill by their concomitants. If they be accompanied with Justice, Mercy, &c. they are good; if otherwise, they are naught. For [*justum operi effe, quod landem meretur*] *Nothing deserveth praise, unless it be just.*

(2) Power and soveraignty may as well be shewed in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. *Saul* shewed his authority and power to the full in slaying the Lords Priests, and *Nabuchadnezar* in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and *Daniel* into the Lyons Denne; but no Mercy, nor Justice, nor any thing else that was good.

2 The second thing to be preconfidered, is —

That Justice, Mercy, Truth, and Holiness in God are the same in nature with these vertues in men, though infinitely differing in degree; ( as light in the ayre and the Sunne, are the same in nature, not degree: ) and that which is just, upright and mercifull in men, is so in God too: and

by these vertues in our selves with acts conformable to them. [ *tanquam ex pede Herculem* ] we may safely measure what are so in God. For otherwise these things will follow.

(1) The common and received distinction of divine Attributes into *communicable* and *incommunicable* would fall to the ground. For against it this might be sayd, that the holiness, mercy, justice and sincerity with other vertues that are in us, are not the perfections of God in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.

Gen. 1. 17.  
Col 3. 10.  
2. Pet. 1. 4.

(2) Men cannot be truly sayd to be made according to Gods Image; nor when they are regenerated to be renewed after the same image, and to be made partakers of the divine nature. That picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in his parts and lineaments truly resemble him: no more can we be truly called the picture or image of God, if in our graces ( in respect of which we are principally so called ) there be not a lively resemblance of Gods attributes.

Math. 5. 48.  
2. Pet. 1. 16.

(3) We may not safely imitate God, as we are comanded. *Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect: and Be ye holy, as I am holy.* Nor when we shew forth holiness, mercy, justice and sincerity in our doings, can we be properly sayd to imitate God, if these be one thing in God and in men another.

These two things being thus premised, viz. Gods holiness, mercy, justice and truth, are four of his chiefe Attributes, in the exercise of which, he taketh himselfe to bee much glorified; and that we are to measure these attributes by the same vertues in our selves.

I come to the prooфе of my second reason, against absolute Reprobation stated even in the mildest and most plausible way.

It opposeth Gods principall Attributes; particularly

his {  
Holiness.  
Mercy.  
Justice.  
Sincerity.

1. Reprobation to Gods Holiness, First, it fighteth with Gods Holiness, and maketh him the principall cause of sinne in the greatest number of men. I know

know that the defenders of it do not thinke so. For the maine reason which moved the Synod at *Dort* and some other Divines before and since, to bring downe Predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall; was, that they might maiataine a fatall and absolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoyd this imputation, as "Dr. *Twisse* hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can see) they have not compassed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their conclusions too, that of all the sinnes of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principall author.

Two things they say, which taken together (me thinks) inferre it.

1 That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate, in which they cannot avoyd sinne.

2 That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.

1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they can not possibly avoyd sin: that is, into the state of originall sinne, which consists of two parts: 1 The guilt of *Adams* transgressions. 2 The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankind is interessed, not through the force and efficacie of naturall generation, because we all derive our nature from *Adam* as our first principle; but by Gods free and voluntary order and imputation. (a) *It came not to passe by any naturall meanes* (sayth *Calvus*) *that all men fell from salvation by the fault of our first parent.* (b) *That all men are hold under the guilt of eternall death in the person of one man; it is the cleare and constane voyce of Scripture.* Now this cannot be ascribed to any naturall cause: it must therefore come from the wonderfull counsell of God. A little after he hath the same again with as great an Emphasis, - (c) *How is it, that so many nations with their children should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so?* As roundly doth Dr. *Twisse* affirme the same. (d) *The guilt of originall sinne is derived to us onely by imputation; the filth onely by propagation: and both these onely by Gods free constitution.* A little before hee hath these words - (e) *The fault of nature commeth from enim; quarecum utraque sic voluntate Dei, Deus enim nulla necessitate, sed pro uictu sua uocat nobis imputat peccatum Adx.*

\*Dr. *Twisse* his viad. gral. 1. par. 1. c. 4. initio.

(a) *Calv. Inflit. l. 3. c. 13. sect. 7.* Nō enim factum est naturaliter, ut à salute exciderent omnes unius parentis culij.

(b) *Cunctos mortales in unius hominis persona morti eternae mancipatos fuisse Scriptura clamatis: hoc cum naturæ nequeat ascribi, ab admirabili dei consilio protectum esse minime obscurum est.*

(c) *Quomodo factum est, ut tot gentes una cum liberi coruia infantibus, eternæ morti involueret lapsus A.D. x. absque remedio, nisi quia deo ita visum est.*

(d) *Twisse viad. gral. 1. par. 1. digr. 4. c. 3. prope finem.* Originallis peccati reatus, non nisi imputatione, lues non nisi propagatione, ad nos derivatus; quorum utique non nisi a libera Dei constitutione proficiuntur.

(e) *Etenim naturæ viuum non est cuique suum voluntate propriâ contractum, sed sola imputatione aut propagatione derivatum.*

Gods free appointment: for he doth not out of any necessity, but of his meere will onely impute the sinne of Adam to us. To this purpose he speaketh a great deale more in the same place. - To these sayings S. Bernard hath the like: speaking of Adams sinne, he sayth. (f) Adams sinne is anothers, because we knew not of it; and yet ours, because it was through the iust, though secret judgment of God repented ours.

And this that they say is agreeable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sinne and the corruption of nature, onely because we were in Adams loyns when he sinned, and derive our being from him; then these two things will follow.

1 That we stand guilty of all the sinnes which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were virtually in his loynes as well after his fall as before, and in every passage and variation of his life he was still a priinciple of mankinde. But where doe we reade that we are guilty of any other of his sinnes? To the first sinne onely doth the Scripture entitle that sinne and misery, which entred into the world, and invaded all mankinde, as we may see Rom. 5. 15, 16, 17, &c.

2 That children are guilty of the sinnes of all their progenitors, especially of their immediate Parents. For they were in theyr loynes when they sinned, and more immediatly then in Adams. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children, as we may see, Exod. 20. 5. where God saying, that he will visite the sinnes of the Fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation in them that [ hate ] him; plainly implyeth, that children are not simply charged with their fathers sinnes, but conditionally if they be haters of God as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents, they become partakers of their sinnes. In Ezek. 18. 14. &c. The Lord signifies thus much in his Apology against the Cavill of the Lewes. For first he sayth, that if a wicked man beget a sonne that seeth his Fathers sinnes, and doth not the like, he shall not dye for the iniquity of his Father. This implyeth, that the derivation of being from the Parent doth not render the child obnoxious to the punishment of the fathers sinne, nor

con-

consequently to the sinne. For the good childe is not obnoxious, and yet the good childe is equally in the fathers loynes with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him.

And then verf. 20. the Lord telleth them expressly thus much, in two propositions.

1 *Affirmatively. The Soule that sinneth, it shall dye.* And that it may be knowne that he speakest exclusively, onely the soule that sinneth, shall dye; he delivers his minde.

2 *Negatively, The Sonne shall not beare the iniquity of the Father, neither shall the Father beare the iniquity of the Sonne, &c.*

Our Saviour in that wofull speech of his to the Pharisees, *Math. 23. 32, 34. Fulfill yee also the measure of your Fathers. Behold I send unto you Prophets, &c. themye shall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous blood, &c.* Intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritors of their Fathers sinnes and punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their fathers sinnes, they came to inherit both their sinnes and plagues. Miserable would our case bee on whom the ends of the world are come, if children should be guilty of all their Ancestors prevarications. What a world of sinnes should we be to answer for, personall sianes, parents, progenitors sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined.

This is the first thing.

II. Secondly, they say that God hath immutably decreed, to leave the farre greatest part of mankinde in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sinne to newnesse of life; and this decree he executeth in time; and both these he doth out of his onely will and pleasure.

Of this proposition there be three branches.

1 God decreeth to leave them.

2 He doth leave them.

3 He doth both out of his alone pleasure.

1 God (say they) hath decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessity.

necessity of sinning. This is the very *Helen* which they fight for, the maine act of that absolute Reprobation, which with joynt-consent and endeavour they labour to maintaine.

Most of them cast their Reprobation into two acts: a *Negative*, which is a peremptory denyall of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall: and a *Positive*, which they say is a preordination of the men thus left, to the eternall torments of Hell.

Others among them define Reprobation by an act meere-ly negative, and call it [*Non Electionem, decretum quo statuit non eō ulque māseri, &c.*] Thus our Divines in theyr suffrage define it, and in their explication of the definition which they give; they say, that the proper acts of Reprobation, as it standeth oppoited to Election, are no other then a denyall of that faine glory and grace, which are prepared in the decree of Election for the Sonnes of God. But in this they all agree, that by the decree of Reprobation, grace necessary for the avoyding of sinne, is flatly denied to Reprobates. And if at any tyme we heare them say, that God hath gratified Reprobates with some grace; ( for so sayth *W. a. a.*, Reprobates are left *(g) Under the common providence of God, and consequently under some common endowments:* And our Divines in the Synod say, *(h) Reprobates though they are not elected, yet receive many of Gods graces:* they are to be understood, of such guifts and graces as are insufficient to make them avoyd sinne, as we may see in thete two cyted places and many more.

*(g) Wil. defens A. 4. nat Armin. de Kep. In statu pristino & sub exercitio arbitrii sui, & administratio- ne communis provi- denzie.*

*(h) Suffr. Brit. thes. 4. de Reprob. Hos eti- non electi, percipi- tamen multa gra- tia divine effecta esse negamus.*

2 God doth actually according to his eternall and unchangeable decree leave the Reprobates in their severall tyme and generations, without his grace, under a necessity of final sinne and impenitency.

This is the seconde branch, of that second proposition. And this must they needs say. For Gods decrees cannot be frustrated: what he purposed before time, without fail he doth in time. I shall not need the before to prove, that they say so; Neverthelesse, to let it be seene how positively and categorically they say so, I will give an instance or two. The Divines of Geneva at the Synod among theyr Theeses of Reprobation, have this for one —

*(i) Those*

(i) Those whom God hath reprobated, out of the same will by which hee hath rejected them, eyther he calleth not at all, or being called, he reneweth not thoroughly by the spirit of regeneration, ingraffeth not into Christ mystically, nor justifieth, &c. Like to this is the speech of Lubbert, who speaking of Reprobates, saith; (k) To them eyther he revealeth not the way of salvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration: but leaveth them in sinne and misery. The same Author, speaking against the position of the Remonstrants, *viz.* that God doth supply to all men sufficient and necessary meanes of salvation, with an intention of saving them; setteth downe this Antithesis, -- (l) God doth not administer to all men meanes needfull and sufficient to salvation, and that with an intention of saving them. And to this his Antithesis, *Polyander, Walaw, and Thysius*, 3 other professors of divinity in the Low-Countries did set their hands.

3 God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves, of his alone absolute will and pleasure.

This is the third branch.

That they say so, witnesse the suffrage of our English Divines. (m) We affirm, that this non-Election is founded in the most free pleasure of God. And (n) that no man lying in the fall is pass over by the meere Will of God; is numbered by the same Divines among the Heterodox positions. To this purpose also speake the Ministers of the Palatinate, (o) The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God, - (p) That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Goffell, the cause is the same free pleasure of God.

(q) God decreed to leave some in the fall, of his owne good pleasure. Thus the Divines of Hessen. The prooufe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time, — (r) God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen and doth not bestow upon them meanes necessary to believe, &c. and this our

rimus ac justissima Dei voluntas. (p) Ib thes 4. Quod Deus nonnullos praeterit gratia praedicati. unus evan. elii, ejus causa est idem beneficium, sive eadem libera voluntas. (q) Iudic. Theol. Hissiac. Decreuit deus quosdam in lapsu & miseria relinqueret pro suo beneficio. (r) Deus in tempore quosdam in genere humano de relinquit in miseria sua, nec media ad fidem & conversionem ipsiusque etiam salutem obtainendam necessaria eis confert, &c. idque pro liberaria sua voluntate.

of his most free pleasure. This they joynly affirme, and prove it by this reason especially; All men were lookeit on as sinners: If sinne therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate, he should have reprobated or rejected all.

But he did not reprobate all; therefore for sinne he reprobated none, but for his own pleasure, in which we must rest without seeking any other cause.

Now from these two things layd together, viz.

- 1 That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning.
- 2 That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity: it will follow that he is the author of the reprobates sinnes.

1 Because [*Causa causa est causa causati,*] *The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect,* (if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect;) whether it be a cause by acts negative, or positive. But God is the chiefe or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace; therefore he is (by the same doctrine) the true and proper cause of their sinnes.

2 Because [*Removens prohibens, &c.*] that, which withdraweth or withholdeth a thing, which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event: as for example, he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs, is the cause of the falling of that stone; and he that withdraweth a pillar, which being put to, would uphold a house; is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house. But God (by their opinion) withholdeth from Reprobates that power, which being granted them, might keep them from falling into sinne: therefore he becommeth a true moral cause of their sinnes, -- (s) *In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, When it is done,* saith Tertullian.

(s) *Tertul. l. 1. contr. Marcion. c. 22.* In cuius manu est quid ne fiat, ei deputatur, *men jam sit,*

It will not suffice to say, that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becommeth only an *accidentall*, not a proper and direct cause of their sinnes. For a cause is then only accidentall in relation to the effect, when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause. For example: digging in a feild is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected nor

hor intended by the husbandman in digging, But when the effect is looke for and aymed at, then the cause (though it be the cause onely by withholding the impediment) is not accidentall; as a pilot who withholdeth his care, and skill from a ship in a storne, foreseeing, that by his neglect the Ship will be drownned, is not to be reputed an accidentall, but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship. This being so, it followeth, that God by this act and decree of removing and detayning grace necessary to the avoyding of sinne, from Reprobates, not as one ignorant and carelesse what will or shall follow, but knowing infallably what mischiefe will follow, and determining precisely that, which doth follow; namely, their impenitency and damnation, becommeth the proper and direct cause of their sinnes.

### Secondly, it opposeth Gods Mercy.

God is mercifull; a part it is of his title. *Exod. 34. 6.*  
*mercifull and gracious.* He is mercy in the abstract, *1 Job. 4.*  
*16. God is love, a Father of mercies, and God of all consolations,* *2 Cor. 1. 3. a Saviour of men,* *1 Tim. 4. 10.* And thus the Church hath alwayes taken him to be. And therefore hath of old stiled him in her liturgy, *A God, Whose nature and property is always to have mercy and to forgive.*

<sup>3</sup> Contrary to his Mercy.

Two wayes is Gods mercy spoken of in Scripture, absolutely and comparatively.

(1) *Absolutely*, and so it is set out in high and stately termes. It is called *rich mercy*, *Eph. 3. 4. great kindness*. *Jonah. 4. 2. Abundant mercy*, *1 Pet. 1. 2. love without height or depth, length or breadth, or any dimensions, - love passing knowledge*, *Eph. 3. 18.* So great it is, that *Jonah* could not intreat him to punish the little, infant, hamelesse Ninivites with temporall death for the sinnes of their guilty parents. *Jonah 4. 11.*

(2) *Comparatively*: with two things it is compared.

1 His owne justice.

2 The love that dwelleth in the creature: and is advanced above both.

I. With his owne Justice it is compared and advanced above it: not in its essence (for all Gods excellencies are infinite).

infinitely good; and one is not greater then another) but in its expressions, and some things that have relation to it; particularly in these;

(1) In its naturalnesse and dearenesse to God. It is sayd of mercy, it pleaseth him, *Micah. 7.18.* but justice is called his strange worke [alio nō a naturā suā] *Ezay 28.21.* He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. *Lamentat. 3.33.*

(2) In the frequent exercise of it selfe. He is said to be slow of anger, but abundant in goodness. *Exod. 34.6.* mercies are bestowed every day; judgements inflicted but now, and then, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is no remedy, *2 Chron. 36.15.* All the day long have I stretched out my hands to a gain saying and rebellious people, *Ezay. 65.3.* That is, I have been patient a long time, and in that time I have not been idle, but employed in exhorting, promising and shewing mercy, that so I might do you good. God waits a great while for the conversion of sinners, as Marriners doe for theyr tyde: and at last with much adoe, if there be a necessity, he chideth and fighteth.

(3) In its amplitude or objects, to whom it is extended; Visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation, but shewing mercy to those fands, *Exod. 20.5.* In these words God implyeth, that his mercy reacheth farther then his justice, and that, how much 3 or 4 come short of a thousand; so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in the exercise of it.

(4) In the occasions that move God to exercise them. It is a great matter that moveth God to punish, as we may see, *Gen. 6.5,6,7,12,13.* when the wickednesse of man was great in the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way, then God thinketh of a flood. He would not destroy the Amorites, till their wickednesse was full. *How oft would I have gathered thee?* saith CHRIST to Jerusalem, *Mashim. 23.37.* that is, I have not taken advantages against thee, nor upon the first, second, or third unkindnes, cast thee off: small matters have not moved me to destroy thee, O Jerusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare men? when he had examined Sodome, and found their sinnes to be

be answerable to the cry, yet then, for ten righteous mens sakes would he have spared *Sodome*, *Gen. 18. 32*. Nay, he would have spared *Jerusalem*, if the Prophet could by his searching have found one man who did execute judgment and seek the truth. *Jer. 5. 1*. What a slender humiliation made him to spare wicked *Ahab* and his house a long time? *1. Kings, 21. 29*. And the repentance of *Ninive*, whose wickednesse cryed to the Lord for vengeance, *Jonah. 1. 2* did easily procure her a pardon.

Thus is Gods mercy advanced above his justice.

2 It is compared also with the affection of a father to his sonne, of a tender mother to her childe, and of the most affectionate bruits to their brood, and set above them all. It goeth beyond a fathers to his sonne, *Mat. 7. 11*. *If you that are evil, can give good giuists to your children; how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that aske him?* What doth this (*quanto magis*) imply, but that Gods love out-strips a fathers! And so it doth a mothers too. *Esay, 49. 15*. *Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she shoud not have compassion upon the Sonne of her wombe? yea, they may forget, yet I will not forget thee.* Women are compassionate toward their children, because they are the fruit of their wombes, and a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they toward those children, to whom they are *Nurses*, as well as *mothers*, to their sucking children. And yet mothers may forget even their sucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his children.

Againe, God compareth himselfe with one of the most affectionate females among unreasonale creatures, (the Hen) *Math. 23. 37*. *O Ierusalem, how oft would I have gather'd thee, as a Hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, &c.* No Bird (sayth S. Austin) expresseth such tender love to her young ones, as the Hen doth; (t) No Fowles discover themselves to be mothers, so much as Hens doe. Others, when we see them in their Nests with their young, we know them to be mothers, but no way else: but the Hen discovereth her selfe to be so even when her chickens do not follow her; her feathers stand up, her wings hang downe, she strockes her mounfully and goeth feebly; so that we may know her to be a mother,

(t) *Aug. tract. 15. in Iob. pag. 4. 6.* Videmus nidiificare passeres quoslibet ante oculos nostros: hirundines, ciconias, columbas, quotidie videmus nidiificare: quos nisi quindam in nidis videamus, parentes esse non agnoscimus. Gallina verè sic infirmatur in pullis suis, ut etiam in ipsis pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas. Ita fit a lis demissis, plumis hispida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demissis & abjecta; ut (quemadmodum dixi) erit filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas.

mother, when yet we cannot see her brood.

Such another speech he hath in another place, and concludeth it with these words. (w) Our Lord did therefore compare himselfe to a Hen rather, then to any other creature, because of her singular expressions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her sight.

By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of Gods mercy, especially in its expressions to mankinde, to whom he hath borne a greater love, and for whom he hath declared himselfe to have done farre greater matters, then for the Angels; the wisdome of God delighting it selfe in the cbldren of men, before the world was. Prov. 8. 31: and gratifying them in the fulnesse of time with the assumption of their nature. (Heb. 2. 16.) and the redemption of their soules with his bloud. 1. Pet. 1. &c.

Now with such a *Mercy* cannot stand such a decree: absolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me think) more properly call God a *Father of cruelties*, then of *mercies*, and of [hatred] rather then of [love]. And the Devils names [Satan, and Ἀρωνων] an *adversary*, a *destroyer* may be fitter for him, then [Σωτης] a *Saviour*, which I tremble to think. Doth *mercy* please him, when he hath made a decree which sheweth farre more severity toward poore men then *mercy*? Is he *slow to anger*, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the greater part of men for ever; and for one sinne once committed, hath shut them up under invincible sinne and *damnation*? Is his *mercy abundant*, doth it reach further then *justice*; when it is tuckt up so short, limited to a very few selected ones, when a hundred for one at least (take in all parts of the world) are unavoidably cast away out of his onely will and pleasure? Or doth his *love passe knowledge*, when we see dayly farre greater *love*, then this in men and other creatures? What *Father* and *mother* (that have not only cast off *father-hood* and *mother-hood*, but *humanity* too) would determine their children to certaine *death*, nay to *cruell torments worse then death* for one onely offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own persons, but by some other, and imputed onely to them?

But to deliver things a little more closely. Four things

(in

(in my conceit) being well and distinctly considered, do make it apparent, that this decree is compatible with Gods mercy.

1 That Adams sinne is the sinne of mans nature onely and no mans personall transgression, but Adams: it was neyther committed nor consented to, by any of his posterity in their own persons.

2 That it was the sinne of our nature, not by generation (as I have shewed) but by Gods own voluntary imputation.

3 That God did pardon it in Adam, (for so it is generally beleived;) who did actually and freely commit it in his own person.

4 That CHRIST came into the world to take away [Peccatum mundi] the sinne of the world. Job, 1: 29. That God eyther did or might have satisfied his wronged justice, in the bloud of the Covenant for all mankind, and without any impeachment to justice, and have opened a way of salvation to all and every man.

These considerations (I think) being well digested, will make any man to think, that eyther there is no decree of absolute Reprobation; or that God is not mercifull to men at all: much lesse more mercifull to them then to other creatures; but more sharpe a great deale and severer then he is

to { 1 any Creatures in the world.

to { 2 the very Divels themselves.

1 Then to any other creatures. For they, even the basest among them, though perhaps they have but a despicable being, yet they have such a being as is farre better then no being at all: Whereas men are determined by his omnipotent decree to such a wofull being, as is a thousand times worse then no being at all. What man would have accepted of life, when first he entred upon possession of it, if he had knowne upon what lamentable conditions, it was to be tendred? Or (did men firmly beleive this decree) they would at a venture with Job curse their birth day, be released willingly from the right of creatures, and desire their immortall soules might vanish into nothing. *Melanch.* *extingui penitus, quam ad supplicia reparari* (as *Minutius Felix* speaks in another case) And Parents out of meere compas-

*Mit. Felix pag.*

113.

compassion to their children, would wish that they might be borne toads and serpents, rather then men; creatures whose beings at last shall be resolved into nothing, rather then immortall spirits.

2 To the very Diuels also ( supposing this decree ) is God more mercifull, then to men; and yet the Divels are set forth in Scripture for the greatest spectacles of Gods i'refull severity. In one thing, this decree maketh most men and Divels equall, [ *Verisque desperata salu*, ] they are both sure to be damned: but in three things, men are in a ferre worse condition by it.

( 1 ) In their appointment to hell, not for their *owne, proper, personall sinnes*, for which only the Divels are damned: but for the sinne of another man, that lived and sinned long before they were borne.

( 2 ) In their *unavoyable* destination to endlesse misery, under a colour of the contrary. The Divels, as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they looke for no other. But men, who are appointed to wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of salvation and made to beleeeve that the whole busynesse is put into their hands; so as if they perish, it is not [ *defectu misericordia* ] because God will have no mercy on them, but [ *defectu voluntatis proprie*, ] because they will not bee saved: when yet indeed there is no such matter.

Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery, then simply to be miserable; then is the condition of men in this respect (by this decree) much worse then the state of Divels.

( 3 ) In their *obligation* to beleeeve, and the *aggravation* of their punishment by not beleeving. The Divels, because they must be damned, are not commanded to beleeeve in C H R I S T, nor is their punishment heightned by theyr not beleeving: but miserable men, who by this decree have no more liberty to escape Hell, then the Divels, must yet be tyed to beleeeve in C H R I S T, and have their torments increased, if they beleeeve not. These things being so, (I think) I may conclude with the words of *Proph*. ( x ) *He which sayth, that God would not have all men to be saved, but a certaine set number of predestinate persons onely: he speakeith more harshly then he shoulde of the heighe of Gods unsearchable grace. Nay, he*

(7) *Senten. super. 8.c.*  
*Gall. Qui dicit quod non omnes homines velit deus salvos fieri, sed certum numerum prædestinatorem; dicit loquitur, quæ loquendum est de altitudine inscrutabilis graue Dei.*

He speaketh that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sonnes of men.

Nor doth that give me satisfaction, which is usually answered, namely, that God by this absolute decree doth fully manifest his justice and mercy too: his justice toward Reprobates, his mercy toward the Elect; and that it is necessary his decrees should so be ordered, as that both these may be clearly declared by them. For,

1 Gods mercy is revealed to be *rich mercy, abundant, long suffering*, surmounting justice, and beyond understanding. Now such a mercy set forth with such titles, clothed with such properties, is no wayes manifested by this decree.

2 Neyther is Gods pure and spotlesse Justice set forth by it, as I now come to shew: this being my third argument drawne from Gods attributes against absolute Reprobation.

Thirdly, this absolute Reprobation is incompatible with Gods Justice.

3 Against Gods Justice.

The Lord (sayth David) is *righteous in all his wayes*, Pial. 145. The *Judgments of the Lord* (sayth Salomon) are *weight and measure*. Prov. 16.11. Exact and without exception. So apparently just is God, that he offereth the justice of his decrees and wayes to the tryall of humane understanding. *E-say, 5. 3. Judge I pray you between me and my Vineyard.* Those to whom the Vineyard was committed, flew their masters heyre being sent unto them: *What will the Lord of the Vineyard thinke ye* (sayth CHRIST) do therefore when he commeth, to those husbandmen? Math. 21.40. In which words hee appealeth to their judgment: nay, he is content to proove himselfe and his dealings to be just by plaine and evident arguments, *Ezek. 18. 25. &c.* *Are not my wayes equal, and yours unequal, O ye house of Israel?* And he permits Abraham when he was in his greatest humility acknowledging himselfe to be but dust and ashes, yet to reason with him about the equity of his doings. *Wilt thou slay the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* Gen. 18.23, 25. And Moses also is suffered to argue Gods justice in the same manner. *Shall one man sinne, and wilt thou be wrath with all the congregation?* In a word, so evidently just is God in all his proceedings; that many both good and bad,

who have felt his justice, have cleared God, and deeply charged themselves. Witness *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, and *Daniel* in their 9th. Chapters: and *Adonibezek*, *Ind.* 1. 7. And the Emperor *Mauricius*, who having seen his children butchered, and waiting every misure for the bloody stroke of death, brake out into these words. (7) *Righteous art thou O Lord, and just is thy judgment.*

(y) *Osiand. Eccl. hist.* Cen. 5. pag. 261. In-

stus es domine & ju-  
stum est iudicium tu-  
rum.

With this inviolable justice of God, cannot absolute Reprobation (of such especially, as are commanded to believe and are called to salvation) be reconciled.

My Reasons are these.

1 Because it maketh God to punish the Righteous with the wicked. -

The *Sublapsarians* say directly in plaine termes, that God decreed to destruction mea considered without sin, and therefore yet righteous. And the *Sublapsarians* say as much in effect; for they say two things.

(1) That God did lay a necessity upon every man of being borne in Originall sinne (as I have noted before.)

(2) That he hath determined for that sinne to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever: and so they make God to doe that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one.

*Calv. Instit. 3.*  
cap. 23. §. 23.

This is so cleare a case, that *Calvin* with some others have not stickt to say, that God may with as much justice determine men to Hell the first way, as the latter. (See *Instit. l. 3. c. 23. s. 7.*) Where against those who deny that *Adam* fell by Gods decree, he reasoneth thus; All men are made guilty of *Adams* sinne by Gods absolute decree alone: *Adam* therefore finned by this onely decree. (2) *What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men?* And a little after he sayth: (a) *It is too absurd, that these kind Pagans of Gods Justice, should thus stumble at a straw and leape over a blocke.* God may with as much justice decree *Adams* sinne and mens damnation out of his onely will and pleasure; as out of that will and pleasure, the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne and their damnation for it: that is, the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose speaketh *Mauricius*. From hence we may see (sayth he) what to judge of that opinion of our adversaries: viz. That God, cannot justly

(x) *Quid eos prohibet faci de uno homine, quod invitit de toto humano genere concedunt? Quid enim tergiverlandio iuderen operam?*

(a) *Bonos istos iustitiae Dei patronos perplexos habere in festina, alias verò tristes superare, nimis absurdum est,*

justly ordaine men to destruction without the consideration of sinne. (b) *Let them tell me which is greater, to impose to one man the sinne of another, and punish him for it with eternall death, or to ordaine simply, without looking at sinne to destruction: surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater. But this God may doe without any wrong to Justice, much more therefore may he do the other.* To these consenteth Dr. Twisse and sayth. (c) *If God may ordaine men to Hell for Adams sin, which is derived unto them by Gods onely constitution, he may as well doe it absolutely, without any such constitution.* And it is most true, it is all one in substance, simply to decree the misery of an innocent man, and to involve him in a sinne that he may be brought to misery.

Neyther of these decrees (I take it) are just.

2 The second reason, why it is against Gods justice, is, because it maketh him to require faith in CHRIST of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denied both a power to believe, and a CHRIST to believe in.

That God bindeth Reprobates to believe as well as others, it is the constant doctrine of Divines; among whom Zanchius delivereth it for a Thesis, (d) *Every man (especially he that professeth CHRIST) is bound to believe, that he is chosen in CHRIST to salvation; every man without exception (even the Reprobate himselfe:) and if he believe it not, he committeth a most grievous sinne above all others.* This he proveth by that speech of CHRIST, Job. 16. 9. *The Spirit shall convince the World of sinne, because they believe not in me.* Reprobates therefore are bound to believe. Mr. Perkins also layth something to the same purpose. (e) *Every one in the Church by virtue of this commandement [believe the Gospell] is bound to believe that he is redeemed by CHRIST, as well the Reprobate as the Elect, though for a different reason: the Elect, that by believing he may be saved, the Reprobate, that by not believing he may be without excuse: and this out of the very purpose of God.*

But now they cannot in justice be bound to believe, if they be absolute Reprobates, for three causes.

(b) *Maccov diff. 18. p. 16.* Nam dicant (quozlo) nobis, quid majus sit, imputare alicui culpam altius, & propter ipsam, illum morte eternâ plectere; an vero ordinare ad interitum: At hoc potest sine ul. lâ lascione justitiae fuisse: ergo mul. magis potest illud posterius.

(c) *Dr. Twiss. Vind. gral. 2. digr. 1. pag. 15.* Quod potest Deus intercedente libertâ suâ constitutione, illud etiam absolute poterit, vel sine aliqua constitutione intercedere.

(d) *Zanch. l. 5. de natur. Dei, cap. 2. q. 1. de pred. Sandorii.* Quisque mandato Dei tenerat credere se ad salutem eternam in Christo factum; maxime autem is qui fidem in Christum proficeret. Cum dicemus unum, quenque teneri hoc credere, neminem, ne Reprobos quidem, qui neque unquam credent, nec credere in Christum possunt, excipimus; & nisi credant, gravissime omnium peccant.

(e) *Perk lib. de Pred. pag 89. Obj. 3.* Quisque in Ecclesia mandato Dei [ credere Evangelio] tenetur credere, se redempsum esse per Christum, etiam improbus, perinde ac Electus, sed alia tamen & alia ratione: Electus tenetur credere, ut credendo particeps fiat electionis; reprobus, ut non credendo fiat inexcusabilis, etiam ex intentione Dei.

(1) Because they have no power to beleieve : they want it and must want it for ever. God hath decreed they shall never have any to their dying day. [*Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia*] no man can be justly tyed to impossible performances. Because no man can flye like a bird, or reach heaven with the top of his finger ; therefore, God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions : nor can he of Reprobates the obedience of Faith, if it be not possible to them.

(2) Because it is not Gods unfeyned will they shall beleieve. No man will say, that it is Gods serious will, that such a man shall live, when it is his will, that he shall never have the concourse of his providence and the act of preservation. Nor can we say, that God doth in good earnest will that those men should beleieve, whom he will not furnish with necessary power to beleieve. It may rather be sayd, it is Gods unfeyned will they shall not beleieve, because it is his will they shall want power to beleieve. For it is a Maxime in Logique, [*Quis vult aliquid in causa, vult effectum ex ista causa profinenter.*] *He who willeth a thing in the cause, willeth the effect that necessarily floweth from that cause.* Now if it be the certaine will of God, that Reprobates shall in no wise beleieve, hee cannot with reason and equity tye them to beleieve. For then he tyeth them to an act contrary to his determinate will.

(3) Because they have no object of Faith, no Christ to beleieve in : [*Crederemus, & si ac nullum obiectum ponit.*] He commandeth to beleieve, and affordeth no object to beleieve in : this soundeth not well. The Divels have no part in Christ or the new Covenant. We will not therefore say, that God can justly bind them to beleieve, or punish them as transgressors of the Covenant ; because they beleieve not. How then can we say, that God can justly require faith of Reprobates, or destroy them for not beleeving ; if they have indeed no more part in Christ or in the Covenant, then the Divels have ? If a man should command his servant to eate and punish him for not eating, and in the meane time fully resolve, that he shall have no meat to eat; would any reasonable man say, that such a man were just in the command or punishment ? Change but the name and the case is the saune. Againe, that Christ dyed for Reprobates (by the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation) is a lye ; and can God justly bind men to beleieve a lye ? This is the second reason.

3 The

3 The third reason why the absolute decree infringeth Gods justice is, because it will have him to punish men for omission of an act, which is made impossible to them by his owne decree : not by that decree alone, by which he determined to give them no power to beleefe, having lost it ; but by that decree also, by which he purposed, that we should partake with *Adam* in his sinne, and be stripped of all that supernaturall power, which we had by Gods free grant bestowed upon us in *Adam* before he fell.

These are the reasons which move me to thinke, that this absolute decree is repugnant to Gods *In*justice.

Three things are usually answered.

1 That Gods wayes may be very just, and yet seem unjust to mans erring understanding ; and so is this decree, though flesh and blood will not yeeld it to be so.

This answer I take to be false, and the contradictory to it to be true, namely, that nothing is truely just, which humane understanding purged from prejudice, corrupt affections and customes, hath in all ages, places and persons judged to be unjust. The reason is, because God hath by the light of nature, and those generall impressions of good and evill, honest and dishonest, just and unjust, made in the hearts of men, sufficiently instructed and enabled them to judge what is just and what is not. When a thing is done, reason so qualified is able to say, This is just, or this is unjust, whether it be done by God or man. For (vertues in men being but the image of those perfections that dwell in God) Justice in men and God are for substance but one and the same thing, though infinitely differing in degree, as the greater and lesser light. That this power is ingrafted in men, God himself (who best knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature,) hath sufficiently signified in those Scriptures, where he calleth on men to be judges of the equity of his wayes. *Judge I pray you betwix me and my vineyard, Esay 5. Judge, O ye house of Israel, are not my wayes equall and your wayes unequal?* *Ezek. 18.25.* God would never put them upon the tryall of reason, if he had not made it able to examine them. The incarnation of the sonne of God, his birth of a Virgin, his dying, the resurrection of the body, and such mysteries, as are peculiar to the *Gospell*, and the proper objects of the Christian faith;

God hath not offered to the tryall of our understandings, but rather derideth those, that presume to judge of them by reason. *1 Cor. 1.10. Where is the Scribe? where is the wise? where is the disputant of this world?* and the reason is, because, the things being supernaturall, and therefore not discernable by naturall power; man is no competent judge of them by his naturall understanding, nor may adventure upon the tryall and judgement of them with lesse danger, then *Vzzah* look into the Ark, for *[Scrutator maiestatis opprimetur à gloria]* that pryeth into Gods majestie, will be overwhelmed of his glory. But of the justice of his decrees and wayes, he maketh him a judge; because, the common notions of just and unjust being imprinted in nature, he is able by naturall reason to apprehend what is just in divine acts, as well as in his owne.

2 It is answercd, that these decrees are set downe in Scripture to be the will of God: and therfore, they must needs be just. For Gods will is the rule of all righteousness.

To this answer, I have these things to reply.

(1) This rule in Divinity is much abused by the maintainers of absolute Reprobation, and may not be admitted in their sence and meaning. For Gods will is not a *rule of justice* to himself, as if things were therefore just, because he willeth them and worketh them: but his justice rather is a rule of his will and works, which are the expressions of his will. He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, because they are agreeable to that justice which dwels in the divine nature: as he maketh nothing, which hath not *[potestiam obiectivam]* a power of being created without implying contradiction to himself or any thing in him: so he willeth and doeth nothing, but that which may be willed or done, *[sab*

*Hierom: Proclus. in vñ justitia] without wrong to his justice. St. Hierom speaking of the Prophet *Hoseas* taking a wife of fornications, *Hosea 1.2.* saith it was done *[in typō]* typically, not really, *[quia si fieri turpissimum est,]* because if bad beeene indeed done, it had beeene most soule thing. But thou wilt answere (sayth he) *[Deo jubere nihil turpe est]* God commanding is, nothing is dishonest. Thus much we say, (sayth the Father,) that God commandeth nothing but what is honest, but he doth not by commanding dishonest things, make those things honest which are abominable: plainly giving us to see what he thought, viz. that*

God

God doth not will a thing and so make it good; but willeth it, because it is in it selfe good antecedently and before the act of Gods will about it.

And thus much doth Zanchy (though a rigid mainteyner of absolute reprobation) not obscurely confess in his *Treatise de nativ. Dei*: where he letteh fall such speeches as make Gods justice antecedent to his will; and therefore the rule of it, rather then a thing regulated by it. (f) *Neither can God will anything (layth he) which is not just.* And againe, (g) *The Prince's pleasure bath the strenght of a Law; is a rule (sayth he) among the Canonists: but (h) this is true, Where the King is just and willeth nothing but what is just.* In which words, he plainly maketh the justice of the King antecedent to that will of his, which must be a law. Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose. Gods will therefore, is not a rule of Justice to himself. To whom then?

To us. For by it we are, (i) to square all our thoughts, words, and deeds. (j) to examine them when they are spoken and done: [*Primum in aliquo generi est regula posteriorum, & supremum inferiorum.*]

(k) I reply, that these absolute decrees of mens inevitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The Scriptures teach us no such matter.

And therefore to say they are, is but a mere begging of the question. It hath alwayes beene ordinary with false Teachers, to make Gods word a Father to their false opinions, that they may stand the faster and winne the greater credit. The Papists ground their transubstantiation, and the Lutherans their cosubstanciation and ubiquity upon the Scripture, [*Hoc est corpus meum*] *This is my body,* *Math. 26.* And the defenders of absolute Reprobation do so too: they make their cause to be Gods, and entitle his word to it; because they see it is the surest way to defend it: being herein like to some contentious people, who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to lose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it.

(l) Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reason is, because, it is odious to right reason, and begetteth absurdities. For [*Nulla veritas parit absurdum*] no truth begetteth absurdities. Divers truths are revealed in

(f) *Zanch. l. 3. de nat. Dei. c. 4 q. 9. thes.*  
2. *Neque aliquid vellet potest, quod justum non sit.*

(g) *Quod placet principi, legis habet vigorem.*

(h) *Ibi maxime verum est, ubi rex justus est. & nihil vult nisi justum. Quanto minus in regno Dei, &c.*

Scripture which are above, but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life: faith and reason, nature and scripture are both Gods excellent gifts: and therefore though there may be a disproportion, yet there can be no repugnancy between them. The worship which God requireth, is [εὐτελεστὸς] a reasonable service. Rom. 12.2. and the word of God is [γὰρ ἀνίκητος, καὶ ἀδόκιμος] make reasonable and without guile. 1 Pet. 2.2.

These things therefore being layd together, it will appear to be but a meere shift and evasion, when absolute Reprobation is proved to be unjust; and therefore unworthy of God, to say, Gods will is the rule of Justice: this is part of Gods revealed will; and therefore most just, whatsoeuer reason may cavill and say to the contrary.

3 Their third answere is, that God is not bound to restore men power to beleieve, because they once had it and have lost it through their own fault, as a master is not bound to renew his servants stocke, if he have wasted it by bad husbandry.

This answer doth not satisfie me. For I grant, that God is simply and absolutely bound to no man, because he is [agens liberrimum] a most free dispenser of his owne favours, where and what, and to whom he will, and no man is aforhand with God: [Quis prior illi dedit ut retribuatur] Who hat given unto him and it shall be recompensed again? Rom. 11.35.

But yet he is conditionally bound: for he hath determined and tyed himselfe 3 wayes especially.

(1) *Decernendo*, by decreeing. The Almighty is eternally subject to his own ordinances, or els he should be mutable. And therefore, what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by vertue of his own decree.

(2) *Promittendo*, by promising. We use to say promise is debt, it is Justice to performe what it was free to promise; and whosoever he be that promiseth and payeth not, is guilty of a trespass (witnesse *Ananias and Sapphira*;) and unworthy of the kingdome of heaven, Psal. 15.4. If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men; his promise bindeth him to performance, *Nam sanctum est nomen domini non avarum* revocabile verbum.

(3) *Legem ferendo*, by giving men a law to keep; which with-

without supernaturall grace they can no more keepe; then they can eat a rock. By such a law the supreme Lawgiver bindeth himself to his people, to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law, or else he becommeth (as the evill servant in the parable stiled him) a hard master, rea-  
ping where he sowed not, and the very true and proper cause of the transgression of that law. We shall finde God alwayes giving strength when he giveth a command. When he com-  
mandeth the creatures, to increase and multiply; he gave them a multiplying vertue: when C H R I S T bade the lame man a-  
rise, take up his bed and walk; he put into his limbs an ability of walking: when Adam had a spirituall law given him to obey, which without spirituall strength he could not; God gave him strength answerable to the law, as Divines agree, consenting to that noted speech of St. Austin, that Adam had [posse non cadere] though he never had [non posse cadere] a power and possibility, though no necessity of continuing in o-  
bedience.

That I may bring this home to my purpose, I say, that God is bound to restore unto men power to beleevve, supposing these things that follow.

- 1 That he hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of peace with men, when he needed not.
- 2 That in that Covenant, he requireth obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that perish.
- 3 That he promiseth eternall life to every man, if he obey and keepe the Covenant.
- 4 That he punisheth the disobedient with everlasting death.

These particulars supposed, the most free God who is ab-  
solutely bound to none, is engaged to give ability of beleevving unto men: nor can he justly without this gift punish the dis-  
obedient any more then a Magistrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence; can command this man with justice to reade a book; and because he readeth not, put him to death: or then a Master (that I may returne the Simile in the answer) when he hath taken away from his servant the stocke which he hath misimployed, can afterward exact of him a just im-  
ployment of the same stocke, and punish him, because he im-  
ployeth it not.

I conclude therefore, that the absolute and inevitable reprobation of such men as are called to believe in CHRIST, and punished if they believe not; is utterly repugnant to the Justice of God, and therefore can be no part of his word.

4 Opposite to  
Gods Truth.

Rom. 3. 4.

**F**ourthly, it oppugneth the truth and sincerity of God. **F**or God is a God of truth, *Deut. 32. 4.* Truth it self, *Job. 14. 6.* so called, because he is the fountaine of truth; and the perfection of truth without the least mixture of falsehood. *The strength of Israell cannot lye, 1 Sam. 15. 29.* Let God be true and every man a lyar (sayth the Apostle;) that he might be justified in his sayings, and overcome when he is judged, that is, men may lye, (for all men are liars;) but God can never lye. If any man would goe about to challenge him with untruth, his challenge would easily appeare to be a calumny: the truth of God like the glorious Sunne will break through all the clouds of false accusations, that seek to obscure it. *[Simile gaudet Simili]* Like loveth his like, God loveth isch, as are true of his art, *Psal. 51. 6.* and hath an hypocrite in utter detestation: and therefore, he must needs be true himself. No man (for ought I know) doubteth of it. But by absolute Reprobation God is made untrue and Hypocritical in his dealings with men, and in all matters appertaining to their eternall state; particularly, 'in his commands,' 'in his offers of grace and glory,' 'in his threats,' 'passionate wishes and desires of mens chiefe good, and 'in his expostulations and commiseration also.'

1 In his commands. For by this doctrine God commandeth those men to repent and believe, whom he secretly purposeth shall not believe. *Though God command Reprobates to believe the Gosp:ll, yet he will not have them believe; saith Piscator.* Now whom God commandeth to believe and repent, those he willett outwardly, shoulde believe and repent, for by his commandements he signifieth his good will and pleasure: and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or els he dissembleth. For words if they be true, are an interpretation of the minde: wheathery are not, they are meere impostures and simulations.

2 In his offers of grace and glory, which he maketh to such as refuse them and perish for refusing them, as well as to those who do accept them to their Salvation.

This is evident, *Esay. 65. 2.* *I have spread out my hands at* the

(i) *L. contr. schism:*  
pa. 60. Etsi reprobos  
mandat Deus ut e-  
vangelio credant, non  
vult tamen ut ero-  
dant:

the day long. To whom <sup>is</sup> to a rebellious people, and *Matth. 22.* we reade, that those men were invited to the wedding, that came not: and *Act. 3. 26.* there 'tis sayd to the Lewes who had denied Christ, as vers. 14. *To you bath God sent his Sonne Iesus to bleffe you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities.* How oft (sayth Christ) Would <sup>I</sup> have gathered you? speaking of such as neglected their visitation, and so lost their salvation. It is evident also by reason. For, as many as are under the Commandement, are under the Promise too; as wee may see, *Act. 2. 38, 39.* *Repent and be Baptized every one of you, and ye shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost: for to you and your children is the Promise made.*

In which words, Peter maketh the command and the promise of equall extent, both universall. And there is cause why: for he maketh the Promise his motive to perswade obedience to the command: and it would not have reached home, if it had not respected all those, to whom the command was given. No man, Reprobate or other, thinketh any leſſe: every man that heareth the Gospell preached; taketh himself to be under the gracious offer of eternall life; and upon these thoughts hath ſome desires, ſome hopes of it, and stirreth up himſelfe to forſake ſome pleaſing finnes, which otherwife he would not part with, and doe ſome unweſcome dutyes, which otherwife he would not doe.

But now Gods meaning is [by this doctrine] that the moſt of thoſe to whom he offereſth his grace and glory, ſhall have neither. And ſo Piftator faſh, -- (i) *Grace is not offered by God even to thoſe who are called, with a meaning to give it, but to the Elect onely.* In the ſame Booke he hath ſuch another ſpeech: (l) *Though God in words protest hee would have Reprobates to believe, yet ſindeed he will not have them.* They make God to deale with men in matters of Salvation, as the Poets feigne the Gods to have dealt with poore Tantalus. They placed him in a cleere and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which beare much ſweet and pleasant fruit that did almoſt touch his lips: but this they did with a purpoſe that he ſhould taſt of neyther. For when hee put his mouth to the water to drinke, it waved away from him: and when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew it ſelfe preſently out of his reach: ſo as he could

(k) *I. de pred. contra schaf. pag. 74.* *Gratia non effertur à Deo singulis (licet vocatis) animo communicandi eam, ſed ſolis Electis.*

(l) *Non vult Deus reprobos credere, licet lingua prefiteatur ſe velle.* pag. 143.

neither eat nor drink. Iust so dealeth God with Reprobates (by their Doctrine :) hee placeth them under the plentiful meanes of Salvation, offereth it to them, so plainly, that men would think they might have it when they will; and yet intendeth fully they shall never have it, with-holding from them either the first grace that they cannot beleive, or the second grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those Gods delude *Tantalus*? yes doubtlesse. And if God doe so with Reprobates; what doth he but delude them, and dissemble with them in his fairest and likelyest offers of Salvation that he makes them? And this do *Zanchius* and *Bucer* grant by evident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion; and therefore [I suppose] fell unwarily from them.

*Zanchius* telleth us roundly, that every man, who is called, is bound to think that he is elected, otherwise he doth offer great injury to God, and (m) accuse him of lying, & *et facit to him in his Word, that he desirith his Salvation, and for this cause hath called him*. In which speech he plainly impiyeth, that if God call a man whom he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but delude him when he calleth him. The like speech hath *Bucer* (n) *A man must beleieve that he is predestinate: or else he maketh God to mock him, when he calleth him*.

A man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute Reprobate; when he is called to Salvation, is but deluded: it is the necessary resultante of their speeches.

If a Creditor should resolve, upon no termes to forgive his Debtor one farthing of his debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind his offers with a deep and soleyme oath: would not we say, that he were a ranke dissembler and a meere deluder of his poore debtor? We can say no lesse of God, if it be true, that he hath irrevo-cably decreed at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth and sweareth that he will save them, if they will beleieve his promises, and repent. What can such oaths and promises be, but meere delusions of miserable men?

3 In his threats and comminations also (by this doctrine) is God made to be hollow and deceitfull. For against what sinnes are threats denounced? Alwayes against actuall sins; we never read that they are thundered out against us for Originall

(m) *Zanch. l. c. de nat. Dei c. 1. Perit in- gere Deum monstacii qui illi in verbo dicit, sc velle salutem ejus, & in hunc: finem ad Ch istu vocasse.*

(n) *Bucer in c. 8 ad Rom. q. de pred. Primum quod Deo debes, est ut credas esse te ab eo predestinatum. Nam id nisi credas, facis eum tibi, cum te ad salutem vocat per Evangelium, illudere.*

ginall sinne: they intimate therefore that the sinnes for which men goe to Hell, are their actuall transgressions. But if it be true that God decreed men to Hell for originall sinne, that which those threats import and signifie is not true, and so God is not sincere in them. Besides, all the eatnings imply that the evill threatened may be avoyded. For therefore are they denounced, that men might by them be brought to repentence, and so escape the evils threatened. But if some men be peremptorily ordained to destruction, then their destruction cannot be prevented: and so the threatnings of damnation (in this respect also) do signifie an uatruth, and God in them dealeth not plainly with men.

4. In all the other things before mentioned, is God full of guile too (by this opinion;) namely, in his —

(1) Passionate *wishes*, that even those men might repent, that repent not, and might be saved that through their impenitency are not saved. Of these we read, *Deut. 5. 29.* *O that there were such a heart in them to feare me, that it might goe well with them.* And, *Psal. 81. 11.* *O, that my people had hearkned, and Israel had walked in my wayes, &c.* And, *Esay. 48. 18.* *O, that thou hadst hearkned to my Commandements. &c.*

(2) In his mournfull *Expostulations*, *Esay. 5. 3.* *Judge (I pray you) between me and my Vineyard, what could I have done more for my Vineyard?* And *Ieremiah 2.* throughout the whole Chapter, especially ver. 31. *Have I been a Wildernes to Israel, or a land of darknesse?* And ver. 32. *Can a Maidforget her Ornaments, or a Bride her attire?* Yet my people have forgotten me dayes without number. *Ezek. 33. 11.* *Turne ye, turne ye: why will ye dye, O house of Israel?*

(3) In his melting commiserations of the wofull condition of foolish men, who would not bee reclaymed. *How shall I give thee up O Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee O Irael?* *My repentings are kindled together, my heart is turned within me.* *Hol. 11. 8.* *O Ierusalem, Ierusalem, which killest the Prophets, and stonest them that are sent to thee, &c.*

In all these there is but little sincerity, if there be a secret resolution that the most of those, towards whom those wifles, chidings, and pittifull bemoanings are used, shall be damned without remedy. Gods fairest offers, his sweetest invitations, his greatest sympathies, and amplest curtesies, (if this

doctrine be true) come little short (I think) of *Abrahams* feast, *Iaobs* congey, the kisse of *Iudas*, and the *Hyunes* teares. For in all these [ *aliud animo vult, aliud verbi significat* ] hee sayth one thing and meaneth another, and therefore dissemblereth.

Nay, the whole Ministry (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth, &c.) if this be true, is but a meere imposture, a giving of words without any meaning of answerable deeds; and an imposture so much the greater, by how much the shew of kindnesse is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with stronger shewes of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and intreaties to accept it, with cleare demonstrations of the excellencies of it, with unfeyned wishes that the parties to whom it is offered, would accept it, and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it? With all these inforcements is Gods tender of Salvation to Reprobates accompanied; and therefore in shew most hearty and serious.

In a word, thus speaketh God (by this doctrine) to Reprobates in the ministry.

„ O ye Reprobates, (once most dearely beloved of me in „ your father *Adam*, but now extreamly and implacably hated, „ and by mine eternal & uncontrollable order Sealed up under „ invincible sin and misery : ) amend your lives, and beleeve „ in the name of mine onely begotten Sonne. If you repent „ and beleeve not, there is no remedy, you must be damned: „ but if you repent and beleeve, you shall bee saved; though „ your finnes be as red as Scarlet, I will make them as white „ as Wooll. Think not that I would have you dye, for I „ sweare as I live, I will not the death of him that dyeth; I „ would have no man to perish, but all to come to repentance. „ I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cryed and „ called unto you, I have a long time waited upon you, that „ you might repent, and still am I knocking at the doores of „ your hearts for entrance. O, that there were a heart in you to „ feare me, and keep my commandements that it might goe well „ with you for ever. What shall I doe unto you? how shall I in- „ treat you? Will you not be made cleane? When will it once be? Can God speake thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent, nor bee saved, without the deepest disillu- That

That which is usually sayd to cleare the absolute decree from this crimination, is, That God wilth the Salvation of the Reprobate seriously, but not absolutely ; he would have those men saved who are not saved, but yet upon condition they will repent and believe. And therefore, though they do perish, God is candid and sincere in his offers of Salvation to them. For therefore do they perish, because they performe not the condition, and not because God offereth not Salvati-  
on seriously unto them.

But this answer is too short : It is true indeed, God will have all men to be saved upon condition onely, that they will believe and repent, according to that speech of S. Ambrose, [ *Deus vult omnes salvari, si & ipsi volunt.* ] God would have all to be saved, if they themselves would : For if he would absolutely have it so, what can hinder it ? who hath resisted his will ? and it is true likewise, that a conditionall promise may be serious as well as an absolute : but then the condition must be possible to them, to whom the promise is made ; and the performance of the condition must be a part of Gods will, as well as the Salvation promised : or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. [ *Conditio est oblati potestas aliquid eligendi* ] a condition is the offer of a power of choyce. Where there is no liberty of choyce afforded, there is no true condition appointed. In substance it is all one to offer a curteſie under a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all ; and in circumstance it is much worse.

In substance all one ; The Lawyers tell us that a Contract made [ *sub condicione impraestabilis nullus assensus* ] under a condition not possible, is esteemed no bargaine. And the Logicians rule is, that (o) A conditionall proposition which hath an impossible condition annexed to it, is equivalent to a bare Negation. It is all one for me to offer a peece of mony to one blinde man upon condition he will open his eyes and tell me what peece of money it is, and what stampe it hath ; and to deny it flatly to another. For the one hath it no more then the other. And it is all one for a man that hath a daughter to bestow in marriage, to tell her Suiter ; I will give you my Daughter, if you will span the Earth, or touch the Heavens with your finger ; and to tell him plainly, set your heart at rest, I will never bestow her upon you. For the Suiter spe-  
deth both wayes alike. And

(o) *Conditionalis  
propositio quæ habet  
annexam conditionem  
impossibilem,  
æquipollit simpliciter negant.*

And it is in circumstance a great deale worse. For it is a denyall under colour of the contrary, a denyall joyned with a scoffe, a derision, as was that of the lebuites, 2. Sam. 5. 6. Who told *David*, that he shoulde not enter into the Fort of Zion, except he tooke away the blinde and the lame. Their meaning was, they would never deliver it up unto him: and because they thought it impossible for him to take away the blinde and the lame, they told him if he did so, then they would yeld it up. It was an Ironicall and scoffing denyall of his demand. If the King shoulde make an unrepealable Law, that no *German* shoulde be made a Citizen of *London*, or free Denizen of the Kingdome; and then make a Decree to give some bountifull gratuities, but to the Citizens of London, or to the Subjects of the Kingdome only, and to none but them; and yet for all this shoulde command it to be proclaymed, that he will give them to the *Germans* upon condition they will be made Freemen of London, or bee incorporated into the Kingdome: would not any man say, that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poore Dutchmen? and if any should say, there would be no dissembling in it; for if they would become Citizens or Subjects, they shoulde have the promised gratuities: a man might truely answer, that therefore the King doth counterfeit and cosin them, because hee maketh a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his owne decree. In like manner, if God have made a decree, that such men shall never beleeve, and yet offer them Heaven on condition they will beleeve; it may most truely be sayd, that God doth not onely deny them Heaven, but deny it with a bitter derision, which is farre from that candor and goodness that dwelleth in him.

And thus have I shewed the contrariety of this Opinion to foure principall attributes of God, which is my second generall reason against it.

3 It is contrary to the use & end of Gods gifts to men.

**T**hirdly, it is contrary to the use and end of Gods gifts bestowed upon men, which gifts are of two sorts:

(1) Gifts of *Nature*, our Creation, Sustentation, Preservation, together with Health, Strength, Beauty, Wisdome, &c.

(2) Gifts of *Grace*, which have a more immediate relati-

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*taketh away the use and end of Gods gifts.*

on to everlasting life, and are meane cyther of purchasing  
Salvation or of applying it.

Meanes of purchasing it, are the comming of CHRIST into  
the world, and the sacrificing himselfe on the Crosse.

Meanes of applying it, are the ministry of the word and  
Sacraments, the long suffering of God, the enlightening of  
mens understandings, the plantation of many excellent ver-  
tues in their hearts, with many more of the like sort.

Now of these endowments of Nature and Grace, what  
the true use and end is, the Scripture doth plainly and parti-  
cularly shew us.

First, for guifts of *Nature*, we finde them bestowed upon  
all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them  
to serve God and save their Soules. For, *Act. 14, 16, 17.* The Apostle saith, that God (even in those times in which he  
suffered the Gentiles to walke in their own wayes, and  
with-held from them the light of his holy word) did give unto  
the people of the world, *raine from Heaven and fructful sea-  
sons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse*, and in so do-  
ing he left not himselfe among them *Without witness*. This  
implyeth, that therefore he gave them these good things, that  
he might make himself knownen unto them, and so might  
draw them to gloriifie him according to the knowledge  
which they had of him.

*Act. 17, 26.* The Apostle saith directly, that therefore men  
are made and placed in this world and appoynted to their  
several times and dwellings, *that they might seek and finde God*:  
that is, that they might serve him and save their Soules. For  
what is it to seek God, but to serve him? and what is it to  
finde God, but to enjoy his face and favour here and in *Hea-  
ven*? To this purpose Propper. (p) *I* therefore (sayth he)  
*is every creature made and ordained especially, that Mankind*  
*which is endewed with knowledge and ability to discourse, might*  
*by the sight of so many goodly sorte of Creatures, and the taste of*  
*so many blessings, be drawne to the love and service of his and*  
*their maker.*

And a little after he sayth, in the same Chapter.

(q) *Looke to what use the Law and Prophets were to the*  
*Israelites; of the same use were the guifts of Creation and Pro-  
vidence to the Gentiles. God never intended to deal with*

L

the

(p) *Propper. de voc.*  
*Gentium. l. 2. c. 4. p.*  
*8: 8. Cœlum quippe*  
*& terra & mare, om-  
nisque crea<sup>re</sup>a que*  
*videti & intelligi po-  
tuisse est hu-  
mani generis, utilita-  
tem, ut natura ratio-  
nalis de contemplati-  
one tot specierum, de*  
*experimentis tot bo-  
norum, de perceptio-  
ne tot munerum, ad*  
*cultum & delactio-  
nem, impletare om-  
nia spiritu Dei in quo-  
vivimus, movemur &*  
*sumus.*

(q) *Ibid. Quod ergo*  
*in Israhel per constitu-  
tionem legis, & Pro-  
phetica eloqua gere-  
batur, hoc in univer-  
sis nationibus, totius*  
*creaturæ testimonia*  
*& bonitatis Dei mi-  
racula semper egerunt.*

the Gentiles (as the soule-mouth'd Manichees sayd, he dealt with the Iewes) to feed and fat them up with outward and more common blessings, as so many Hogs and Swine with husks and alcornes, but to draw them up by these to an expectation of better things and a carefull endeavor to please God, that so they might obtaine them.

The end of all Creatures and of all created gifts bestowed upon man, is subordinate to the end of man. Mans end is to gloriſe God upon earth, and enjoy perpetuall society with him in heaven; and the end of thole gifts is to direct and encourage men to achieve that high and excellent end, to which his Creator had appoynted him.

Now for the gifts of *Grace*, they likewise are given to all them that enjoy them for the same use and end too.

For first, **CHRIST** came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men should stumble and fall; but to ſhed his bloud and by that bloud to purchase Salvation for all mankind, not onely for those who are ſaved, but for those also who through their wilfull unbelife and impenitency are not ſaved; as we may ſee, *Job. 3. 17. God ſent his Sonne (sayth the Sonne) into the World, not to condemne the world, but that the World through him might be ſaved.* In which words the end of his comming is ſet down.

1. Negatively, [not to condemne the World.]
2. Affirmatively, [but that the World through him might be ſaved:] and therefore very fully.

The like ſpeech we have, *Job. 12. 47. I came not to judge the World, but to ſave it.* These Negations joyned with affirmations, shew, that the Salvation of all men was the onely end of **CHRISTS** comming, the end exclusively, no other end was properly intended by it, but this. *The Sonne of man came to ſeek and to ſave what was lost. Luke, 19. 10.* Therefore he came to ſave every man, for every man was lost. And *Act. 3. 26. To you (sayth S. Peter) hath God ſent his Sonne IESVS to blesſe you in turning every one of you from your iniquity; [every one of you] you that reject him, as well as you that receive him.* The end of **CHRISTS** comming into the world, was the Salvation of all and every man therein.

2. The miniftry of the word and Sacraments is given also and appointed for the ſame end, and is in its own proper na-  
ture

ture and use, an instrument of conveying the Spirit of regeneration to those that live under it and to all those,

Better proofs for this I cannot have, then those which our reverend Divines at Dort gathered to my hand. *Esay, 59. 21.* *This is my Covenant with them ( sayth the Lord) my Spirit shall be upon thee, and my Words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor from his seed for ever.* *Hinc partem ( say they) from these words it appeareth, that the word and spirit are joyned in the ministry of the word with an inseparable band, by the promise of God.* Hence it is, that the Ministers of the New Testament are called, *Ministers not of the letter but of the Spirit; not of the letter that killeth, but of the spirit that giveth life.* *2. Cor. 3. 6.* And the ministry of the Gospell is called *diakonia τοῦ ἀναγνώστος* the ministry of the Spirit, in the same place, ver. 8. Hence also is the Gospell called *εὐαγγέλιον των σωθίων*, Grace bringing Salvation. *Tit. 2. 11.* *And ἀβούτοις καταπλασία, the Word of Reconciliation.* *2. Cor. 5. 19.* To these let me add, *1. Pet. 1. 23.* Where the word is called, *the seed of the new birth* : and *2. Cor. 5. 20.* Where Ministers are called, *Emassadors for CHRIST, to beseech men to be reconciled to God.* They are so called, to shew that the word preached is by Gods appointment an instrument to make men new creatures, and that the proper matter of Ministers errands is reconciliation with God, and the naturall fruit of it is in Gods intent, not the obduration and destruction, but the conversion and salvation of men. The same Authors out of *Joh. 5. 22.* [*If I had not come & spoken unto them, they should not have had sin*] do say it is evident, that *CHRIST in his preaching did administer so much inward grace as was sufficient to convince those that rejected the Gospell, of positive unbelief, and render them obnoxious to just punishment* : and by good consequence (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted and saved them : for that grace leaveth none without excuse, which is not sufficient to convert them. I will conclude what they say of this gracious intention of God in the ministry of the word, with that speech of *Prophets*, cyted by them in the same place. (r) *They that say, that all those to whom the Gospell is preached (even those that obey not the Gospell) are not called to grace, they say an untruth.* God looked for Grapes (sayes the Text) *Esay, 5. 1.* What

*Suffrag. Brit p. 30;*  
*31. art. 2. thef. 5.*

(r) *Proph. ad cap.*  
*Gal. resp. ad. Obj. 4.*  
*Non omnes voca-*  
*ad gratiam eos, qui*  
*bus omnibus evan-*  
*gium praedicatur, no-*  
*recte dicitur; etiam*  
*si sint qui evangeli-*  
*non obaudirent.*

doth this imply? but that it was Gods principall ayme in the husbandry which he bestowed upon the Church of Israel, that it should bring forth good fruit, though in the event it did not? *How oft would I have gathered you?* sayth CHRIST to Jerusalem. *Math. 23. 37.* *These things (sayth he) have I spoken to you, that ye might be saved: but ye will not come to me, that ye might have life.* *Iob. 5. 34, 40.* In those words intimating no less then this, that it was his full intent by his preaching to gather and to save those very particular men, that in the end were not gathered nor saved, through the contempt or neglect of CHRIST'S Ministry.

Touching the Sacraments, this is also the use and end for which they were ordayned; as we may see, *Luke, 7. 30.* Where we have these words; *But the Scribes and Pharisees and expounders of the Law despised the counsell of God against themselves; and were not baptized of John.* In which words thus much is evidently included, that it was Gods counsell and purpole, in Johns Baptisme to bring them to CHRIST, and in him to Heaven. So much also is layd of his Baptisme, *Mark, 1. 4.* *John did baptize in the Wildernes and preach the baptisme of Repentance, and remission of sinnes.* If this were the end of Johns, much more is it the end of CHRISTs baptisme; it being more excellent then Johns was, not in substance, but in the fulnesse of grace administered and dispensed by it. *All that have been baptized into CHRIST (sayth the Apostle) have been baptized into his death.* *Rom. 6. 3.* *All ye that have been baptized into CHRIST, have put on CHRIST,* *Gal. 3. 27.* The very phrases there used, shew that baptisme is in its originall intention, an instrument of uniting men to CHRIST, and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death. *Except a man be borne againe of water (sayth our Saviour) and of the Spirit, he cannot, &c.* *Iob. 3. 5.* In which words are these two things.

1. The necessity of regeneration. [ *Except a man be borne againe.* ]

2. The working cause of it: *Efficient, the Spirit; instrumentall the Sacrament of Baptisme, there called Water from the outward matter of it.* Baptisme therefore is appoynted to be a meanes of regeneration to all those that are baptiz'd, and doth effect it in all, who do not put an obstacle in the way to,

to hinder it. So much doth the Apostle ascribe to Baptisme, Eph. 5. 16. and for this cause doth dignifie it with this title, [The laver of regeneration.] Tit. 3. 5.

I will shut up this with Act. 2. 38. where Peter sayth, Repent and be baptized every one of you for the remission of sinnes; plainly implying, that therefore is baptisme ordeyned to be received, that those who do receive it, might have their sins remitted.

This is also Gods intent in the Lords Supper. This is my body (saith CHRIST) and this is my blood, Math. 26. 26, 27. in those words teaching us, that in that Sacrament there is an exhibition of CHRIST and his benefits intended on Gods part, and received of those by whom no obstacle is interposed: and therefore doth the Apostle call it in expresse words, 1 Cor. 10. 16. *The communion of the body and blood of Christ.*

For this end also, is the patience of God (another singular dignitatiōn of God) exercised among men, as we may see, Rom 2. 4. *Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, not knowing that the bountifulness of God leadeth thee to repen-tance? but thou after thy hardness, and heart that cannot repent, heapest up wrath to thy selfe, &c.* In these words may be noted for our purpose: (1) Gods intent in forbearing sinners, which is, *the leading of them to repentance*, and so on to Salvation: (for repentance, is *per se ordinata ad salutem*, by him ordeyned to Salvation as a meanes to the end.) (2) The persons, to whom God intendeth this good by his forbearance: and they are, such as *despiseth the riches of his goodness*, and have *hard and impenitent hearts*. (3) The issue and event of this their contempt of Gods patience, and that is, *a measuring up of wrath unto themselves against the day of Wrath*. Out of all which layed together ariseth thus much, that God by sparing wicked men, who have hard and impenitent hearts, intendeth their everlasting good, though they by the abuse of his patience and refusall to repent, doe treasure up unto themselves wrath and misery everlasting. The like to this is delivered in 2 Pet. 3. 9. *God is not slack (saith Peter) (as some men conne-sackness) but patient toward us: & that is us men. And why patient toward us? because he would have none to perish.* The end therefore of Gods patience, is mans Salvation and Repentance.

In the last place those other gifts of God, by which mens understandings are enlightened, and their soules beautified (namely knowledge, faith, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility and chastity, and such like) are bestowed upon all that have them [ among whom are many who prove Reprobates in the end ] that by the exercise of them and continuance in them they might come to eternall life.

That Reprobates are adorned with many of these graces, appeareth by sundry Scriptures, especially *Heb. 6.4.* where the Apostle sayth, That it is impossible for them that have bin enlightened, tasted the heavenly gift, beene madde partakers of the *Holy Ghost*, tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come; if they fall away, should be renewed by repentance. The graces which the Apostle here speaketh of, are not ordinary and common, but speciall and excellent graces; illumination, faith, a relish of Gods word and a taste of Heaven; and the persons spoken of, are Apostates, such as are under a possibility of falling away for ever (for upon a danger not possible cannot be built a solid exhortation,) and consequently Reprobates: and the thing intimated, is that upon Apostates & Reprobates are these excellent gifts many times bestowed. The like speech we have, *Heb. 10.26.* For, if we sinne willingly after we have received the knowledge of the truth; there remaineth no more sacrifice for sinne, &c. From whence we may collect, that men who sinne willingly and unpardonably, may receive the knowledge of the truth; yea and be sanctified by the bloud of the Testament and the Spirit of grace, *vers. 29.*

In the 2 *Pet. 2.20.* They may (sayth Peter) escape the filthiness of the world: that is, be washed from their former sin by repentance. The unclean spirit may goe out of them, *Mark. 12.43.* They may receive the word with joy, *Matb. 13. 20.* And many more excellent graces they may have besides. Now all these vertues and graces are not therefore given them that they might abuse them, and so purchase to themselves the greater damnation; or that they might doe good to others with them, but none to themselves: but rather, that (as by the former gifts of nature, so) by these of grace they may obtaine salvation. For if God aymeth this in those gifts that are farther off, much more in these, which make those that have

have them (like the young man in the Gospell) not farre from the kingdome of Heaven. My prooфе for this, I borrow of our Divines at the Synod, who in their suffrage have these two positions.

1 (1) There are certain internall works preparing a man for justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified; such as are the knowledge of Gods will, a sense of sinne, feare of punishment, &c. that is their first.

2 Their second position is this. (2) Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those be truly and seriously callēth and invitēth to conversion.

Out of these two Theses thus much ariseth, that God worketh the knowledge of his will, the sence of sinne, feare of hell, hope of pardon, and consequently many other excellent graces in the hearts of men, that by these, they may be converted and so eternally saved.

We see by these things, what end God aymeth at in his gifts to men.

But there are some Scriptures, that seeme to say the contrary, namely Rom. 1.20, where God is sayd to reveale himself to the Gentiles by the creatures, [εἰς τὸ ἐπώνυμον ἀνθρώπων] that they might be without excuse. And Luke 2, 34. Someon faith of CHRIST, that he is appointed for the falling and rising againe of many in Israel. And 1 Cor. 1.23. I preach Christ (saith St. Paul) to the Jewes a stumbling block, 2 Cor. 2.16. We are the favour of death to death, &c. By these places it seemeth, that God giveth these things to some, to make them stumble, and that they might be left without excuse. What shall we say therefore to these places.

Of all these places in generall, I may say this; that they are to be understood of the end, which is many times effected by these gifts of God, and not of the end which is primarily intended in them; and they shew what CHRIST, the word preached, and the gifts of nature and grace are [occasionally] to some men, through their voluntary rebellion against God and his ordinances, and not what they are [intentionally] in Gods first thoughts and resolutions: he intendeth them for their good, though many times they receive them to theyr hurt. It is with Gods ordinances and gifts (and that very often

(1) Suffrag. Brit pag. 41. thes. 1. & p. 43. thes 3. Sunt quædam effecta interna ad conversionem pævias, que virtute verbi, spiritusque in nondum justificatorum cordibus excitancur; qualia sunt, notitia voluntatis divinæ, sensus peccati, timor peccati, cogitatio de liberatione, spes aliqua venia.

(2) Quos Deus (mediante verbo) per Spiritum suum in hunc modum afficit, eos ad fidem, conversionem, que veritatem & seruidem vocat & invitat.

ten too,) as it is sometimes with physick: it is given by the Physician for the patients good, but many times through the distemper of his body, it doth him hurt. And as it is with the Sunne. God intendeth by the shining of it the enlightening and clearing of men and other creatures in this inferiour world; and yet some men are hurt by the light of it, others are scorched by the heat of it; [accidentally] by reason of the climates wherein they live, or the ill affectednesse of they eyes and bodyes.

So the blessings of God, which out of his abundant goodness are bestowed on men for theyr eternall good; through their ill frame and temper of heart doe effect their hurt, partly because lighting on naughty hearts, they lose their edge; (for *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*:) and partly because of the severity of God, who as he hath an antecedent and gracious will to doe men good; so hee hath consequent and judiciary will of giving up obstinate men to their own hearts lusts, and of permitting them to dash against CHRIST and other meanes of eternall life, and so to fall into endlessse misery and mischief, as we may see, *Psal. 81.11,12.* and *Rev. 22.11.* which made Propper say, (*n*) *T bey that havi despised Gods inviting will, shall feele his revenging will.*

(a) *Propp. resp. ad ob. 16. Vincent.* *Qui voluntatem Dei sperverant invitarem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.*

Now if this be the meaning of these Scriptures, then do they not thwart that which hath bin sayd of Gods gracious intent of promoting the eternall good of men by his blessings bestowed upon them. For, [*argumentum ab eventu ad intentionem Dei non valeat*:] because no sinfull event is properly under Gods decree, but his prescience only, or at most under a permissive decree: and many things happen in the world which are beside the antecedent and principall purpose of God; not because there is any want of power in God, but because his will is oftentimes conditionall, and therefore not effected; because the condition is not performed.

But by the opinion of absolute Reprobation, the gifts both of Nature and Grace have another end: eyther God doth not meane them to those that perish (although they doe enjoy them, because they are mingled in the world with the Elect to whom onely they are directed;) or if he doe, hee meaneth they shall have them, and be lifted up by them above the common rank of men, [*ut lapsu graviose rham*,] that their fall may

may be the greater. And so much is sayd by the chief defenders of it. (w) God sendeth his Word to Reprobates (sayth Calvin) that they might be made more deaf; he setteth up a light before them, to make them the blinder; he giveth them a remedy that they might not be healed. And (z) it should not seem absurd unto us (sayth Beza) that God should offer his grace in the word and Sacraments to some Reprobates in the Church, not to this end that they might be saved by it, but that they might be lesse excusable then others, and obnoxious to the severer punishment. Speeches like to these hath Macovins in his Disputations, (a) CHRIST (sayth he) knocketh at the hearts of Reprobates, who he knoweth neither can nor will open unto him; not that he may enter in, but partly that he upbraid them for their impotency, and partly that he may increase their damnation. And immediately after to a place in John, c. 15. v. 22. he giveth this exposition. (b) Therefore did God speake to them, that by the contempt and hatred of his Sonne they might procure the greater damnation. In another place likewise of his disputations he speakest the same thing foure or 5 times over, very positively. (c) God doth proound his Word to Reprobates for no other end, then that they might be left without excuse.

(d) If the Gospell be considered in respect of Gods intention, the proper end of it, and not the accidentall in reference to Reprobates is their inexcusableness. And very consequently doe these writers speake to their maine conclusion. For, how can God intend the meanes or gifts of grace for the Salvation of them, whom he hath by his absolute eternall decree rejected utterly from grace and glory?

More particularly by this Doctrine,

CHRIST came not into the world to procure the Salvation of them that perish, because they were inevitably ordyned to perish.

2. The word of grace is not sent to them: or if it be, it is sent, that they might slight it, or contemne it; and so increase their damnation by contemning of it, which being so, these inconveniences will arise;

(1) That God is a mere deluder of miserable men, whom he calleth to Salvation in the name of his Sonne by the preaching of the word. For what else can he be that faignly pretendeth theyr good, whom he fully intendeth to mine?

hū consideres ratione intentionis Dei, hū ejus esse per se, & non per accidentem, inexcusabiliter ratiōne reproborum.

(w) Calv. Instit. 1.3  
c. 24. n. 13. Ex  
vocem ad eos dirigit  
ut magis obsurdes  
eare; lucem accendit  
sed ut redantur cœci  
ores; doctrinam pro  
fest, sed quā magi  
obstupescant, reme  
diū adhibet, sed ne  
sanentur.

(z) Beza. prelud. in c  
9. ad Rom. p. 434  
Absurdum videri no  
debit, deum reprob  
quibusdam, qui in Ec  
clesiā Dei versantur  
gratiam suam in ver  
bo suo, sive ciuitate po  
Sacramenta sua offere  
re, non eum in finē  
ut per eam fruenter  
sed contiū, ut mindū  
habent excusationis  
quād reliqui, & tan  
cē gravium puniantur

(a) Mac. diff. 1.4  
pag. 11, 12. Pulsus  
Christus ad ostium  
reproborum, quo  
novit nec pollici nec  
velle aperire; non ut  
intret, sed partim ut  
exprebi cillis impo  
tentiam suā ipsorum  
culpā contractū; par  
tim ut condamnationē  
in illis augent, &c.

(b) Nimirum idē  
lucius est iis, ut ex  
contemptu odioqu  
fili vniogeniti gravio  
condemnatio esset.

(c) Diff. 2. p. 3. Deu  
reprobis verbum su  
proponit non alic  
fine, quam ut inexc  
cusabiles reddantur

(d) p. 15. Si Evinge  
(z) That

(2) That Ministers are but false witnesses, because in their ministry they offer Salvation conditionally to many, whose damnation is determined absolutely.

(3) The Ministry of the word cannot leave men without excuse. For Reprobates may have this just plea ; " Lord, doest thou punish us for not believing in thy Sonne, when thou didst call us to believe by the preaching of thy word ? " why ? Thou didst decree to leave us (w<sup>o</sup>full men) in Adams sinne, to give us neither power to believe, nor a Christ to believe in. How canst thou justly charge us with sinne, or increase our punishment for not believing in him whom thou didst resolve before the world was, that we should never believe in ? Certainly that (e) Ministry giveth men a faire excuse, that is given for no other end, then to leave them without excuse.

(e) Neque enim eas  
singi potest homines  
reddere inexcusabili-  
les, per verbum &  
spiritu vocatio, que  
eo tantum sine exhibe-  
re ut reddat in ex-  
cusabiles. Suffrag.  
Brit. de 3. C<sup>o</sup> 4. art.  
Antecedentis ad Con-  
versi thes 3. pag 43.

3 The Sacraments also (by this opinion) doe signify nothing, seale up nothing, conferre nothing to such as are not saved ; but are meere blanks and empty ordinances at the best unto them; not through the fault of the men, but by the primary and absolute will of God.

Lastly, Gods other gifts which he bestoweth upon men of what nature soever they be, are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention,

(1) Unprofitable, such as shall never do them good in reference to their eternall condition.

(2) Dangerous and hurtfull, given them not out of love but extreme hatred ; nor that they might use them well and be blessed in so doing, but that they naught use them ill, and by ill using of them procure to themselves the greater damnation. God liftest them up (as the Divell did Christ) to the pynacle of the Temple; that so they might fall : and loadeth them with knowledge and other goodly endowments, that with the weight of them he might sinke them downe to Hell.

And so by good consequence, Gods choysel gifts are intended and used as snares to intrap mens soules. Men that have them, have little cause to be proud of them, (for they are the more unhappy because they have them :) or small reason to be thankfull for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate him rather ; because they are but giftlesse gifts, of the same

same nature with a griping Vsurers bountie, *Iaels curtesie, Sauls marrying of Michal to David, or a bayt for a poore fish* which she swalloweth with a hooke to boot :

*Munera magna quidem misit, sed misit in hamo.*

*Num piscatores piscis amare posent?*

**M**Y fourth generall reason against this absolute Reprobation is, It is a hinderance to *Piety*: it is a Doctrine that serveth greatly to discourage holiness and encourage prophaneness. It maketh Ministers (by its natural importment) negligent in their Preaching, praying, and other services, which are ordeyned of God for the eternall good of their people. It maketh people carelesse in hearing, reading, praying, instructing their families, examining their consciences, falting and mourning for their sinnes, and all other godly exercizes. In a word, it cutteth a sunder the very sinewes of religion, and pulleth away the strongest inducements to a holy life. Therefore it is no true and wholsome Doctrine.

*4th. Reason.*  
*It is prejudicial to Piety.*

That it doth so, it will appeare by these reasons that follow.

I. It taketh away [Hope] and [Feare:] [Hope of attayning any good by godlinesse; feare of susteyning any hurt by wickednesse: and so it taketh away two principall props of Religion.

This reason may be resolved into these two branches.

I. Hope and feare uphold godlinesse. Were it not for these, it would come to ruine: by these, are men strongly led on to vertue, and with-held from vice. Hope doth [*excitare*] stirre men up to begin, and [*corroborare*] strengthen them in the doing of any good action begun. By this hope of Heaven did our Saviour stirre up himselfe to endure the *Crosse*, and despise the *shame*. *Heb. 12.2.* By this he heartned his Disciples to doe and to suffer for his sake. *Mat. 5, 11. Mat. 10. 32.* By this have all the godly in all ages encouraged themselves in well doing, as we may see in generall. *Phil. 3. 20. Col. 1. 5. Tit. 2. 12, 13.* And in particular, *Heb. 11.* Abraham left his Country and Kindred at Gods call, because he looked for a *City, whose builder and maker was God.* ver. 8, 9, 10. Moses left all the *pleasures and treasures of Egypt, and endured afflictions with the people of God, because he saw him that was invisible, and had respect to the recompence of reward,* ver. 25. 27.

The Martyrs endured racks, gibbets, lyons, sword, fire, with a world of other torments, because they looked for a better resurrection, ver. 35. *Paul indeavoureth always to keep a cleere conscience, through the hope which he had of a blessed resurrection, Act. 24. 15.* All the noble and heroicke acts of active and passive obedience, have sprung from the hope of eternal glory. Souldiers, Merchants, Husbandmen, all are whetted on by hope to diligence in their callings, as daily experience sheweth us. Hope, sayth Aquinas [confert ad operationem] conduceth to action: and he prooveth it: first by Scripture, 1. Cor. 9. 10. *He which earcth and thresheth, must earc and thresh in hope.* And then he prooveth it by a twofold reason. 1 From the nature of Hopes object, which is [bonumarduum, & possibile haberi] some excellent good attainable by industry. [Exstimator ardui excitat attentionem] hope to get that by paines, which is conceived to be a thing of worth, stirreth up to paines taking. 2 From the effect of hope, which is, [dilectatio] an inward pleasure, which the party that liveth under hope, is affected with by his hope. There is not any man, which hath an inward contentment and satisfaction of heart in the worke he hath to doe, but goeth on merrily. The hope of Heaven therefore is a great encouragement to piety.

The feare of Hell also is a strong curbe to hold men in, from impiety, and therefore (sayth one) God hath planted in men a feare of vengeance, that by it as the ship by the Rudder, the soule may be prefently turned aside from any rocks, gulfs, or quicksands of sinne, when it is neare them, and may steere its course another way. For this cause feare of God and abstaining from evill are often joyned together in Scripture, Job. 1. 1, Exod. 1. 17. And the want of this feare is made the root of all licentiousnesse in sinning. Gen. 20. 11. Nor doth feare only hinder a bad action, but it promoteth a good. It hindereth a bad action [directly] because it is [fuga malis] a flying from that evill of misery which is annexed to the evill of sinne: and it promoteth a good action [accidentally,] because men thinke that they are never so safe from the mischife which they feare, as when they are exercised in such imployments as tend to the getting of a contrary state. *Work out your salvation* (sayth the Apostle) *with feare and trembling;* imply-

implying that the working out of salvation goeth not on handfomely, except the feare of misling it be an ingredient into the worke.

The second branch of this reason is, That by the absolute decree, Hope and feare are taken away. For hope is properly exercised about [ *bonum possibile haberi* ] some good thing which may be obtained, not which must be obtained of necessity: and the object of feare is [ *malum possibile vitari* ], an evill that may be escaped. For [ *metus est fuga mali* ] feare is a fleeing from evill: and therefore supposeth the evill to bee avoydable. For no man will flee from an evill that cannot be prevented, but will yeeld up himselfe to it, as *Casar* did his body to the murtherers in the Senate house. Now ( by this decree ) Heaven and Hell are not objects possible but necessary. Heaven shall unavoydably be obtained by those that are elected, and Hell must as certainly be endured by those that are reprobated. For men have no power to alter their eternall states: all men by this decree are precisely determined *ad unum*, to one state, to necessary salvation or necessary damnation without any power or liberty to choose whether.

And from hence this conclusion is cleare, that the absolute decree taketh away the chiefeſt inducements to holinesſe, and deterrements from wickednesſe, and consequently hindereth a godly life exceedingly.

The Injuriousieſt of this doctrine to a godly life may further appeare by these conſiderations that follow, one depending upon another.

1. Absolute and peremptory decrees are inevitable, whatſoever the things be about which they are exercised: and mens everlasting states if they be absolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. [ *Stat fata lex indeclinabilis* ] the law of destiny is undeclinable. And the reason is, because it hath an inevitable cause, the Adamantine decrees of Almighty God, which are indeclinable two wayes.

(1) *Irreversible*, lyable to no repeale (as the Statutes are which are made in our Parliaments: ) but farre more unalterable then the Lawes of the *Medes and Persians*. *As I have spoken, so will I bring it to passe: I have purpoſed, and I will doe it.* *Essay. 46. 11.* Men do many times bite in their words againe, because they utter things rashly; and do repeale theyr

statutes and ordinances, because they see some inconvenience by all  
in them being made, which they could not foresee: but God soule  
never calleth in his decrees, because they are all made in greatest to  
Wisdom.

(2) Irresistible. It lyes not in the power of any creature  
to dilanull them. *Who hath resisted his will?* Rom. 9. 19. Our  
God is in Heaven: bee doth whatsoeuer he will. Psal. 115. 3.  
Whatsoever is once concluded by his absolute will, is no  
wayes alterable by the will of man. It is more possible for a  
man to hinder the rising of the Sunne, or to stay his course in  
the Heaven, to stop the revolutions of the yeare, and over-  
turne the whole course of nature, then to make the least  
change in any of Gods absolute decrees.

2 Mens actions about ends and things determined by an  
absolute decree are vaine and fruitlesse; and the reason is, be-  
cause they cannot make them otherwise then they are deter-  
mined to be. It is absolutely decreed, the Divels shall be dam-  
ned. Were it not a fruitlesse thing in them by prayers, teares,  
and endeavors to seeke to alter it? It is also simply decreed,  
that the Soule of man shall be immortall. Is it not a labor in  
vaine for any man to use meanes that his Soule may be annihi-  
lated? It is ordained, that the Sunne shall rule the day and the  
Moon the night; that the one shall finish his proper course  
in a yeare, the other in a Moneth. Would not a mans indea-  
vour to make an alteration in these things bee unprofitable  
and ridiculous? Without doubt it would. So likewise, in  
vain do men labour to obtaine everlasting life, and avoyd e-  
ternall death; if there be no power and liberty in their hands  
to choose life or death, but must of necessity take that which  
is assigned them, be it life or death. For by their labour they  
effect just nothing: if they bee absolutely appointed to de-  
struction; theyr hearing, reading, praying, almes giving,  
and mourning for their sinnes cannot possibly procure theyr  
Salvation: damned they must be. And if they be absolutely  
ordayned to Salvation, theyr neglect of holy duties, their ig-  
norance, their love of pleasures, and continuallance in a course  
of ungodliness cannot bring them to damnation, they must be  
saved. If so many Soules in a Parish, be in this manner decreed  
to Heaven or Hell; the Minister preacheth in vaine, and the  
people heare in vaine. For there cannot one Soule bee saved

by

enience by all his or their paines, which is ordayneed to Hell; nor one  
but God soule be cast away by his or their negligence, which is appoin-  
tment granted to Heaven.

It is hard for thee (ayd CHRIST to Saul) to kicke against  
creature tricks: that is, to indeavour by thy Persecutions & slaughters  
to root out my Church out of the world; because the preser-  
vation of it is absolutely decreed in Heaven: Teaching us by  
that speech, that a mans labour in any thing whatsoever, is  
never profitable, except it be exercised about an end, attayn-  
able thereby, and without which the end may be lost.

3 Men are not willing to be employed in fruitlesse actions,  
if they know it.

*I fo runne (sayth S. Paul) not as uncertainly; so fight I, not as one that beateth the ayre: but I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest that by any meanes, when I have preached to others, I my selfe shoulde bee a cast-away.* The meaning is, I indeavour to keep Gods Commandements, I fight with the temptations of the Divell, the allurements of the world, and mine own corruptions; I keep my body low by watchings, and fastings, and other severe exercises of holy discipline. But *cui bono?* Do I all this at randome? Uncertaine whether I shall obtaine any good or prevent any mischiefe hereby? No, but I do this, as one that is sure, that by so doing, I shall attaine e-  
verlasting life, and without so doing, I cannot avoyd eternall death: intimating in these words the common disposition of men, which is, to labour, where some proportionable good is to be gotten, or evill prevented: otherwise to spare their heads and hands too.

To be employed in fruitlesse affaires, is both a folly and a misery.

(1) A folly, for [*de necessariis nemo sapiens deliberat.*] No man useth deliberation about things necessary, sayth the Philosopher. And our Saviour speaking of things above our power; *Cur estis solliciti?* saith he to his Disciples, *Math. 6. 27. Luke 12. 25, 26.* Why take yee thought about such things? which is as much as if he had sayd, It is an argument of folly in you to trouble your self about such things as lye not in your power.

(2) It is a misery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of Sisyphus implyeth, who (as the Poets feigne) is punished in Hell for his Robberies, with the rolling of a great stone to the top.

top of a steep hill, where it cannot rest, but presently tumb downe againe.

The morall of that Fable is, that it is a torment, and a torment fit for Hell; for a man to be set about any work that fruitlesse and in vaine. Men will rather be exercised in hard and hard imployments that produce proportionable end, then pick strawes, play with feathers, or with *Domitian* spe their times in flapping and killing of flies, or doe any other easie worke, which endeth in nothing but ayre and emptynesse except they be fooles or Selfe-tormentors. And therefore when *Balaam* once saw that the Lord had fully determined to blesse *Israel*, and that all his Sorceries could not effect the contrary; he presently gave over and set no more Enchantment. And reason teacheth every man to doe the like. If any man were fully possest with a perswasion that his temporall estate were determined in Heaven, and that hee should be won just so much, neyther more nor lesse; he would conclude his thoughts, that his care and paines could nothing profit him, nor his idlenesse impoverish him: and so would quickly be perswaded to take his ease. And were it evident that every common-wealth had [ *terminum magnitudinis* ] a condition appoynted for it which could not be altered, and a fatal period which could not be avoyded; then would the King call no Parliaments, use no privie Counsellors, make no laws, and Ordinances for the preventing of a Kingdome's ruine, or the procuring of its prosperity and continuance. For it would be to little purpose (as once a famous privie Counsellor told our late Queene *Elizabeth*) but would follow the Poet counsell:

*Manilius.*

*Solvite mortales animos, curisque levate,  
Totque supervacuus animum deplete querelis;  
Fata regunt orbem, certa flant omnia lege.*

From these three premisses layed together it followeth directly, that the doctrinae of an absolute decree, which determineth mens ends precisely; is no friend at all to a godly life. For if events absolutely decreed be unavoydable; if mens actions about unavoydable ends be unprofitable; if in unprofitable imployments men will have no hand willingly: whosoe

ver they be that believe and consider this, will have nothing to do with the practice of godlinesse. For their ends being absolutely pitched and therefore unavoydable; they will conclude that their labour in religion will be unprofitable, and so will not labour in it at all.

That which hath been sayd, may be yet confirmed by two Witnesses. The one of them is Mr. *Calvin*, who in his *Institutions* hath these words; (f) *If any man (sayth he) should speak thus to the people; If there be any among you that believe not, it is because ye are ordained to destruction; this man would not onely cherish slothfulnesse, but wickednesse also.* Which is as much to say (me thinks) as this; If a man should set forth the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explaine it to people in a cleare and lively fashion, he would hereby open a doore to liberty and prophanenesse.

The other witness is a man of another stamp, the miserable Landgrave of *Tburing*, of whom it is recorded by *Heisterbachus*, that being by his friends admonished of his vicious conversation and dangerous condition, he made them this answer; (g) *If I be elected, no sinnes can bereave me of Heaven; if I be reprobated, no good deeds can helpe me to Heaven.*

I conclude therefore, that by this opinion (which is taught for one of Gods principall truths;) Religion eyther is or may be made a very great looser, which is my fourth generall Reason against it.

But there are three things which are usually answered to vindicate this opinion from this crimination.

First, that many of them which believe and defend this doctrine, are holy and good men: and therefore of it selfe it openeth no way for liberty of life, but through the wickednesse of men, whouse to pervert the sweetest and surest truths of Scripture to their own damnation. The like defence to this, did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensuall and Swinish doctrine; which was, that happiness consisted in pleasure. They sayd that many of their Sect were honest men, and so much *Tully* granteth to be true, but with exception still against their doctrine. (b) *I take (sayth he) Epicurus himselfe to be an honest man, yea and many Epicures have been and are faishfull in friendship, square and constante men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives, not by*

(f) *Instit. I. 3. 4. 23.*  
§. 14. *Si quis ita ple-  
bem compellere. Si  
non credens, ideo fit;  
quia cum divinitus  
exitio praedestinata  
estis; is non modis  
ignaviam fover, sed et-  
iam indulget mali-  
tia.*

(g) *Heift. I. 1. de  
memor. his. c. 27.  
ps. 38. Si praedestin-  
atus sum, nulla pec-  
cata proterunt mihi  
regnum coelorum au-  
ferre: Si praescitus,  
nulla opera mihi illud  
valebunt conferre.*

(b) *Cic. I. 2. de finibus  
bon. & mal pag. 117.  
Ac mihi quidem vi-  
detur quod ipse vir  
bonus fuit: & multi  
Epicure fuerunt, &  
hodiè sunt, & in ami-  
citis fideles, & in om-  
ni vita constantes &  
graves; nec volup-  
tate, sed officio con-  
filia moderantes.*

(1) Hoc viderunt ma-  
jor & honestatis, mi-  
nor voluptatis.

(2) Atq; ut ceteri  
existimantur dicere  
melis, quidam facere;  
sicut mihi videntur  
melis facere quam  
dicere.

pleasure by duty. But, (sayth he) (1) this proceeded not from the principles of their opinion, but from their own virtuous inclination; and the force of honesty by their so doing, appeared to be more prevailing in them, than the force of pleasure, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath other words to the same purpose; (2) As other mens doctrines are esteemed to be better then their deeds; so these mens deeds seeme to me to be better then their doctrines.

Like to this answer of *Tully* to the defenders of Epicurisme, will I shape mine.

It cannot (I confess) be denied, that many of this opinion are godly men; but it is no thanks to their opinion, that they are so; (the true and naturall genius of which is to beget sloth, to drowne men in security, and to countenance carnall liberty;) but to something else, eyther to Gods providence, (who will not suffer this doctrine for his own glories sake and the good of men, to have any great stroke in their lives;) or to mens incogitancy, who think not of reducing it [*ad praxim*] to practice, and drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they do of many others; or lastly, to some good practicall conclusions, which they meet with in the word of God, and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions;) such as these are for example; *Be ye holy as I am holy. Without Holiness no man shall see God. If ye consent and obey, ye shall easie the good things of the land. Godliness hath the promises of this life and of the life to come, &c.* And hence we may learne to measure this opinion, not by the lives of some few of the men that hold it, but by the sequels, which the logick even of simple men, if they should apply their braines to consider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath throughly suckt it in, and understandeth the force of it, but will eyther quite relinquish it, or live according to the naturall importment of it, that is, li-

centiously.

Secondly, it is sayd, that albeit this doctrine teacheth, That men are absolutely elected, or absolutely reprobated: yet,

(1) It tells no man who in particular is elected, who rejected.

(2) It teacheth that men must get the knowledge of their Election by good works, and so by consequent, doth rather

rather encourage, then stifle holy and honest indeavours.

For answere to the first of these; The ignorance of a mans particular state (in my judgment) doth not alter the case a jot. For he that believeth in generall, that many and they the greatest company without comparison, are inevitably ordyned to destruction, and a few others to salvation; is able out of these two generall propositions, to make these particular condicions, and to reason thus with himself: Eyther I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely cast off from both. If I be chosen, I must of necessity beleevve and be saved; if I be cast off, I must as necessarily not beleevve, and be damned.

What need I therefore take thought eyther way about meanes or end? My end is pitched in heaven and the meanes too; my finall perseverance in Faith and my Salvation, or my continuance in unbelief and my damnation. If I lye under this necessity of believving and being saved, or of dying in unbelief and being damned; in vaine doe I trouble my selfe about meanes or end, I have my *Supersedens*, I may take mine ease and so I will: enough it is for me to sit downe and wait what God will doe unto mee. Thus (it is likely) did *Tiberius* reason with himself. For *Suetonius* reports of him, that he was (1) *The more negligent in religion, because he was fully persuaded, that all things came to passe by destiny*. And in this manner (it is to be feared) doe too many reaon in their hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not perhaps acknowledge it) encourage themselves in prophaneness. Though men cannot hide their wickednes, yet they will bide their grounds, which flesht them in it, either through modesty, or to avoyd some further ignominie: *The foole hard said in his heart, there is no God. Psal. 14.*

(1) *Suet. de vit. Tiber. c. 69. p. 180.* Circa Dees & religiones negligenter, quippe addicitus Mathematicis, persuasioneque plenus omnia fato agi.

To the 2<sup>d</sup>. I answer, that men ordinarily will not thinke the getting of the knowledge of their election (if that be all) worth all those painfull duties of religion, that are to be performed, and all those sweet and pleasing sinnes which are to be relinquished, they will rest contented without it for a while, rather then pay so dearely for it: and the rather, because

1 When they have gotten it, it is in most but a weak and conjectural knowledge, obscured with many cloudes and uncertainties. (who not by blindes have) in this Religion

3 It must be mainteyned with a great deale of paines and care, or else it will be lost againe. To the retaing of it is required a continuall indeavour to keep a cleare conscience, which is irkesom and tedious. Men therefore had need of a stronger motive to obedience then this is, or else they will do nothing.

Thirdly, they that defend and teach this absolute reprobation (say they) doe earnestly exhort men to good works, and deny that any can be saved, except they live honestly.

So much was also sayd in the behalf of Epicurus, viz. That he denied that any man that lived not honestly, could live pleasantly. But *Tully* aufereth roundly: (m) *As if I cared what he affirmeth or denyeth: this I aske, what is meet for him to say who placeth happiness in pleasure.* And so it mattereth not what these men teach, but what they should teach, if they will speak consequently to their own conclusions.

(m) *Cic. offi. l. 3. pro. pe finem. Quid ego id currem quid ille ai- as aut neget? illud quo- o, quid ei qui in volupitate sumnum bonum putat, conser- taneum sit dicere.*

5<sup>th</sup> Reason.  
It is an enemy to true Comfort.

Rom. 15.4.

I Come now to my last reason against it, drawn from the *uncomfortableness* of it: it is a doctrine full of desperation, both to them which stand, and to those that are fallen, to men out of temptation, and to men in temptation,

It { leadeth into { Temptation.  
{ leaveth in {

And therefore can be no Doctrine of Gods word, for that is *euangelio*, good newes to men, a storehouse of sweet consolations for us in our [ *urbis & lucis intervallo*,] in our best and worse conditions and changes. These things are written (sayth the Apostle) *that by patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope*: implying that therefore was the word written, & left to the Church, that by the comforts comprised in it, those poore soules that look toward Heaven, might never want in any changes or chances of this mortall life, a sweet gale of hope to refresh them, and to carry-on their Ship full merily toward the Haven.

I. First, this Doctrine leadeth men into Temptation, and into such a one too, as is as sharpe and dangerous as any the Tempter hath. The Divell can easily perswade a man that maketh absolute reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of those absolute Reprobates: because there are farre more absolute Reprobates (even a hundred for one,) then absolute chosen

choseſ ones: and a man hath a great deale more reason to think that he is one of the moſt, then one of the feweſt, one of the huge multitude of inevitable castawayes, then one of that little flocke, for whom God hath preſently prepared a kingdom. Such a man is not onely capable of, but framed and foſtured by his opinion for this ſuggeſtione. Which is a ve-ry ſore one, if we may beleeve *Calvin*, *Bucer* and *Zanchius*. *Calvin* telleth us, (n) that the Devil cannot affaile a beſtever with a temptation more dangerous.

And a little after he ſayth, that it is ſo much the deadlyer, by how much comiſſioneer it is then any other.

(o) So ordinary is this temptation, that he which is at all times free from it, is a rare man. (we are to conceive that he ſpeaketh of thoſe who hold absolute Reprobaſion:) and ſo dangerous it is that if it get ſtrength, he which is under it, is either miſerably tormented, or mightily aſtoniſhed. And a little after he ſayth againe; (p) He that will not wrack his ſoule, muſt avoyd thiſ rock. *Bucer* alſo hath a paſſage like to thiſ. (q) *This doubt whether we be predeſtinate or no; muſt be repelliſed as the lead of every pernicious temptation: for he that doubteth of thiſ, cannot beleeve that he is caſted or juſtified: that is, he cannot be a Christian.* (r) Every man therefore muſt preſume upon it as a principle of his faith, that he is eleceted. (s) This very ſpeech of *Bucers*, *Zanchy* maketh all to the ſame purpoſe.

We ſee then by the teſtimonies of theſe worthy men, that thiſ temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too, to ſuch as think there be absolute Reprobates.

The truſh of both will further appeare by the example of (t) *Petrus Florenſius*, a Schoolemaſter in Hungary, who going to hang himſelf, ſignified in a writing which he left in his ſtudy for the ſatisfaction of his friends and contermen, the true cauſe of that his annaturall fact. In that writing he de-ivered theſe three things.

(t) That he was of *Calvins* and *St. Anſtins* opinion, that men are not dealt withall [ſecundum bona aut mala opera] ac-cording to their works good or evill; but that there are [oc-cultiores cauſe] more hidden cauſes of mens eternall condi-tions.

(u) That he was one of that wofull Company of absolute Reprobates; [*Was formatus in ignorantiam*] a vessel prepared to diſhon-

(s) *Calv. Iuſtit. l. 3.*  
c. 2. 4. 5. 4. Quod nul-lā tentatione vel gra-vius, vel periculosis fideles percellit Satanus.  
(o) *Raniflum est* cuius non interdum animus hac cogitatio-ne feriatur, unde tibi faſus, niſi ex Dei elec-tione? *Electio*na-utem quæ tibi re-ve-latio? quæ ſi apud quempiam ſemel in-valuit, aut diris tor-men-tis miſeris per-pe-ruſ exer-cuat, aut reddit penitus attoni-tum.

(p) Ergo ſi naufragi-um timemus, ſollicite ca-vendum ab hoc ſcopulo in quem nun-qua mias exiſio im-pingitur.

(q) *Bucer in 8. ad Rom. q. de præd.* Ve-caput: omnis noxiæ tentationis, repelliſ-da eſt haic queſtio-ni, ſuſculū predeſti-nati. Nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum ſe nec juſtificatum eſſe credere poterit, hoc eſt, nequit eſſe Christianus.

(r) *Preſumendum in-gitur ut principium fidei, nos omnes eſſe adeo preſeruos.*

(s) *Zanch. l. 5. de nat. Dei q. de præd.*

(t) *Georg. major in 2 ad Tim. 2. fol. 22099.*

## The Sublapsarian doctrine

dishonour: and that therefore (though his life had been none of the worst) he could not possibly be saved.

(3) That being unable to bear those dreadfull apprehensions of wrath, with which he was affrighted, he hang'd himself. For these are some of his last words there recorded:

(a) *Discedo igitur ad  
ligeris infernales æ-  
ternum dedecus pa-  
triz mei: Deo vos  
comendo, cuius mi-  
sericordia mihi ne-  
gata est:*

(b) *I go to those infernal lakes, an eternal reproach to my Coun-  
try. I commend you to God, whose mercy is denied to me.*

Out of this example, two things we may safely collect.

1 That men who think there are many whom God hath utterly rejected out of his onely will and pleasure, may be easily brought to think by Satans suggestion that they are of that company.

2 That this Temptation is very dangerous.

I conclude therefore this first part of my last reason, which is; That absolute Reprobation leadeth men into temptation.

II. It leaveth men in Temptation: and this it doth two wayes; by,

1 Making the tempted uncapable of true comfort.

2 Making Ministers unable to give true comfort.

1 It maketh the Tempted uncapable of true comfort: like a Gorgons head, it doth so trouble their fancies and amaze them, especially in their paroxysmes and fits, that the strongest arguments of comfort, applyed with as much art and cunning as may be, will not fasten upon them. With *David* they lay in their fear, that *all men are liars*, namely all such as come to comfort them in their temptation. The reason is, because it is an opinion incompatible with any word of comfort, that can be ministred to the distressed Soule in this temptation. Gods love to mankind, *CHRISTS* death for all men, the calling of poore sinners without exception, to repentance and salvation, with all other grounds of consolation; the tempted will easily elude with the grounds of his opinion.

Which that we may the better see, let us imagine that we heare a Minister and a Tempted Soule, reasoning in this or the like manner.

*Tempted.* **W**ho is me; I am a Cast-away: I am absolutely rejected from Grace and Glory.

*Minister.* Discourage not thy selfe thou poore afflicted soule:

**faulc.** God hath not calld thee off. For he hateth nothing that he hath made, but beareth a love to all men, and to thee among the rest.

**Tempt.** God hateth no man as he is his Creature, but hee hateth a great many as they are sinners in *Adam*. And God hath a two-fold love (as I have learned) a generall love, which putteth forth it self in outward and temporall blessings only, and with this he loveth all men : and a speciall love, by which he provideth everlasting life for men; and with this he loveth only a very few, which out of his alone will and pleasure he singled from the rest. Under this generall love am I, but not under the speciall.

**Min.** Nay but God so loveth all men, as that he desirerh their eternall good : for the Apostle sayth, *He would have all be saved, and he would have no man to perish*, nor thee in particular.

**Tempt.** ( All ) is taken two wayes : for all sorts and conditions of men, high and low, rich and poore, bound and free, &c. and for all particular men in these severall sorts and ranks. God would have all men to be saved in the first sense : that is, all sorts ; but he would not have all to be saved in the second sense, that is, all particular men of those sorts : some of my country, my calling, my condition of life, but not all and every one, nor me in particular. Or if it be true, that God would have all particular men to be saved ; yet he willetteth it only with a revealed will, not with a secret : for with that he will have millions to be damned. Under this revealed will am I, not under the secret.

**Min.** Nay but **CHRIST** came into the world to seek and to save what was lost, and is a propitiation not for our sinnes only, *viz.* the sinnes of a few particular men, or the sinnes of all sorts of men, but for the [ whole ] world. Therefore he came to save thee, and to be a propitiation for thy sinnes : for thou art one of the whole world.

**Tempt.** The [ world ] as I have heard, is taken two wayes in Scripture : largely for all mankind, and strictly in a restrai ned signification, for the elect, or for beleevers. In this latter sense, **CHRIST** dyed for the world, namely, for the world of the Elect, for the world of Beleevers. Or if it be true, that he dyed for all mankind, yet he dyed for them but after a sort : he

he dyed for them all [ *dignitate pretii* ] he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it so; but he did not dye for all [ *voluntate propriei* ] God never intended that he should lye his bloud for all and every man, but for a few selected ones onely, with whom it is my lot to be numbered.

*Adiu.* God hath founded an universall Covenant of peace with men upon the Mediator's bloud: and therefore he intended it should be shed for all men universally. He hath made a promise of salvation to every one that will beleieve, and excludeth none, that do not exclude themselves.

*Tempt.* God purposed that his Sonne should dye for all men, and that in his name should be preached and offered remission of sinnes to every one; but yet upon condition they will repent, beleieve, and doe that which hee meaneth the greatest part of men shall never doe, nor me among the rest.

*Min.* God hath a true meaning that all men who are called, should repent and beleieve; that so they might be saved; as he would have all to be saved, so he would have them come to the knowledge of the truth, and as he would have no man to perish, so he would have all men to repent; and therefore he calleth them in the preaching of the word to the one, as well as to the other.

*Tempt.* God hath a double call; an outward by the preaching of the word in mens eares; an inward by the irresistible work of the Spirit in their hearts.

The outward call is a part of Gods outward will: with that he calleth every man to beleieve: the inward and effectuall call is a part of his secret will; and with that he calleth not every man to beleieve, but a very few onely, whom he hath inevitably ordain'd to eternall life. And therefore by the outward call, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be assured of Gods good will and meaning, that I should beleieve, repent and be saved.

By this we may see, that no sound comfort can be fastned upon a poore soule rooted in this opinion, when he lyeth under this horrible Temptation.

The example of *Francis Spiera* an *Italian Lawyer*, will give some further light and prooфе to this. This *Spiera* about the

the yeare 1543. against his knowledge and conscience, did openly abjare his Religion and subscribe to Popery, that thereby he might preserve his life, and goods, and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deepe distresse of conscience, out of which he could never wrestle, but ended his woffull dayes in despaire.

To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note, but against all the comforts which they applied to him, hee appoaled two things especially.

(1) The *greatnesse* of his sinne : it was a sinne (sayd he) of a deep dye, committed with many urging and aggravating circumstances : and therefore could not be forgiven. This argument they quickly took from him, and convinced him by the example of *Peter*, that there was nothing in his sinne, that could make it irremissible. *Peter* that committed the same sinne, and with some more odious circumstances, repeated and was pardoned, and so (nodoubt) might he.

(2) He appoaled his absolute *Reprobation*, and with that he put off all their comforts. *Peter* (sayth he) repented indeed and was pardoned, because he was elected : as for me I was utterly rejected before I was borne ; and therefore I cannot possibly repent or be saved. If any man be elected, he shall be saved, though he have committed sinnes, for number many, and haynous in degree : but if he be [*ex repudiatis*] one of the *Cast-awayes*, [*necessario condemnabatur*] he shall be inevitably condemned, though his sinnes be small and few. (w) A Reprobate must be damned, *be his sinnes many or few, great or little, because Gods mercy and CHRISTs merits belong not to him.*

In this Story (recorded by *Carlius Secundus* and *Calvin* with some others who lived at that time and wrote of it to their friends;) as in a glasse we may see the disconsolate condition of a poore Soule, that is strongly conceited that the greatest part of the world are absolute Reprobates, and that he is one of them : he sticketh so fast in the myre and clay, that he can very hardly be drawne out.

3 It maketh Ministers unable to afford true comfort to the Tempted ; and this it doth, because it —

1 Taketh from them all solid grounds of comfort.

2 Leaveth them onely weak and insufficent grounds.

(w) *Nihil interest an multa, an pauca, an magna, an parva sint, quando nec Dei misericordia, nec Christi sanguis, quam ad eos pertinet*

(x) *Melancth. loc. com. P. 52. ad Pred. Et si malum disputatur dum tamen necesse est in vero agone ad hanc arcem confugere, videlicet, quod si de voluntate dei iudicandum sit ex prelio verbo, & quod promissio sit universalis, & quod sit mandatum Dei aeternum & immutabile, audire filium & assentiri promissio- ni.*

(y) *Obtemperemus igitur ne vagentur animi querentes electionem extra verbum, & relicto Christo & omni mandato de amplectenda promissione; sed teneamus certam & indubitata fidem promitione gratiae non inanem esse fabulam; sed Deum vere patefuisse voluntate suam in promissione, & verè praestare quod promisit.*

(z) *P. 230. de prom. Evang. Sicut est necesse: sicut Evangelium est promissio gratiarum, ita necesse est sicut Evangelium promissionem universale esse. Hanc universale tenere necesse est ad. versus periculosa imaginaciones depraedatione, ne dis- putemus hanc promissionem ad paucos quosdam alios pertinere, non pertinere.*

1 It bereaveth them of all solid arguments of comfort, which are these; The universtality of Gods love, of CHRISTs death, and of the new Covenant of grace. That Minister which doth explaine and apply these three things soundly and wisely to him which is tempted in this kinde, doth that which is abundantly enough for the releaving and releasing of him from this Temptation. And he that doth not apply these, leaveth him as he found him, in the midst of the Temptation still; whatsoever may be sayd to the contrary in the heate of Disputation. (x) Though (sayth Melancthon) there be many things dispensed in this point more harshly; yet when all is done, the universall promise of Grace and Salvation is a Christians onely Bulwark in this temptation and combatte. (y) Let us not therefore (sayth he) leave CHRIST and seek for an Election out of the Word: but let us judge of Gods will of saving men by the promise and commandement, which are both universall. And in another place of the same Book he hath these words. (z) *As it is needfull to know that the promise of Salvation is free: so it is needfull to know that it is universall, against some dangerous conceits of Predestination.*

By these speeches we see clearely what this learned man thought to be the true balm of Gilead, wherby a wouded soule should be cured; viz. The universality of the promise, and of Gods love and of CHRISTs death; for they all hang together, and cannot be dis-joyned.

The reason why those grounds are able to helpe a man in such a case, is two-fold.

1 Because they are directly contradictory to the temptation: a will to save all, a giving of CHRIST to death for all, a serious offer of grace to all, cannot possibly stand with an absolute antecedent will and intent of casting away the greatest part of mankind, or to say the truth, of any one man in the world. Upon this followeth the second reason.

2 Because they serve to convince the Tempted, that he cannot be in that condition, in which he supposeth himselfe to be. For if two contraditories cannot be true, he that convinceth the truth of the one, convinceth the understanding of the untruth of the other: and he that maketh it appeare that this contradictory, [ God would have all to bee saved, ad nos. Non enim dubium est, quin omnian animos sit; cogitatio ex- redet.

redeemed and called, to repent and beleevē] is true ; putteth it out of all doubt to the understanding, that the other contradictory [God will have most men to be absolutely and inevitably damned] must needs be false, and so rayseth up that poore soule which was pressed downe with an erronius conceit and feare, that it was true. In this manner did *Iunius*, (though not in the same temptation) releeve a woman perplexed exceedingly with a strong perswasion, that she and all her children should be damned ; because she was busied about her children at a certain time when she should have been at Masse. *Junius* maketh short work with her, telleth her, that her imployment about her children was a duty pleasing to God, but the Masse was a meere will-worship : and so (delivering her of her error upon which the temptation was built,) giveth her present ease and comfort. In like manner tell a man who feareth himself to be an absolute Reprobate, that there are no such absolute Reprobates, and that his feare is but a meete fancy and his doubt a dreame ; convince him once by contradictory grounds, that there is no man in the world in that state in which he thinketh himselfe to be, and you drive out one nayle by another, and expell the temptation. These are the sword of *Alexander*, which will cut aunder this Gordion knot of absolute Reprobation ; and these are the true Nepenthes of a sicke and sorrowfull soule.

But now these true grounds of hope and comfort no Minister can make use of, that holdeth absolute Reprobation : nor if he do usurp them, can he possibly mainteyne them against the replies of the tempted, unlesse he relinquish his opinion ; because (as I have sayd) there is a plaine contradiction between them, and no man is able to maintain two propositions, which speak contrary things, to be both true, any more then he can make it good, that the same thing may have a being, and no being at the same time. For example. A minister commeth to comfort a man that thinketh himselfe to be an absolute Reprobate, and how doth he set about it ? He telleth him, that God would have all to be saved, that C H R I S T dyed for all, &c.

But what right hath he to these grounds of comfort seeing he holdeth the contrary conclusions, viz. that God will have

a great many to be damned, and to have no part in C H R I S T ? Well: he usurpeth them notwithstanding; but is he able to maintaine them against the answers of the tempted? or can he make a good reply. No certainly, for thus answereth the tempted, God would have all to be saved with a revealed, but not with a secret will: and C H R I S T dyed for all men sufficiently, but not intentionally, or if God did intend that hee should dye for all, yet he intended it upon a condition, which he purposed the most should never performe.

What can the Minister reply to this? If he will make a direct reply, which shall take away the answer, he must deny that God hath two wills, the one opposite to the other, a secret will that many shall unavoidably be damned, and a revealed will that all men may be possibly saved. And he must also deny, that God had an intent, that C H R I S T should not dye for a great many, or that he intended he should dye for all upon condition, they would beleevre or repent, and yet purpose that the most should never beleevre or repent. But can he deny these things? he cannot, except he deny his owne conclusion, which is, that there are many thousands eternally and unavoidably rejected in Gods absolute purpose from grace and glory. For that conclusion is all one with the answers of the Tempted, and contradictory to those arguments of comfort, which he is glad to make use of.

Absolute Reprobation therefore bereaveth that Minister who beleeveth it, of all solid grounds of consolation, and so maketh him unable to recover a poore Soule wounded with this temptation.

Secondly, it leaveth a Minister some weak grounds onely and insufficient to quiet the tempted: and therefore it maketh him unable to comfort him.

The grounds which it leaveth him, are insufficient, because they cannot convince, and make it evident to the understanding of the Tempted, that he is not that which hee feareth: that is, a Reprobate. Out of temptation probabilities will uphold a mans hopes (as they did Manoahs wives, *Judg. 13. 22. 23.* If the Lord would kill me, he would not have received a burnt offering at our bands, nor shewed us all these things;) because men are not so mistrustfull then: but in temptation men are usually very suspicious and incredulous,

like

like *Zach* who would not be perswaded that *Joseph* was alive, and a great man in *Egypt*; till he saw the Chariots that were sent to fetch him thither. *Gen. 45. 25.* And like *Thome*, who would not beleevve that *CHRIST* was risen, till he saw the print of the nayles and speare. *Job. 20. 25.* They will not beleevve any thing that is spoken for their comfort, till it be made so apparent, that they have nothing to say to the contrary.

My selfe have knowne some, who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofs, to their protestations, nay to their oathes too, before they would beleevve their words of comfort. And in this temptation (we speake of) men are strongly possest with the feare of eternall refection from the face of God, that they will not easily without manifest conviction beleevve the contrary.

But grounds coavincing and satisfying, a Minister that maintaineth absolute Reprobation, hath not in store: nothing can he say, that is able to make it appeare infallibly and undeniably to the understanding of the Tempted, that hee is no absolute Reprobate. All that he can say, is, Be of good comfort: you are a Believer, a truly repenting sinner: therefore no Reprobate. For faith and repentance are infallible fruits of Election, and arguments of a state contrary to what you feare. But this the Tempted will deny: he will say, that he is no believer, &c. and how will the Minister convince him that he is? He must prove to him by the outward acts of Faith and Repentance, (for they onely are apparent to him;) that he doth repent and beleevve.

But this prooife is not demonstrative, nor doth convince, because [ *opera virtutum simulari possunt* ] the external acts of Faith, Repentance, or any other grace may be counterfeited. The Divell may seem to be an Angell of light, Wolves may go in Sheepe's clothing, *Judas* may make the world beleev by his preaching and following of *CHRIST*, that he is a true Apostle; and *Simon Magus* though he remaine in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity, may be thought by his receiving of baptism, to be a true believer: and so may any hypocrite by some exterior acts of Faith and Repentance delude the best discerner of spirits among men, and gaine the opinion and esteem of a true penitent and belie-

ver. Actions externally good, or good in appearance, may be evill indeed for want of a good rule, manner, end, or some other good circumstances, with which an action that is good must be clothed. For [ *bonum non oritur nisi ex integris* : ] and so by good consequence cannot certainly prove the man who doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of Faith, Repentance, or any other truely planted in his heart.

Which being so, I say, that a Minister cannot by the outward acts and fruits of faith, and Repentance which he seeth come from him, make it evident to the Tempted ( to the silencing of all replies ; ) that he is without doubt a true believer and repenting sinner and consequently no Reprobate. For still the Tempted may say, you may be deceived in me: for you cannot see any thing more in me, then hath been seene in many a Reprobate. And if this be all you can say, to prove me to be none; I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate:nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Phyfitian of no value.

This that I say, *Piscator* doth confess ingeniously in *Dissens. de Pred. contra Schafmanu*: thes. 85: where he sayth,

1 That no comfort can be possibly infilled into the soules of Reprobates afflicted with this horrible temptation: from whence it followeth, that the farre greatest part of men, even an hundred for one must beare their burden, (if they fall into this distemper and trouble,) as well as they can: the Gospell is not able to afford them any solid comfort.

2 That the Elect being in this condition, may indeed be comforted, but it must be by their sense of sinne and theyr desire to be freed of it by **CHRIST**: which proofs are but onely probable to the best, and to a man in temptation no proofs at all: and consequently either no comforts or very small ones.

In the end of the same *Thesis* also, where he sayth, that a man should reason thus with himselfe; Grace is offered to some with a mind of communicating it unto them: therefore it may be that I am one of those to whom it is so offered. In this place (I say) he implyeth plainly, that the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth the communication of grace to a very few only, affordeth but a [ *fieri potest* ] a peradventure I am Elected (and that a very poore one too) for a poore soule to comfort himselfe withall.

**FINIS.**

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